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A good deal of discussion, from a variety of vantage points, ad-
dresses the need to "reform" (a word translated in a myriad of ways)
the federal COUItS. But commonplace predicates in this discussion are
problematic because many of them fail to take into account how much
the context has changed.
First, the often-invoked description of the federal courts as com-
prised of a three-tiered pyramid of courts fails to capture the sprawling
structure into which the federal judicial system, consisting of courts,
agencies, and private-affiliated decision makers, has evolved. Second,
that description does not comprehend the large-scale, aggregate litiga-
tions to which judges now have to respond. Third, the nature of the
decision making process itself has been altered; the pretrial phase at
the trial level has taken on greater importance, and alternative dispute
resolution has become a part of both trial and appellate court
processes. A fourth difficulty is that the premise of state and federal
courts as boundt::d and distinct is being undermined in practice; judges
and lawyers are inventing ways to join the systems together under the
rubric of what is now termed judicial federalism. Yet another limit
comes from laclmae about information on current use of the federal
courts.
But so often have traditions been rehearsed - of the three-tiered
federal pyramid (constructed by the way only a hundred years ago'),
1. The original structure of 1789 provided that Supreme Court justices joined district
judges in sitting as appellate courts; no right of appeal attached in all instances. The
creation of a separate intermediate appellate court between trial and Supreme Court and of a
right of appellate review occurred by a series of enactments from 1891 to 1925. See Act of
March 3, 1891 (Evarts Act), ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (establishing circuit courts of appeal and
appointing additional drcuit judges but continuing the nisi prius jurisdiction of those courts);
Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1087 (abolishing circuit courts and transferring
their jurisdiction to the district courts); Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936 (Judges
Bill) (requiring the use of intermediate appellate judges and establishing generally
discretionary review at the Supreme Court level). See generally FELIX FRANKFURTER &
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of only life tenured federal judges, of bipolar litigation, of trials as
central, and of discrete and territorially-bounded roles for the state and
federal system - that the description persists despite the changing
realities.2
The purpose of this essay, and of the ongoing project of which it
is a part,3 is to help reframe current discussions of "the federal courts"
in the hopes of altering contemporary arrangements and the imagined
future of adjudicatory activities within the United States. Below I
specify how descriptions of federal courts miss a good deal of today's
function and practice. Thereafter, I analyze allocations of jurisdictional
authority between state and federal courts as proposed by a 1995
"Long Range Plan" from a federal judicial committee.4 The underlying
premise of long range planning is that dramatic changes do and could
further undermine the ability of the federal courts to function. Yet the
1995 Proposed Plan's recommendations reiterate familiar themes, evi-
dencing a preservationist commitment to maintaining the special status
that the life tenured judiciary has enjoyed.
JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BusINESS OF 1HE SUPREME COURT, A STUDY IN 1HE FEDERAL
JUDICIAL SYSTEM 103-145 (1928).
2. In some respects, courts have come to resemble what Morton Grodzins described
as the "chaotic" structure of United States government MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN
SYSTEM 3-4 (Daniel 1. Elazar ed., 1966) (not only describing the "multitude of govern-
ments" but also that "[t]here is no neat division of functions among them").
3. See Judith Resnik, Rereading "The Federal Courts": Revising the Domain of
Federal Courts Jurisprudence at the End of the Twentieth Century, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1021
(1994) [hereinafter Resnik, Rereading "The Federal Courts"]; Judith Resnik, Whose Judg-
ment? Vacating Judgments, Preftrences of Settlement and the Role of Adjudication at the
Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1471 (1994) [hereinafter Resnik, Whose
Judgment?]; Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation," LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Sum-
mer 1991, at 5 [hereinafter Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation"]; Judith Resnik, House-
keeping: The Nature and Allocation of Work in Federal Trial Courts, 24 GA. L. REv. 909
(1990) [hereinafter Resnik, Housekeeping]; Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian
Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 671 (1989) [hereinafter Resnik,
Dependent Sovereigns].
4. See COMMITIEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF 1HE
UNITED STATES, PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR 1HE FEDERAL COURTS (March, 1995)
[hereinafter 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN]; see also COMMITIEE ON LONG RANGE
PLANNING, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF 1HE UNITED STATES, PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN
FOR 1HE FEDERAL COURTS 18 (Nov. 1, 1994) (draft for public comment) [hereinafter 1994
DRAFT PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN]. As of this writing (the fall of 1995), a final version
of the plan is to be published this winter.
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An animating assumption of the Long Range Plan is that what has
been within the: jurisdictional preserve of the state courts should not,
absent special justification, become a matter for federal court jurisdic-
tion. At the same time, the planners propose de-accessing parts of what
has been within. federal jurisdictional terrain. In their explanations, the
planners often claim that jurisdictional history supports their proposals.
But their reliance on historical practices as guides to the future of
federal jurisdiction is problematic, in part because the jurisdictional
history is itself varied and complex, and in part because one way to
view that history is that it supports federal expansion rather than con-
traction.
Not surprisingly, therefore, proponents of particular visions of
federal court jurisdiction disown some traditions and embrace others.
For example, the Proposed Long Range Plan seeks to reduce federal
jurisdiction over one longstanding category of cases - diversity -
and ignores another, federal jurisdiction to enforce individual rights
conferred by Congress. Missing from the planning is much by way of
explanation of the normative arguments that inevitably underlie under-
standings of the role of a life tenured judiciary as contrasted to the
many other judicial actors, including state judges, federal magistrate,
bankruptcy, and administrative judges, all of whom lack life tenure but
regularly render judgments.
Of course, invocation of historical practices as a basis for contem-
porary decision making is not without its attractions - as a means of
attempting to draw principles from practice and to avoid imposition of
normative judgments not anchored in shared assumptions. But given the
breadth of federal jurisdictional history, it becomes difficult to use it as
a limiting principal. There is no escaping the selection among historical
practices, of emphasizing some and distancing oneself from others, of
frankly asking why one has fixed on a particular set of practices as
specially instructive for contemporary problems. The basic questions,
when considering allocation among judicial actors within the United
States, are questions of federalism.
My purpose here is to begin to respond to the broad issue of how
theories and aspirations for federalism affect the deployment of judges.
I reject what might be termed either a "categorical" or an "essentialist"
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federalism approach, which ascribes to states and the federal govern-
ment particular activities as intrinsically belonging to them. Political
scientists have long embraced metaphors like "marble cake,"5 "picket
fences,"6 and "matrixes,,7 to capture the interdependent governance of
local, state, and national institutions. Lawyers and judges have been
slower to see the webs and connections that make problematic claims
of a priori distinctive functions of the various levels of government
and their courts.
Under my "non-categorical" approach, discussion of federal and
state jurisdiction acknowledges the variety of jurisdictional
arrangements that lace United States history and appreciates the
necessarily fluid and changing understandings of federal and state
boundaries. Whatever the mandates of either court system, one should
see the potential for their transient quality, that neither federal nor state
jurisdiction need be what it has or has not been before.
Further, by pushing current developments of judicial federalism to
the fore, and focusing on the interdependent court systems in which
state and federal judges work together on litigation that sprawls across
jurisdictions, the possibilities of other arrangements among court actors
become conceivable. To give one illustration of where a non-categori-
cal analysis might lead, I suggest consideration of a set of courts that
are neither state nor federal but have authority over disputes that in-
volve litigants of more than one state. Such national courts (as con-
trasted with federal courts) would join other institutions that are
national associations of state-based actors and that reflect the
increasingly common phenomenon of inevitably overlapping work
among actors empowered by municipal, state, tribal and/or federal
governments.8
5. GRODZINS, supra note 2.
6. Deil S. Wright, Revenue Sharing and Structural Features of Federalism, 419 AN-
NALS 100, 109-10 (1975) [hereinafter Wright, Revenue Sharing].
7. DANIEL J. ELAZER, EXPLORING FEDERALISM 37, 200 (1987).
8. See, for example, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, the National Conference of State Legislators, the National Association of Attorneys
General, the National League of Cities, the National Governors' Association, and the United
States Conference of Mayors, discussed infra notes 321-27 and accompanying text
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I do not advance this proposal as the ultimate answer to issues of
federalism; I do not believe any such answer exists or that relationships
among the participants in United States federalism will remain static.
What I do belileve is that, whether by the creation of inter-state, non-
federal courts or by other means, it is time to depart from the history
of dichotomous alternatives (of either state or federal courts) and of
essentialized images (of both state and federal courts) and to imagine
new institutional arrangements that embody the interdependence of
judicial actors and that serve the adjudicatory needs of the participants
in the many systems of justice within the United States.
II. THE PERENNIAL TOPIC: FEDERAL JUDICIAL AUTHORITY
Federal jurisdiction is once again a "hot" topic. Conversation -
both popular and scholarly - has been prompted by several events of
which I will flag just a few. On the criminal side, Congress has ex-
tended federal jurisdiction to embrace crimes such as "carjacking"9 and
gun possession by juveniles.10 Further, by increasing penalties for a
variety of drug·-related offenses,l1 Congress has created incentives for
federal and state prosecutors to seek federal indictments. 12 Federal
9. Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-519, § 101(b), 106 Stat. 3384 (cur-
rent version at 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994)).
10. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §
110201, 108 Stat. 1796, 2010 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(x)(2) (1994)); see also Michael
deCourcy Hinds, Bush Aides Push State Gun Cases into U.S. Courts, N.Y. TIMES, May 17,
1991, at AI.
11. Penalties for the distribution, sale, and manufacturing of drugs have increased sub-
stantially over the last few decades. Congress enacted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Pre-
vention and Control Act of 1970, under which first time offenders convicted of distribution,
sale, or manufacturing of Schedule I or II narcotics faced a maximum sentence of 15 years
and a maximum fine of $25,000; there was no mandatory minimum sentence. Pub. L. No.
91-513, § 401(b)(I)(A), 84 Stat 1236, 1261. After Congress enacted the Narcotics Penalties
and Enforcement Act of 1986, such an offender faced a sentence range of a minimum of
ten years to life, and fines of up to $4,000,000. Narcotics Penalties and Enforcement Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1002, 100 Stat 3207-2 (current version at 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(I)(A) (1994)).
12. See Dennis E. Curtis, Congressional Powers and Federal Judicial Burdens, 46
HASTINGS LJ. 1019 (1995), and the Symposium, Federalization of Crime: The Roles of the
Federal and State Governments in the Criminal Justice System, 46 HASTINGS LJ. 965
(1995).
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judges report a docket skewed by what they believe to be a surplus of
criminal cases, 13 and bemoan what has come to be called the
"federalization of crime."14 The United States Supreme Court has
recently held one such grant of jurisdiction unconstitutional. IS
13. Scholars debate the impact of the recent wave of filings; whether the percentage
of criminal cases nationwide has increased depends upon the benchmark used. Compare Rory
K. Little, Myths and Principles of Federalization, 46 HASTINGS LJ. 1029, 1031, 1040
(1995) (reporting skepticism about docket overload and commenting that, while federal
"criminal case filings have fluctuated over time," they have "remained basically steady for
sixty years") with Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define
the Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS LJ. 979, 983 (1995)
(arguing that an "explosion of new federal criminal statutes" has imposed a cost and that
the "increasing criminal caseload threatens to impair the quality of . . . justice").
Professor Little relied on the number of criminal cases per judge, the increased role
in criminal cases of federal magistrate judges who augment the workforce of the federal
courts, and geographic differences in tenns of effects of criminal filings to conclude that "it
is simply a myth that federal criminal case filings have skyrocketed." However, he believed
that the "character" of the cases, in which prosecutions have "shifted dramatically toward
larger numbers of narcotics and weapons offenses," had changed. Little, supra, at 1043.
Professor Beale disagreed, claiming that the "real impact of the criminal docket" is the pro-
portion of judicial resources that criminal cases take rather than their absolute numbers.
Beale shared with Little a view that the nature of the cases have changed as well. Beale,
supra, at 984.
As of 1994, after a prior decade of growth, both the number of criminal filings and
the number of criminal defendants declined in 1994 and 1993. Filings per judgeship also
declined to about 70 per life tenured judge. Yet the length of trials by jury and the number
of multi-defendant cases has increased in recent years. 1994 REPORT OF TIlE DIRECTOR OF
TIlE ADMINISlRATlVE OFFICE OF TIlE UNTIED STAlES COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF TIlE
UNITED STAlES COURTS 9-11 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 AO REPORT]. For further discussion
of the effects of changes in the criminal docket, see David L. Cook, Steven R. Schlesinger,
Thomas J. Bak & William T. Rule, II, Criminal CaseLoad in U.S. District Courts: More
Than Meets the Eye, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 1579 (1995) (arguing that the changing nature of
the caseload is underappreciated when only filings are considered); Terence Dunworth &
Charles D. Weisselberg, Felony Cases and the Federal Courts: The Guidelines Experience,
66 S. CAL. L. REv. 99, 131, 133 (1992) (analyzing criminal trial rates by kind of offense
and filings by districts). For discussion of judicial perceptions of particular kinds of cases as
burdensome, see Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 837, 951-62 (1984).
14. See generally WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER & RUSSELL R. WHEELER. ON TIlE FEDER-
ALIZATION OF TIlE ADMINISlRATION OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (FJC, 1994) (summa-
rizing arguments for and against "federalization").
15. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct 1624 (1995) (invalidating the provision making
it a federal crime to have a gun within 1000 feet of a school yard), discussed infra notes
260-72 and accompanying text
HeinOnline -- 98 W. Va. L. Rev. 178 1995-1996
178 WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:171
On the civil side, the nature of the federal docket and the tasks of
federal judges have also changed in recent years. One highly visible
pocket of litigation comes from lawsuits involving thousands of claims
about products such as asbestos and breast implants; these lawsuits
prompt questions about how to handle a myriad of interrelated civil
complaints, numbering from the tens of thousands to millions. 16
Atop a changing docket, the federal judicial mandate has also been
revised. In 1990, Congress charged the judiciary with developing "civil
justice reform" to speed decision making and to lessen its expense;
Congress urged. judges to rely on managerial modes and alternative
dispute resolution in such efforts. 17 The 1994 Congress created new
causes of action, such as protection for persons injured by a "crime of
violence motivated by genderms and for persons seeking to use clinics
providing reproductive services including abortions. 19 The more
recently elected 1995 Congress has before it yet other agendas. One
effort would change the status of federally-funded assistance programs
to make current "entitlements" discretionary and thus divest recipients
of rights enforceable in federal court.20 Other proposed legislation, the
16. See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 416 (l.P.M.L.
1991) (then over 26,000 federal cases); Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246,
261 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (involving "future" asbestos claims, estimated to be in the "tens of
thousands"); In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig. (Lindsey v. Dow Corning
Corp.) (MOL 926), No. CV94-P-1l558-S, 1994 WL 578353 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994) (in-
volving claims about the safety of more than 2 million breast implants and the viability of
a proposed settlement in light of the bankruptcy of one of the defendants); see also Milo
Geyelin & Timothy D. Schellhardt, Dow Corning Seeks Chapter JJ: Shield Clouding Status
of Breast-Implant Pact, WALL ST. 1., May 16, 1995, at A3.
17. The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, Tit. I, 104 Stat. 50
89 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994».
18. The Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-122, § 40302, 108
Stat. 1902, 1941 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A § 13981(c) (West Supp. 1995».
19. The Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 punishes any person who,
"by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally injures, intimidates or
interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with any person because that
person is or has bel~n, or in order to intimidate such person or any other person or any
class of persons from, obtaining or providing reproductive health services," and creates a
civil cause of action for any person so injured, including compensatory and punitive
damages, or an alternative fixed damages amount of $5,000. Pub. L. No. 103-259, 108 Stat.
694 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 248(a)(l), 248(c)(I)(A)-(B) (1994».
20. Welfare Transformation Act of 1995, H.R. 4, § 302, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
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"Common Sense Legal Act,"21 seeks to curb litigation and alter rules
on legal fees, including requiring losers to pay winners in some
instances.22
Not surprisingly, the federal judiciary has also sought to articulate
a comprehensive view of the shape of its own work. The Judicial Con-
ference of the United States commissioned a project of "long range
planning" in an effort to set goals for the federal COurtS.23 This work
represents an important initiative by the federal judiciary - contem-
plating the changing demands made on the federal courts and
considering how to formulate structural responses. In November of
1994, the federal judiciary's Long Range Planning Committee issued a
draft report that described its "nightmarish" picture of rising numbers
of federal cases and overburdened federal judges and set forth
responses.24 After soliciting comments and holding hearings,25 the
(Version 3, March 30, 1995).
21. H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), and H.R. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995).
22. H.R. 10, § 101 (version 4, Feb. 13, 1995) (proposing to amend 28 U.S.C. § 1332
to require losers to pay winners' reasonable attorneys fees not to exceed the amount of the
loser's fees, or a reasonable fee if the loser is on a contingency fee arrangement).
23. See 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4; 1994 DRAFT PROPOSED
LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4. This project is the second recent effort to contemplate
the future of the federal courts. In 1988 Congress chartered the Federal Courts Study Com-
mittee to "make a complete study of the courts of the United States" and "to develop a
long-range plan for the judicial system." Federal Courts Study Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702,
102 Stat 4644-45 (1988) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 331 note (1994». In 1990 that
group issued its report, which shared many assumptions with that of the Long Range Plan
and which included some proposals similar to those of the Long Range Plan. Both reports
also called for ongoing mechanisms for planning itself. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF TIlE
UNIlED STAlES, FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITIEE, REPORT OF TIlE FEDERAL COURTS
STUDY COMMITIEE 146-48 (Apr. 2, 1990) [hereinafter FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITIEE
REpORT]; 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 135-36; 1994 DRAFT PRO-
POSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 114-15.
Several jurists have also considered the scope of federal court jurisdiction and urged
modifications. See, e.g., HENRy J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW, 1-
14, 197-98 (1973) (describing both a "minimal" and "maximum" model of jurisdiction and
arguing for the curtailment of certain jurisdictional provisions to enable the federal courts to
do the "great work for which they are uniquely equipped") [hereinafter FRIENDLY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION]; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985)
(arguing that a crisis of volume requires substantially limiting the federal courts' jurisdiction)
[hereinafter POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS].
24. 1994 DRAFT PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 16. See Robert Pear,
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Committee presented a revised report in March of 1995 to the Judicial
Conference of the United States.26
Although not all federal judges agree with the Long Range
Plan,27 the draft and the revised monograph provide a distillation of
Judges Proposing to Narrow Access to Federal Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1994, at AI.
25. In December of 1994, the Long Range Planning Committee held public hearings in
Phoenix, Chicago, and Washington D.C., and received written commentary; I testified at the
Washington hearings. See Testimony of Professor Judith Resnik (submitted Dec. 9, 1994) (on
file with the author); see also Judith Resnik, National Courts: Imagining Alternatives to
State and Federal Courts, USC LAW, Spring 1995, at 2 (magazine of the University of
Southern California Law Center); and in Judith Resnik, To Handle the Overload, Create a
National Court, NAT'L L.J. Jan. 30, 1995, A21, A23. The Department of Justice filed com-
ments in January of 1995, and opposed the Plan's insistence on attempting to limit fedeml
court jurisdiction. See Comments of the Department of Justice on the Proposed Long Range
Plan for the Fedeml Courts at 2-6, 9-10 (Jan. 14, 1995) (on file with the author).
26. 1995 PRoPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at vii. The Judicial Conference
"approved" the recommendations of the plan, subject to members of the Judicial Conference
delaying adoption of any particular recommendation by requesting prior to April 11, 1995
that such proposals be sent to committees of the Conference for "further study and report to
the September 1995 Judicial Conference." Letter "To All Interested Parties," from L. Ralph
Mecham, in his capacity as Secretary to the Judicial Conference of the United States (March
15, 1995). By that procedure, almost a half of the 101 recommendations were identified for
"further study," including many relating to the scope of fedeml jurisdiction, both civil and
criminal, the role of bankruptcy and magistmte judges, and changes at the appellate level.
See Action Notice, 60 Fed. Reg. 30,317 (June 8, 1995) [hereinafter Action Notice]. In my
discussion hereafter of specific proposals, I will note whether they have been deferred
pursuant to this prol:ess or have been, as of June 8, 1995, approved, effective April 12,
1995. See Action Notice, supra; 1995 PRoPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4.
In September of 1995, a third document relating to the Long Range Plan was pub-
lished; the Judicial Conference provided a list of recommendations that were approved, as
modified, with proposed methods of implementation. That listing included 93 recommenda-
tions (some of which have numbers different than those in the March, 1995 plan), and
about half of the recommendations are accompanied by an asterisk, indicating changes made
by the Judicial Confhence from the text submitted by the Long Range Plan. See JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF TIlE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR TIlE FEDERAL COURTS: PLAN
RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES (September 1995). Some of the pro-
posed March Recommendations were not accepted in September; this essay, however, de-
scribes the reports as of the spring of 1995.
27. See, e.g., Statement of the Honomble Stephen Reinhardt (submitted Dec 7, 1994)
(criticizing the Committee's efforts to limit fedeml rights enforcement mther than to design
means by which to respond to the needs for national law enforcement) (on file with the
author) [hereinafter Reinhardt Statement]; Statement of the Honomble Joseph F. Weis, Jr.
(submitted Dec. 9, 1994) (agreeing with many of the proposals and urging that the Commit-
tee expand district court authority to review appeals from fedeml agency adjudication) (on
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what many federal judges believe should be the role of the federal
courts. While ever-conscious of Congress' constitutional mandate to
shape federal jurisdictional boundaries,28 the plan puts forth arguments
about why other branches of the federal government should constrain
their aspirations for federal judicial work.
A central premise of the Long Range Plan is that the federal
courts - "national courts of limited jurisdiction operating within a sys-
tem of federalism" - are distinct from other judicial institutions in the
United States and that such distinctions should be maintained.29 The
plan ascribes to the federal judiciary the "core values,,30 of the "rule
file with the author) [hereinafter Weis Statement]; Statement of the Honorable Jon O.
Newman (submitted Dec. 9, 1994) (agreeing with much of the approach but arguing that
further limits be placed on access to the federal courts by authorizing "discretionary access,"
the ability of judges to exercise discretion to decline to hear particular civil cases) (on file
with the author) [hereinafter Newman Statement]; see also Action Notice, supra note 26
(conference members called for additional study of various recommendations).
28. See 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 2 ("Congress sets the
courts' budgets and the scope of federal jurisdiction .... "); 1994 DRAFT PROPOSED LONG
RANGE PLAN, supra note 15, at 1 ("Congress controls the courts' budgets and the scope of
federal jurisdiction .... "). A similar note was struck by the Chief Justice in his 1994
year-end report. See Chief Justice Rehnquist Reflects on J994 in Year-End Report, THIRD
BRANCH, Jan. 1995, at 1, 2 (Congress creates the federal courts except the Supreme Court,
sets the jurisdiction, determines the substantive law to be applied, regulates procedure, and
appropriates money, but judicial commentary is appropriate on "wages, hours, and working
conditions," as well as on procedural rules, consequences of reform, sentencing, and jurisdic-
tional assignments). For further discussion of the dialogue between the federal judiciary and
Congress, see Symposium, Federal Judicial Independence, 46 MERCER L. REv. 637 (1995).
Both scholars and case law debate the actual boundaries set by Article III, § 2. See
generally Lawrence G. Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to
Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REv. 17 (1981); Robert N.
Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original
Understanding of Article III, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 741 (1984); Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-
Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L.
REv. 205 (1985).
29. 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 6 ("Federal courts have
served the nation well because they are special purpose courts, designed and equipped to
adjudicate small numbers of disputes involving important national interests"; the "mission"
includes "a commitment to conserving the federal courts as a distinctive judicial forum of
limited jurisdiction . . . leaving to the state courts the responsibility for adjudicating matters
that, in the light of history and a sound division of authority, rightfully belong there.");
1994 DRAFT PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 4 (same).
30. 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 5 (chapter entitled
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of law," "equal justice," ')udicial independence," "excellence," and
"accountability."3 1 The plan also discusses aspirations for the provision
of equal, affordable, and accessible justice.32
According to the Long Range Plan, a central problem is that the
federal courts have a large caseload with more in store.33 The plan-
ners see the federal judiciary as in need of protection to accomplish its
tasks; that, while the size of the federal judiciary might grow a bit,
expansion from the approximately 830 life tenured judges to 4,000 is,
in their view, highly undesirable.34 The Long Range Plan presents an
overall picture of too many cases,3s too much need for judgment, too
"Conserving Core Values, Yet Preserving Flexibility"); 1994 DRAFT PROPOSED LONG RANGE
PLAN, supra note 4, at 3 (same title).
31. 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 7-8; 1994 DRAFT PROPOSED
LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 5-6 (same except that proposed draft did not discuss
the "rule of law").
32. 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 103-04; 1994 DRAFT PRO-
POSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 87 (discussed in both drafts in chapters entitled
"The Federal Courts and Society").
33. 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 9-15; 1994 DRAFT PRO-
POSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 7-13.
34. 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 18-19; 1994 DRAFT PRO-
POSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 16. For a view that such an approach is deeply
misguided and that the only way to "preserve the fundamental purposes and functions" of
the federal judiciary is to expand it, see Reinhardt Statement, supra note 27, at 2.
35. 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 9-15, 18-20; 1994 DRAFT
PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 11-13, 16-18. Both documents rely on pro-
jections on case filings. Projecting litigation rates, which are affected by a host of variables
from the numbers and methods of payment of lawyers, congressional enactment of legisla-
tion, to the commencement of wars, is a difficult activity; projections vary considerably de-
pending upon the assumptions of a given model.
Appendix A to both the 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 137-
50, and to the 1994 DRAFT PRoPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 117-29, sets
forth the assumptions used by the planners. At hearings on that draft, criticism was voiced
about such projections. See Statement of Leonard S. Rubenstein, Director of the Judge David
Bazelon Center for Mental Health, Hearing before the Long Range Planning Committee at
10-12, and Appendix (Dec. 9, 1994) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Rubenstein
Statement]. Rubenstein described the social security litigation of the 1980s, in which the
federal caseload triplf:d from 10,000 to 30,000 cases in a short time frame. After a series of
decisions by the federal courts, the executive changed aspects of handling social security
cases, and the social security litigation diminished. As of 1990, Social Security Act cases
were at a 15 year low, of fewer than 7,500 cases. Id. For additional criticism of the Ad-
ministrative Office caseload predictions, see Statement of John Frank, Hearing before the
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few judges, and a Congress too actively imposing work on federal
judges.
While one response to such caseload burdens would be to increase
the number of life tenured judges, that route was rejected.36 Instead,
the Long Range Planning Committee proposes redirecting those in
quest of judgment to other sources. The Plan urges that Congress
revisit federal jurisdictional grants in two directions: fIrst, to shift some
authority from federal courts to state courts and/or to restrict current
expansion of federal civil and criminal jurisdiction,37 and second, to
enlarge the jurisdictional grants to federal agencies and thereby to
move cases from federal courts to federal agencies.38 For example,
one proposal reiterates a long-standing suggestion by members of the
federal judiciarf9 to curb diversity jurisdiction. The Plan urges
Committee of the Judicial Conference on Long-Range Planning at 1-3 (phoenix, Ariz, Dec.
7, 1994) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Frank Statement]. The problems of prediction
itself are noted in FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITIEE REPORT, supra note 23, at 9.
36. The Plan supported something it termed "carefully controlled" growth, explained as
"tread[ing] a middle path that rejects unlimited expansion yet avoids a policy of zero
growth." 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 38 (Recommendation 16);
Action Notice, supra note 26 (deferred); 1994 DRAFT PRoPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra
note 4, at 31-32 (same recommendation).
37. See 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 23-32, 34-37 (Recom-
mendations 1-4, 6-8, 12, 15); Action Notice, supra note 26 (deferred); see also 1994 DRAFT
PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 20-27, 29-30 (Recommendations 1-3, 5-7,
11). The plans express distress specifically about "federalization" of criminal law. 1995 PRo-
POSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 23-27 (Recommendations 2-5); 1994 DRAFT
PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 20-23 (Recommendations 1-4).
38. 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 32-34 (Recommendations 9-
10); Action Notice, supra note 26 (deferred); see also 1994 DRAFT PROPOSED LONG RANGE
PLAN, supra note 4, at 27-28 (Recommendations 8 and 9).
39. See FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION, supra note 23, at 139-52; Wilfred Feinberg,
Is Diversity Jurisdiction an Idea Whose Time Has Passed?, N.Y. ST. BJ., July 1989, at 14,
16 (arguing that it is "unjustifiable" to continue diversity jurisdiction in light of other case-
load pressures in the federal courts); Dolores K. Sloviter, Diversity Jurisdiction Through the
Lens of Federalism, 76 JUDICATURE 90 (1992) (criticizing diversity litigation because of the
"inevitable erosion" of state law); Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views Diversity
Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Federalism, 78 VA. L. REv. 1671 (1992) [hereinafter
Sloviter, Diversity Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Federalism]; see also Conference Sup-
ports Repeal of In-State Plaintiff Diversity Jurisdiction, THIRD BRANCH, June 1994, at 4
(describing endorsement by Judicial Conference of the United States of limitations on diver-
sity jurisdiction); Herbert Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial
Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 216, 234-40 (1948) (calling for limits on diversity
HeinOnline -- 98 W. Va. L. Rev. 184 1995-1996
184 WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:171
Congress to twn over to the state courts much of the diversity
docket40 (about 50,000 cases or about a quarter of the current federal
civil docket41).
Turning to c:hanges from within the judiciary and, again, in search
of means to fulf1l1 the core purposes of federal adjudication,42 the re-
port suggests that federal courts increase their reliance on alternative
dispute resolution,43 renew managerial efforts to process cases more
economically,44 and delegate more to magistrate and bankruptcy
jurisdiction); HenlY Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REv.
483, 510 (1928) (calling for a reexamination of diversity jurisdiction and arguing that pres-
sures from "distinctively federal litigation may call for relief of business that intrinsically
belongs to the state courts").
The bases for support for diversity are ably put forth by John Frank. See John P.
Frank, The Case for Diversity Jurisdiction, 16 HARV. 1. LEGIS. 403 (1979) [hereinafter
Frank, The Case for Diversity Jurisdiction]; John P. Frank, For Maintaining Diversity Juris-
diction, 73 YALE LJ. 7 (1963) [hereinafter Frank, For Maintaining Diversity Jurisdiction].
40. The 1995 Proposed Plan recommended that Congress retain diversity cases for
certain kinds of cases, such as large-scale mass torts. 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN,
supra note 4, at 29 (Recommendation 7; either abolishing diversity except for "actions
involving aliens, interpleader actions, and cases in which the petitioner can clearly demon-
strate the need for a federal forum," as well as for "some consolidated 'mass tort'
litigation;" or alternatively eliminating in-state plaintiff diversity, increasing the amount in
controversy and other modifications); Action Notice, supra note 26 (deferred); 1994 DRAFT
PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 25-26 (same).
This proposal resembles that of the Federal Courts Study Committee. FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 23, at 38-43 (recommendation to limit
diversity jurisdiction to "complex multi-state litigation, interpleader, and suits involving
aliens"), 44-47 (recommendations to expand the scope of multidistrict litigation, provide
further guidelines for consolidation, and to "analyze . . . tailored procedures to avoid undue
relitigation of pertinent issues" in "the small number of instances in which extraordinarily
high numbers of injuries may have been caused by a single product or event").
41. 1994 AO REPORT, supra note 13, at A-24 (Table C-2; U.S. District Courts -
Civil Cases Commencl~d by Basis of Jurisdiction) (In 1993-94 year, 229,850 civil cases were
commenced, of which 54,886 or 24 percent were diversity cases).
42. 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 5-9; 1994 DRAFT PROPOSED
LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 5-13.
43. 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 65-66 (Recommendation 41);
Action Notice, supra note 26 (approved); 1994 DRAFT PRoPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra
note 4, at 53 (Recommendation 38) (similar).
44. 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 61-66. Included are sugges-
tions for trial courts lmd appellate courts. Id. at 65-66 (Recommendations 40-41; including
encouraging use of ADR programs); id. at 62-65 (Recommendations No. 37-39, 39a-3ge;
including greater exchange of information among circuits and use of civil appeals
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judges.4s The Plan also raises concern about the need to make justice
"fully accessible to individuals with disabilities"46 and about the im-
portance of serving the increasingly diverse population of litigants, law-
yers, and staff now within the COurtS.47
During the period of notice and comment on the Long Range
Plan, many dissenters emerged.48 Among the various concerns
management programs); Action Notice, supra note 26 (approved); 1994 DRAFT PROPOSED
LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4 (similar recommendations were made at 50-53).
45. See 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4. Recommendations about
magistrate judges can be found at 46-47 (Recommendation 24; if parties have consented to
disposition by a magistrate judge, ''judgments entered in such actions should be reviewable
only in the courts of appeals, and not by a district judge"), and at 93-94, 77-78 (Recom-
mendation 67, 68, and 52(c); calling for magistrate judges to "perform judicial duties to the
extent constitutionally permissible," to be "vested with a limited contempt power," and to
participate in judicial governance).
Recommendations on bankruptcy judges can be found at 49-50, (Recommendation 28;
encouraging Congress to "clarify" bankruptcy judge authority and by legislation to "recog-
nizeD the civil contempt power of bankruptcy judges" and encouraging district courts to
permit bankruptcy judges to exercise all jurisdiction "constitutionally and statutorily permissi-
ble"), at 50 (Recommendation 29; if constitutional limits make bankruptcy courts inefficient,
then "the question of whether some or all bankruptcy judgeships should have Article III
status should be considered"), and at 77-79 (Recommendation 52(c) suggests including one
bankruptcy judge in the Judicial Conference).
All of these recommendations were deferred for further study. Action Notice, supra
note 26. Similar proposals were included in the 1994 DRAFT PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN,
supra note 4, at 64, 77-78 (Recommendations 49(c), 64-65; on magistrate judges), and at
41-42, 64 (Recommendation 26-27, 49(c); on bankruptcy judges).
One other tier of non-Article III judges is discussed in the report; when considering
alternatives, should the volume of cases go up and other remedies not be pursued, the Long
Range planners also mention "expanding the role of adjunct judicial officers (e.g., appellate
commissioners)." 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 123.
46. 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 105-08 (Recommendation
88); Action Notice, supra note 26 (Recommendation 88 approved); 1994 DRAFT PRoPOSED
LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 91 (Recommendation 85).
47. 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 104-05 (Recommendation
86; calling on federal judges to "exert strong leadership to eliminate unfairness . . . in fed-
eral courts," and discussing the prior Judicial Conference resolutions encouraging study of
"gender bias"); id. at 105 (Recommendation 87; "Federal judges and all court personnel
should strive to understand the diverse cultural backgrounds and experienc'es of the parties,
witnesses, and attorneys who appear before them."); id. at 108 (Recommendation 89; accessi-
bility for "those who do not speak English"); Action Notice, supra note 26 (approving Rec-
ommendations 86-87 and deferring Recommendation 89); 1994 DRAFT PROPOSED LONG
RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 88-91 (Recommendations 83-86; similar recommendations).
48. See Reinhardt Statement, supra note 27; Rubenstein Statement, supra note 35;
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expressed, I foc:us here on state judges who oppose the proposal to
shift more cases to them.49 Federal nightmares pale when contrasted
with state court terrors, many of which come in full daylight. so A
1992 American Bar Association survey, Saving our System: A National
Overview of the Crisis in America's System of Justice, described eight
states that had closed their civil jury system for all or part of the year,
fifteen that had laid off personnel, and ten that had unacceptable delays
in decision making.SI
When one turns to the other venue - federal agencies - pro-
posed by the Long Range Planning Committee to take additional work,
one fmds a similar picture of overload. In 1994, the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunities Commission received more than 90,000 claims and
had an even larger backlog.52 In comparison to state and agency adju-
dicators, the fed.eral judiciary occupies a place of privilege.53 Yet its
Testimony of Donald B. Ayer concerning The Proposed Long Range Plan for the Federal
Courts (Dec. 9, 1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter Ayer Statement].
49. See, e.g., Judith Kaye, Federalism Gone Wild, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 13, 1994, at A29
(Op Ed). Others joined in that concern. See Frank Statement, supra note 35, at 6 ("It is
hard to be enthusiastic about relief to federal courts which further breaks down state sys-
tems").
50. See Little, supra note 13, at 1042.
51. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SAVING OUR SYSTEM: A NATIONAL OVERVIEW OF
TIlE CRISIS IN AMERICA'S SYSTEM OF JUSTICE 3 (1993) [hereinafter SAVING OUR SYSTEM].
See also 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 37 (Recommendation 14;
mentioning the problems of the state courts and calling for Congress to consult "with state
authorities in defining any new limits on federal jurisdiction" and to provide "federal finan-
cial and other assistance" to state judiciaries); Action Note, supra note 18 (Recommendation
14 deferred); 1994 DRAFT PRoPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 31 (Recommen-
dation 13; similar provision).
52. See Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, 19 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AND
EEO NEWS 1 (May 8, 1995) (EEOC filings at "record levels," with 91,189 cases filed in
1994 including many alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act); see also
EEOC: Declining Resources, Skyrocketing Workload, EEOC OFFICE OF COMM. & LEGIS.
AFF. at 1 (memorandum of Mar. 24, 1995; on file with the author) (backlog of 97,000
cases); Peter T. Kilborn, Backlog of Cases is Overwhelming Jobs-Bias Agency, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 26, 1994, at Al (detailing slow processing of complaints and frustration resulting);
Peter T. Kilborn, A Family Spirals Downward in Waiting for Agency to Act, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 11, 1995, at Al (discussing problems faced by a family as complainant waited almost
two and half years for response).
53. The Long Range planners note the problem of agencies' resources and call for
Congress to improve agency adjudication. See 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra
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members express concern that it will soon be overwhelmed and that its
ability to deliver justice services will be correspondingly eroded.
III. THE CHALLENGES OF DESCRIPTION
Given the depressing descriptions of contemporary problems of
courts, it is not surprising that "futures planning" is much the rage in
both federal and state systems.54 While it is appropriate to look ahead,
it is also necessary to look hard at the present. In light of the difficul-
ties of imagination and the myriad of variables that can affect the
workload and agendas of the courts, I embark here on a scaled-back
project - lowering my sights in one respect and expanding them in
another. Instead of pressing toward the "long range," I think we need
to hone our skills at understanding what is currently happening within
the federal courts and within the federal system of which they are a
part.55
note 4, at 32-33 (Recommendation 9); Action Notice, supra note 26 (Recommendation 9 de-
ferred); 1994 DRAFT PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 27-28 (less discussion
of agencies' resource needs).
54. According to the National Center for State Courts ("NCSC"), more than a dozen
states have published reports about future planning. See Ruth Etheredge, NCSC, State Courts
Futures Reports, Bibliography (Jan. 6, 1994). Included are California, COMMISSION ON TIIE
FUTURE OF TIIE CALIFORNIA COURTS, JUSTICE IN TIIE BALANCE 2020: REPORT OF TIIE
COMMISSION ON TIIE FUTURE OF TIIE CALIFORNIA COURTS (1993); Michigan, COMMISSION
ON TIIE COURTS IN TIIE 21ST CENTURY, MICHIGAN'S COURTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: A
REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, GOVERNOR, AND SUPREME COURT (1990); and Massachusetts,
CHIEF JUSTICE'S COMMISSION ON TIIE FUTURE OF THE COURTS, REINVENTING JUSTICE 2022:
REPORT OF TIIE CHIEF JUSTICE'S COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF THE COURTS (1992). See
generally IRA PILCHEN & SANDRA RATCLIFF, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIEIY, THE fuTURE
AND THE COURTS: CONDUCTING STATE COURT FUTURES ACTIVITIES (1993). Other states
have commissions underway. See, e.g., Delaware Legis. Servo Senate Jt Res. 9, 138th Gen.
Assem. (Apr. 27, 1995) (continuing the Futures Commission in Delaware).
55. The difficulties of making even short-term projections is made plain by considering
the time period during which the Long Range Planning Committee wrote. Before the elec-
tion of 1994, Congress was assumed to be an entity that would continue to generate federal
rights. Writing before that election, the judiciary's Long Range Planning Committee made
the assumption that federal entitlements were a fIXture of the federal docket. By the spring
of 1995, a very different Congress was at work on legislation that some might also charac-
terize (using the phrase of the judiciary's Long Range Planning Committee) as prompting
"nightmares" - but ones different from those assumed to be frightening only six months
earlier.
HeinOnline -- 98 W. Va. L. Rev. 188 1995-1996
188 WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:171
In an essay written in 1994,56 I relied on Annette Kolodny's
insightful comment (made in the context of literary criticism but apt
here as well) to illustrate the difficulty of appreciating the
contemporary teITain. As she put it:
We read well, and with pleasure, what we already know how to read; and
what we know how to read is to a large extent dependent upon what we
have already read (works from which we developed our expectations and
our interpretative strategies).s7
To put Kolodny's point in this context, we (who are "readers" of the
federal courts) have so frequently read the map of the federal courts
that it has become very difficult to see that the contours have changed.
But how we describe "what is" will affect what changes we can coun-
tenance and those that we find oppressive.
Thinking about describing "what is" must also be a self-conscious
activity. Several philosophical traditions remind us that the "is" of the
federal courts (like the "is" of the world at large) varies considerably
depending on one's perspective, point of view, experiences, and ways
of framing both questions and answers.58 Critical studies and
postmodernism are two traditions that render problematic aspects of
56. Resnik, Rereading "The Federal Courts," supra note 3, at 1021.
57. Annette Kolodny, Dancing Through the Minefield, in THE NEW FEMINIST CRITI-
CISM: ESSAYS ON WOMEN, LllERAlURE, AND THEoRY 144, 155 (Elaine Showalter ed., 1985)
(essay originally published as Annette Kolodny, Dancing Through the Minefield: Some Ob-
servations on the Theory, Practice and Politics of a Feminist Literary Criticism, 6 FEMINIST
STUDIES 1 (1980)).
58. Within the context of the federal courts, Professors Theodore Eisenberg and
Stewart J. Schwab have examined the different attitudes of law professors, appellate judges,
and trial judges. See Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, What Shapes Perceptions of
the Federal Court System?, 56 U. Cm. 1. REv. 501, 503-04, 531-39 (1989).
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many social empirical projects,s9 including mapping current or past
contours of the federal adjudicatory system.
Wary thus of aspiring to a single "reading" of the contemporary
federal courts, let me point to a series of changes, within the federal
adjudicatory landscape, that have not been incorporated into the domi-
nant "story" of the federal courts. Much of the contemporary commen-
tary about the federal courts falls within the tradition of Henry Hart
and Herbert Wechsler, who wrote the landmark text initially in 195360
and rely on what Kolodny termed the developed "expectations and . . .
interpretative strategies,,61 framed in that earlier era.62 Below, I out-
line several dimensions on which federal courts are different than they
were less than fifty years ago when Hart and Wechsler wrote. Because
59. Standpoint theorists argue that the animating assumptions of the enlightenment pro-
ject of a progressive search for universal truths are misguided; some postmodernists go fur-
ther and argue as well that no singular truths exist These issues are discussed in Nancy
C.M. Hartsock, The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist
Historical Materialism, in FEMINISM & MErnODOLOGY 157 (Sandra Harding ed., 1987);
SEYLA BENHABm, JUDI1H BUlLER, DRUCILLA CORNELL & NANCY FRASER, FEMINIST CON-
TENTIONS: A PHILOSOPIDCAL EXCHANGE (1995); Sandra Harding, Conclusion: Epistemological
Questions, in FEMINISM & MErnODOLOGY 181 (Sandra Harding ed., 1987); Sara Ruddick,
Remarks on the Sexual Politics of Reason, in WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY 237 (Eva Feder
Kittay & Diana T. Meyers eds., 1987); Donna Haraway, Situated Knowledges: The Science
Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective, 14 FEMINIST STUDIES 575
(1988).
60. HENRy M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND TIlE
FEDERAL SYSTEM (1st ed. 1953) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER, 1st ed.]; PAUL M. BATOR,
PAUL J. MISHKIN, DAVID L. SHAPIRO & HERBERT WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND TIlE FEDERAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1973); PAUL M. BATOR, DANIEL J.
MEL1ZER, PAUL J. MISHKIN & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND TIlE FEDERAL SYSTEM (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER, 3d ed.].
61. Kolodny, supra note 57, at 155.
62. Many federal courts scholars agree about the dominance of the book and its vi-
sion. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND.
L. REv. 953 (1994) (analyzing the elements of the approach, including its focus on appro-
priate allocations of power and institutional responsibilities); Richard H. Fallon Jr.,
Comparing Federal Courts "Paradigms," 12 CONST. COMMENTARY 3, 3 (1995) (discussing
Hart and Wechsler's approach as the "reigning Federal Courts 'paradigm"') [hereinafter
Fallon, Comparing Federal Courts "Paradigms"]; Michael Wells, Busting the Hart &
Wechsler Paradigm, 11 CONST. COMMENTARY 557 (1994-95) (arguing that the approach is
no longer generative and should be replaced); Akhil Reed Amar, Law Story, 102 HARV. L.
REv. 688 (1989) (reviewing HART & WECHSLER, 3d ed., supra note 60, and discussing its
influence and assumptions).
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my initial focus will be on the federal courts, I do not detail changes
in structure that have occurred over the past half century within the
state court systems and in Indian tribal COurtS.63
A. The Four-Tiered House with Many Add-Ons
The number of places from which to obtain adjudication has
increased. The Article III judiciary is but one of many providers of
federal adjudicatory services. Within the federal courts themselves, two
sets of non-life tenured judges - magistrate and bankruptcy judges64
- now decide (sometimes initially and sometimes finallyts a growing
segment of federal cases. Two descriptive statements, both important
and neither made often in discussion of the federal courts, underscore
this point.
First, the federal courts are no longer a three-tiered bench.66
63. See generally Symposium Indian Tribal Courts and Justice, 79 JUDICATURE 107
(1995); Judith Resnik, Multiple Sovereignties: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Gov-
ernment, 79 JUDICATURE 118 (1995). My topic is also not about changes in other branches
of government, but the obvious point should be noted: the modes of work of both congres-
sional and executive branches has altered greatly over this century.
64. See 28 U.S.C. § 631(e) (1994) (the district judges in each district appoint fuIl-time
magistrate judges for terms of 8 years); 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(l) (1994) (each circuit's appel-
late judges appoint bankruptcy judges for terms of 14 years).
65. Magistrate judges have authority to hear some pretrial matters upon designation by
a district judge, to make other rulings with an opportunity for objection to the district judge,
and to preside at civil trials with the consent of the parties. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(c) (1994).
Bankruptcy judges may issue final decisions in "core proceedings" in bankruptcy but not in
other cases. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (1994). These two sets of judges also interact; according to
testimony provided to the Long Range Planning Committee by Professor Lawrence P. King
on behalf of the National Bankruptcy Conference, "there is an increasing tendency among
Article III district judges to refer an appeal from a final order of the bankruptcy judge to a
non-Article III magistrate judge." Testimony of Professor Lawrence P. King at 2 (Dec. 9,
1994) (on file with the author).
66. Compare Beale, supra note 13, at 991 (reiterating and citing the Federal Courts
Study Committee's discussion about the '''limitations of the pyramidal three-tier system
within which federal courts now operate"'). As John Frank explains, although the recent
edition of Charles AIIan Wright's FEDERAL COURTS (5th ed.) excels in most respects, it too
fails to appreciate fuIly this four-tiered structure. John P. Frank, An Essential Guide:
Wright's Law of Federal Courts, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 285, 291 (1994) (book review of the
4th edition) (noting that "the book treats the federal courts as a three-tier system," and that
"[t]his classic description is not true anymore").
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Magistrate judges and bankruptcy judges are the fourth, bottom tier,
sitting beneath the life tenured Article III district court judges. Second,
arguing for a small number of federal judgeships, Judge Richard
Posner has asserted that the current number of life tenured federal
judges represents the end point of the federal courts' "natural limits of
expansion."67 Judge Jon O. Newman has invoked the number 1,000 as
a benchmark for the appropriate size.68 If the 1,000 mark is the point
of toppling, the edifice has already fallen. Counting only life tenured,
authorized, non-vacant judgeships and including those judges who have
taken "senior status,"69 the federal life tenured judicial strength now
numbers over 1,100.70
67. Richard A. Posner, Coping with the Caseload: A Comment on Magistrates and
Masters, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2215, 2216 (1989).
68. Jon O. Newman, 1,000 Judges-The Limit for an Effective Federal Judiciary, 76
JUDICATURE 187, 187-88, 194 (1993) (arguing that the "line must be held at 1,000 because
once that number is exceeded, it will be only a matter of time until the federal judiciary
grows to 2,000, 3,000, and then 4,000" and arguing that the need for small numbers of
federal judges was not tied to those judges' prestige but rather justified by the need for
high-visibility decision makers and for a coherent body of law) [hereinafter Newman, 1,000
Judges-The Limit for an Effective Federal Judiciary]; see also Gerald B. Tjoflat, More
Judges, Less Justice, A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 70, 71 (arguing that increased numbers of
appellate judges would harm the courts by undermining collegiality and efficiency, and by
disturbing "the clarity and stability of the law"). But see Stephen Reinhardt, Too Few
Judges, Too Many Cases, A.B.A. J., Jan., 1993, at 52 (urging expansion of federal life
tenured judiciary and arguing that quality will not be impaired). While Judge Newman is
generally credited with using the 1,000 number, he subsequently stated that he was not ad-
vocating a "numerical cap" but rather the concept of sharply limited growth and the
reallocation of federal judicial responsibilities to the state courts to avoid needing to increase
the size of the federal judiciary. See Newman Statement, supra note 27, at 2-3.
69. 28 U.S.C. § 371(f) (1994).
70. According to the 1994 Administrative Office Report, the Supreme Court has 9
authorized life tenured judgeships, the federal appellate courts have 179, and the district
courts have 649, for a total of 837 authorized judgeships. 1994 AO REPORT, supra note 13,
at 25 tbl. 12. The actual number of sitting judges is both lesser and greater than the autho-
rized positions. Judgeships go vacant for some period of time during which nominations are
processed; as of 1994, 18 appellate and 60 district seats were vacant Id. However, when a
judge takes "senior status" that judge may continue to sit but has the option of working on
a reduced basis. See 28 U.S.C. § 371(f) (1994) (mandating that senior judges be certified
annually by the chief judge of that judge's circuit and carry a workload of a specified but
reduced amount). In 1994, "82 senior appeals judges and 292 senior district judges were
providing service." 1994 AO REPORT, supra note 13, at 25. Counting active and senior life
tenured judges and subtracting the number of vacancies results in a workforce of 1133.
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When one also includes the fourth tier (the magistrate and bank-
ruptcy judges) within the federal courts, the federal judicial strength
grows to more than 1,850.71 The larger numbers remain at the trial
level, at which work about 650 life tenured district court judges and
more than an equivalent number of bankruptcy and magistrate judges
appointed for terms; a total of 1,601 trial judges worked in the federal
courts in 1994.72 Of course, those arguing for the use of 1,000 as a
benchmark count neither the more than 700 judges who lack life tenure
nor the life tenured judges who have taken senior status.73
Had the United States Supreme Court charted a different path and
found congressional creation of non-Article III judges unconstitutional,
the Article III judiciary would have been the exclusive definition of the
"federal judge," and the number of relevant "federal judges" would
have remained tied to life tenure. However, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly upheld the creation of non-Article III "federal judges" and,
The Long Range Planning Committee supported the reliance on senior judges. See
1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 88, 92-93 (Recommendations 65-66;
proposing that "[t]he courts should use senior and recalled judges . . . as much as possible
to achieve the goal of carefully controlled growth" and that "UJudges should be encouraged
to assume senior judge status through improvement in policies or procedures that affect
senior judges"); Action Notice, supra note 26 (Recommendations 65-66 deferred); 1994
DRAFT PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 76-77 (Recommendations 62-63;
similar provisions).
71. As of 1994, Congress had authorized 406 full-time magistrate judges and 326 full-
time bankruptcy judges. 1994 AO REPORT, supra note 13, at 26-27, Tables 13 & 14.
Including senior status judges and excluding the 90 vacancies reported as of 1994 in the
various categories of judgeships, the federal judiciary's workforce numbered 1,866.
Alternatively, if one counted authorized positions of life and non-life tenured judges but
excluded senior status judges, the workforce numbered 1,560.
72. The number of working federal trial judges include the 649 authorized district
court judgeships, minus the 60 vacancies, plus the 292 senior judges for a subtotal of 881.
Authorized full-time magistrate and bankruptcy judgeships total 732, with 12 bankruptcy
positions vacant as of 1994. 1994 AO REPORT, supra note 13, at 25-27, Tables 12-14.
73. The Ninth Circuit has also authorized the use of a "commissioner" who rules on
"nondispositive motions" at the appellate level. See U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit,
General Orders 1.8 (May 10, 1995) (defining an "appellate commissioner" as an "officer ap-
pointed by the court to rule or review and make recommendations on a variety of
nondispositive matters, such as applications by appointed counsel for compensation under the
Criminal Justice Act and certain motions . . . and to serve as special master as directed by
the court"); Meet Peter Shaw, Appellate Commissioner, 9rn CIRCUIT NEWS, Winter
1994/Spring 1995 at 12.
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moreover, has approved a growing delegation of authority to them.74
While some unspecified "essential attributes of judicial power,,75 are
not to be delegated, the federal judiciary now functions with an amal-
gam of adjudicators, some with life tenure and some without.76 Impor-
tantly, commentators on all sides of the debate believe that the current
number of judges (however totaled) is overloaded with work.
What the continued invocation of the 1,000 figure reflects is that,
although the life tenured federal judiciary is deeply dependent on its
fourth tier of trial judges and some within that judiciary are prepared
to augment both its power and status,77 the Article III judiciary has
74. While not every congressional delegation has been approved, the trend has been
toward expansive powers, with ongoing recommendations - many emanating from within
the federal judiciary - for further delegation. For decisions considering federal adjudication
by non-Article III judges, see Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 115 S. Ct 1493 (1995)
(considering the reach of bankruptcy courts' statutory jurisdiction over cases "related to"
bankruptcy); Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923 (1991) (upon parties' consent, magistrate
judges may supervise jury selection in felony trials); Granfinanciera, SA v. Nordberg, 492
U.S. 33 (1989) (discussing distinctions between public and private rights and jury trials in
the bankruptcy context); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833
(1986) (upholding congressional assignment of common law counterclaims to agency
adjudication); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982)
(finding unconstitutional aspects of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 that provided bankruptcy
judges with jurisdiction over common law claims). See generally ADMINIS1RATIVE OFFICE OF
1HE UNITED STA1ES COURTS, A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF MAGIS1RATE JUDGE
AUTIIORITY (June 1993) reprinted in 150 F.R.D. 247 (1994) [hereinafter A CONSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS OF MAGIS1RATE JUDGE AUTIIORITY]; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts,
Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REv. 915 (1988).
75. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932); Judith Resnik, The Mythic Meaning of
Article III Courts, 56 U. COLO. L. REv. 581 (1985) [hereinafter Resnik, The Mythic
Meaning ofArticle IIIJ; United States v. Williams, 23 F.3d 629 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that
magistrate judge could accept a guilty plea to a felony with defendant's consent under FED.
R. CRIM. P. 11 without violating Article III of the Constitution); United States v. Carr, 18
F.3d 738, 740 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that a magistrate can preside over the "read-back" of
witness testimony to the jury in a criminal trial because it was a "subsidiary matter" and
therefore could be referred to a magistrate under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (1994)).
76. In addition to the duties assigned at the trial level, bankruptcy judges also may
serve on bankruptcy appellate panels ("BAPs"), reviewing decisions by individual bankruptcy
judges. 28 U.S.C.A. § 158(a)-(b)(1) (West Supp. 1995).
77. When read through the eyes of one attuned to the deep resistance of some life
tenured judges to any recognition of the 'judicial" authority of the "other" judges, both the
1994 and 1995 reports of the Long Range Planning Committee reflect movement toward
recognition of the critical role played by non-tenured federal judges. See supra note 45. One
example is the proposed call for non-article III judges ("one bankruptcy judge and one
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not come to telms with either its own current size or with the basic
equivalence of the two kinds of trial judges. Functionally, the federal
trial bench now numbers more than 1,600; the work accomplished by
federal judges has already transformed the institution from whatever it
was a few decades ago.78
The image of this four-tiered structure (with two stories of equal
size at the bottom, and then the triangular slope forming the pyramid
from trial to appellate to Supreme Court) needs yet further modifica-
tion - "add ons," if you will, of various shapes and sizes depending
on the district or the circuit. Federal courts now include a retinue of
other decision makers and advisors; arbitrators, mediators, early neutral
evaluators, settlement specialists, and special masters augment the ranks
of full time judges.79
Moving outside the federal courts - but still staying within the
federal fold - agencies also have become "courts," rendering adjudica-
tive decisions on a caseload larger than that of the federal judicial
docket itself.80 Vie do not often speak about agencies as courts - but
magistrate judge") to participate as members of the Judicial Conference, a recommendation
that has been deferred for further study and which is the subject of substantial internal
debate. See 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 77 (Recommendation
52(c»; Action Notice, supra note 26 (Recommendation 52(c) deferred).
78. The inability to see the transformations that have occurred in familiar institutions
is not limited to this context. See, e.g., Stephen Yeazell, The New Jury and the Ancient
Jury Conflict, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 87 (discussing how the contemporary debate about
the jury rarely acknowledges changes within the jury over the past several centuries).
79. Several appl~lIate courts have Civil Appeals Management Programs ("CAMP") in
which staff attorneys or specially-appointed lawyers and former judges conduct settlement
conferences. See FED. R. APP. P. 33, infra note 112 and accompanying text. In fiscal year
1995, the judiciary allotted 23 staff positions, nationwide, for appellate preargument
conference attorneys. Telephone interview with staff at Administrative Office (June 1995).
At the trial level, statutory authority for alternative dispute resolution programs can
be found at 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(6) (1994); rule-based authority comes from FED. R. CIV. P.
16 & 53, supplemented by the "inherent powers" of the courts. No data are kept nationwide
on the numbers of persons appointed to such positions at the trial courts; many programs
rely on volunteers.
80. For example, in 1993, the Social Security Administration had 358,000 pending
cases and more than 509,000 hearing requests. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 12 (1994). The EEOC
had 96,945 pending cases. See supra note 52. According to INS data, almost 1.5 million
"adjudications" were pending as of May of 1995. Immigration & Naturalization Service,
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agency adjudication is now a basic staple of the federal court sys-
tem.S!
One more venue needs to be marked. Completely outside the
federal system of courts and agencies, one fmds a host of private dis-
pute resolution facilities that offer ')udges," mediators, facilitators,
arbitrators, and counsel for those fmancially able to participate in pri-
vate decision making facilities. s2 While during the 1950s, the Supreme
Court voiced its concern about private ex ante agreements to arbitrate
disputes that preclude federal adjudication of statutory rights,S3 the
Performance Statistics System, INS Adjudication Data (provided at request of the author,
July 5, 1995).
As noted earlier, workload measures come in different forms, and the number of
pending cases is but one. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (BealelLittie exchange).
Whatever the burden of the various dockets, the number of proceedings reflects increasing
reliance on federal agencies to be responsible for first tier adjudication. See supra note 38
(Long Range Plan request for more agency adjudication); see also Liu v. Waters, 55 F3d
421 (9th Cir. 1995) (requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies, including submis-
sion of a challenge based on procedural errors of constitutional magnitude, to the Bureau of
Immigration Appeals prior to federal court review).
81. See, e.g., Paul Verkuil, Daniel Gifford, Charles Koch, Richard Pierce & Jeffrey
Lubbers, The Federal Administrative Judiciary in OFFICE OF 1HE CHAIRMAN, ADMINISlRA-
TIVE CONFERENCE OF 1HE UNIlED STAlES, RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS Vol. II, 779,
784 (1992) ("[i]n many respects, the adjudicative caseload of federal agencies and depart-
ments, which is managed at the hearing stage by administrative judges, looks much like the
cases that arise in the federal courts"). One reminder is in order. The shift to agencies was
fashioned in part in the hopes of escaping the federal courts, seen as less hospitable to
some forms of litigation than would be the administrative agencies. See, e.g., Osmond K.
Fraenkel, The Function of the Lower Federal Courts as Protectors of Civil Liberties, 13
LAW & CONlEMP. PROBS. 132, 143 (1948) (believing that administrative agencies "should be
more effective" than courts and that, if such a "shift to administrative action occurs in . . .
large areas of civil liberties, then the role of the lower federal courts as fact finders will
diminish" although they will still be needed to ensure that states respect individual rights).
82. See, e.g., Amy L. Litkovitz, Comment, The Advantages of Using a "Rent-a-Judge"
System in Ohio, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. REsOL. 491 (1995). Some state judiciaries have
been strongly supportive of the authority of decisions made by private providers to whom
disputants have gone. See, e.g., Moncharsh v. Reily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899, 915-16 (Cal.
1992) (denying judicial review of arbitrator's decisions even if errors of law are made,
including mistakes evident on the face of the award that cause "substantial injustice").
83. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 434-35 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez De
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (holding that a customer of a
brokerage firm had a right to litigate a claim of violation of the Securities Act of 1933,
notwithstanding that the customer had signed a contract to arbitrate future claims).
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case law of th(;: 1980s and 1990s has a decidedly different tone, en-
dorsing arbitration and private modes of resolution of such disputes.84
B. The Calder Mobile: Aggregate Litigation
A second major revision within the federal adjudicatory landscape
is the change in the unit of decision making. The paradigm lawsuit -
a dispute between a plaintiff and a defendant that is resolved by a
single judge - is under revision. Over the past decades, the aggrega-
tion of civil cases, the bringing together of claims of many different
individuals to prepare them for trial, settlement, or other mode of dis-
position, has moved from the periphery closer to the core.
The existence of a group of litigants was until recently an excep-
tional event, in need of special justification. Although the 1938 revi-
sions of civil practice invited liberal joinder of parties and claims and
the 1966 revision of the class action rule made binding certain forms
of group litigation,85 in the 1960s, individual case processing remained
the expected modality. Remember that in 1966, liberalization of the
class action rule was greeted with concern, and the resulting judicial
creation called a. "Frankenstein monster."86 A melange of litigants was
viewed with suspicion and the feasibility of responding to their claims
doubted.
84. See Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution
and Adjudication, 10 Omo ST. J. ON DISP. REsOL. 21 I, 222-29 (1995) [hereinafter Resnik,
Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication] (analyzing changing doctrine and its impli-
cations). In the 1995 term, the Supreme Court decided challenges to arbitration contracts by
focusing on the terms to which the parties had agreed. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v.
Kaplan, 1I5 S. Ct 1920, 1923 (1995) (arbitrators' powers stem from terms to which parties
agreed); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1216 (1995) (if
contract to arbitrate authorizes punitive damages, that provision governs); see also Allied-
Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834, 839 (1995) (interpreting the Federal Arbi-
tration Act's provisions to govern contracts "involving commerce" more broadly than had a
state court).
85. Compare FED. R. CN. P. 23 (1938) with FED. R. Crv. P. 23 (1966 Amendment).
86. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 572 (2d Cir. 1968) (Lumbard, J.,
dissenting), vacated, 416 U.S. 156 (1974); see also Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Mon-
sters and Shining Knights: Myth. Reality, and the "Class Action Problem", 92 HARV. L.
REv. 664, 665 (1979) (defending the revisions against such criticism).
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Further, judges recoiled at permitting relaxation of other procedural
rules to permit more group litigation. For example, in the early and
mid-1980s, federal appellate judges rebuffed trial judges' efforts to
relax collateral estoppel rules and to mandate group treatment of mass
torts in an array of cases, including those involving asbestos injuries
and building collapses.87 The prevailing assumption was that a "day in
court" required an individual system that enabled and respected litigant
autonomy and opportunities for specificity.
But those opinions, only a decade old, now have a curiously old-
fashioned ring. During the 1980s, trial judges continued to press for
group processing of cases - via informal management, by means of
rules, by reliance on the multidistrict litigation statute, by certifying a
class action.88 Certain litigants sought or insisted upon group
treatment; the bankruptcies of A.H. Robins89 and of Johns-Manville90
served to educate and acculturate lawyers, judges, and litigants to the
uses of group processing in mass torts. The Judicial Panel on
Multidistict Litigation, created in 1968,91 provided a similar function;
by ordering consolidation of pending cases for pretrial purposes, it
showed how groups of litigants could be dealt with en masse.92
87. See Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982) (reversing
a district court's preclusion of introduction of evidence that defendants in asbestos litigation
did not have knowledge of dangerousness of product); In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680
F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982) (vacating a mandatory class action
on issues of liability and punitive damages in litigation about a building collapse).
88. DEBORAH R. HENSLER, WILLIAM L.F. FELsTINER, MOLLY SELVIN & PATRICIA A.
EBENER, ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS: THE CHALLENGE OF MAss TOXIC TORTS (1985) (Rand
R-3324-ICJ).
89. See RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD
BANKRUPTCY 37-48 (1991) (bankruptcy filed in August of 1985).
90. See, e.g., Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988).
91. Pub. L. No. 90-296, 82 Stat 109 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1994)).
92. Evidence of the changing perceptions of the feasibility and utility of aggregate
litigation comes from the Multidistrict Litigation Panel itself. While in the 1970s and 1980s,
the panel refused five requests for inter-district consolidation of asbestos litigation, in the
early 1990s, the panel revised its view - prompted in part by judges arguing for group
treatment and in part by a climate that had accustomed itself to seeing groups of tort
plaintiffs assembled. See Stephen Labaton, Six U.S. Judges Will Meet on Burden of Asbestos
Suits, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1990, at B29; Report of the Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Com-
mittee on Asbestos Litigation 36 (March, 1991) reprinted in Asbestos Litigation Crisis in
Federal and State Courts: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and
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This dialogue about the propriety of group litigation and its reach
continues. In 1989, the Supreme Court's decision in Martin v. Wilks93
issued a reminder - that representative structures had limits, that the
resolution between the City of Birmingham, Alabama and its black
fIrefIghters could not lay to rest the questions of employment because
white fIrefIghters had not formally been "parties" to the litigation
unit.94 However, a footnote in the opinion also signalled the role of
rulemakers (both judicial and congressional) in structuring groups.
Whether by means of class actions, bankruptcy, or other forms,
rulemakers can force groups of individuals to participate in a joint
proceeding and preclude further claims, as long as the proper bases for
inclusion are articulated and if some effort to provide notice for absen-
tees is made.95 In an effort to embrace a larger collective of
individuals within the reach of judgments, Congress responded to
Martin v. Wilks by creating such a rule when employment discrimina-
tion cases are litigated under certain federal civil rights statutes.96
Judicial Administration of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess.
381 (Oct 24, 1991, Feb. 26 & 27, 1992) (recommending "that Congress consider legislation
to expressly authorize consolidation and collective trial of asbestos cases" and in the interim
or as an alternative, that judges provide group treatment of these cases).
In 1991, the MDL Panel thus assigned more than 26,000 federal asbestos cases to a
single district judge for pretrial proceedings. See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI),
771 F. Supp. 415, 424 (lP.M.L. 1991) (recognizing that additional transferee judges may
need to be appointed, but "deem[ing] it advisable to allow the transferee judge to make his
own assessment of the needs of this docket and communicate his preference to [the Panel]").
93. 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
94. Id. at 761.
95. Id. at 762, n.2 ("We have recognized an exception to the general rule when, in
certain limited circumstances, a person, although not a party, has his interests adequately
represented by someone with the same interests who is a party .... [citing, inter alia,
Rule 23.] Additionally, where a special remedial scheme exists expressly foreclosing succes-
sive litigation by nonlitigants, as for example in bankruptcy or probate, legal proceedings
may terminate preexisting rights . . . .").
96. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 108, 105 Stat. 1071, 1076
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n)(I)(A) (Supp. 1993». For commentary exploring the
constitutional norms of due process in large-scale litigation, see Owen M. Fiss, The Allure
of Individualism, 78 IOWA L. REv. 965 (1993); Susan P. Sturm, The Promise of Participa-
tion, 78 IOWA L. REV. 981 (1993); Douglas Laycock, Due Process of Law in Trilateral
Disputes, 78 IOWA L. REv. 1011 (1993).
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Within a very brief time period, the presumption of individual case
processing has thus been cabined. Today, aggregation has become the
ordinary and expected response whenever patterns of similar cases
appear in the federal and state COurtS.97 The "asbestos litigation,"98
the "breast implant litigation,"99 and the "Agent Orange litigation"loo
have become phrases so familiar that they pave the way for the next
group of cases (whether alleging harms to the environment, injuries
from tobacco smoke, defaults by banks, or overcharges of consumers).
Note also a somewhat comparable pattern on the criminal side; multi-
defendant criminal cases have increased 80 percent since 1980 and 30
percent in the last four years. 101
97. See Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation," supra note 3; Judith Resnik, Aggrega-
tion, Settlement, and Dismay, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 918 (1995) [hereinafter Resnik, Aggrega-
tion]; Judith Resnik, Dennis E. Curtis & Deborah Hensler, Individuals within the Aggregate:
Representation and Fees, N.Y.U. L. REv. (forthcoming 1996) (manuscript of paper presented
at Research Conference on Class Actions and Related Issues in Complex Litigation) (manu-
script on file with author, Nov. 1995); Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Under-
standing Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 961
(1993).
Of course, the shape and structure of group litigation remains a topic of case law
debate. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1293 (7th Cir. 1995)
(granting petition of mandamus to vacate class certification in case alleging that antihemo-
philic factor concentrate had caused HIV-related infections; Judge Posner, for the majority,
raised concerns that aggregation might create inappropriate pressures to settle or give too
much authority to a single set of jurors); In re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel
Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 778 (3rd Cir. 1995) (permitting certification of class
action for settlement only if all the criteria of class action certification under Rule 23 are
met; also rejecting fairness of settlement itself); In re Copley Pharmaceutical, Inc.,
"Albuterol" Prod. Liab. Litig., 161 F.R.D. 456 (D. Wyo. 1995) (denying decertification of a
class action against the makers of a bronchodilator and declining to apply Rhone-Poulenc).
98. In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415 (J.P.M.L. 1991).
99. In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 1098, 1099
(J.P.M.L. 1992) (consolidating 200 federal actions involving some 6,000 plaintiffs; subse-
quently more than 200,000 women filed claims for compensation).
100. See generally PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MAss TOXIC DISAS-
lERS IN TIlE COURTS (1987).
101. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, The Criminal Caseload: Increasing Bur-
den on the District Courts at 9, Chart 9 (Long Range Planning Working Papers, June, 1993)
(20 percent of all federal crime cases were multidefendant cases as of 1992); at 15, (Chart
16; rising number of jUly trials with four or more defendants); at 19 ("number of multi-
defendant cases has grown by 70 percent since 1980"); see also 1995 PROPOSED LONG
RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 110 (Recommendation 91; calling for a study of whether
guidelines are needed for "federal defender organizations to represent more than one
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These new lawsuits look different from the picture professors often
draw of litigation as a three-sided triangle with the judge on top, lis-
tening to contesting disputants as many Renaissance paintings of the
Day of Judgment depicted Jesus above supplicants in Day of Judgment
scenes. 102 Calder mobiles seem a better visual image, offered to cap-
ture parties switching sides depending on the issue at stake. 103 As
game theory p,~rvades the discussion of such cases, judges, special
masters, and other para-judges bob in and out as one of many sets of
"players."104
This shift towards large-scale litigation affects the view of the
utility and desirability of small-scale litigation,105 and hence of federal
judicial involvement with "small" cases. My phrasing here is deliberate:
I have used the words "large" and "small" in an effort to mark the
defendant in a multi-defendant case"); Action Notice, supra note 26 (Recommendation 91
deferred).
Multi-defendant cases have also given rise to prosecutorial bargaining en masse;
"package pleas" are those in which the prosecutor conditions the offer of settlement on
agreement by all defendants. See, e.g., United States v. Caro, 997 F.2d 657, 659-60 (9th
Cir. 1993) (requiring careful judicial scrutiny of the voluntariness of such pleas); United
States v. Daniels, 821 F.2d 76, 80 (Ist Cir. 1987) (requiring disclosure of such pleas during
Rule 11 guilty plea hearings).
102. See Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Images of Justice, 96 YALE LJ. 1727,
1745 (1987).
103. For exampl.e, in mass disaster fire litigation, defendants may include the owners
and insurers of buildings, as well as those who provide products (wall paper, furnishings,
and the like) and services to a building. Different sets of such defendants may, during cer-
tain phases, ally with plaintiffs in the hopes of protecting themselves from liability. Sec, for
example, the description of the phases of litigation in In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel
Fire Litig., 802 F. Supp. 624, 628-30 (D.P.R. 1992), affd sub nom In re Dupont Plaza
Hotel Fire Litigation, Holders Capital Corp. V. California Union Ins. Co., 989 F.2d 36 (1st
Cir. 1993).
104. See Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 TEx. L. REV.
1821 (1995). This form of analysis has become common in the proceduml Iitemture. See.
e.g., Janet C. Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class
Actions, 43 STAN. L. REv. 497, 528-57 (1991) (analyzing the incentives of litigants in secu-
rities class actions); Judith Resnik, Procedural Innovations. Sloshing Over: A Comment on
Deborah Hensler, A Glass Half Full, A Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alternative Dispute
Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 TEx. L. REv. 1627, 1628 (1995) [hereinaf-
ter Resnik, Procedural Innovations].
105. See Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation." supra note 3; Resnik, Housekeeping,
supra note 3, at 936-40; Resnik, Procedural Innovations, supra note 104, at 1631-36.
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difference in dimensions without ascribing value to either form. How-
ever, many of my counterparts speak of "complex" litigation contrasted
with some unspecified other set of cases, implicitly those that are "sim-
ple." With this trend toward the large-scale lawsuit and its focus on
the "complex" (ergo interesting, and often involving millions if not
billions of dollars), those cases that are "small," or "ordinary," or
"simple" retreat from view. The burden of proof is shifting, such that
adjudication of "small value" claims by life tenured judges is moving
toward being the exceptional occasion, requiring special justifica-
tion. 106
C. Altered Modes of Processing Disputes
Adjudication itself may become exceptional. Aggregation is one of
many factors affecting the modes by which decisions are made and
cases handled within the federal court system. Writing in 1955, politi-
cal scientist Jack Peltason stated that the "central activity" of federal
judges was "to make decisions, issue orders, and write opinions.,,107
At the trial level, that description is no longer accurate. The central
activity of federal trial judges is not singularly focused on adjudication
but rather embraces an array of methods of processing cases to move
them toward conclusion.
In 1938, when nationwide federal rules of procedure were intro-
duced, the federal procedural rule governing the pretrial process did not
mention the word settlement; in 1983, that word was added. lOS Now,
in the 1990s, settlement is enshrined as the desirable outcome for a
host of cases.109 By virtue of rule revision and legislative
106. See, e.g., Robert M. Parker & Leslie J. Hagin, "ADR" Techniques in the Reforma-
tion Model of Civil Dispute Resolution, 46 SMU L. REv. 1905, 1915-16 (1993) (proposing
tracking of cases with not all being eligible for jUlY or judge trials). Further, in many
instances the activities of fact fmding have moved from the life tenured judiciary to
magistrate and bankruptcy judges and to agency adjudicators. See infra discussion part III.C.
107. JACK W. PELTASON, FEDERAL COURTS IN TIIE POLmCAL PROCESS 1-6, 7, 65
(1955) (describing the legitimacy of analyzing judicial behavior in modes akin to that of
administrative and legislative action, that is inquiring into the interests of federal judges as a
group).
108. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (1938), and as amended, in 1983.
109. Evidence of judicial interest in the topic stretches from higher to lower courts.
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encouragement, both federal courts and Congress have demonstrated
their support for alternative dispute resolution,110 which has moved
from outside to inside the courthouse and has become a part of the
court processes itself. JJJ This celebration of settlement is not limited
to the trial level; appellate courts have created "civil appeals
management programs" in which court staff offer assistance to parties
in settling cases while appeals are pending.112
Within the last year, the Supreme Court has issued several opinions amplifYing the "law" of
settlement See, e.g., U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 115 S. Ct.
386 (1994); Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 114 S. Ct. 1673 (1994); Digital Equip.
Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1992 (1994). Turning to the lower courts, in one
federal district's local rules, judges are mandated to suggest settlement at every pretrial con-
ference held. See DIST. CT. RULES D. MAss., L.R. 16.4(B) ("At every conference conducted
under these rules, the judicial officer shall inquire as to the utility of the parties' conducting
settlement negotiations, explore means of facilitating those negotiations, and offer whatever
assistance may be appropriate in the circumstances.").
See generally Resnik, Whose Judgment?, supra note 3; Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill,
"Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REv.
1339 (1994).
110. See FED. R. CN. P. 16 (1993 amendments making plain judicial authority to re-
quire parties or their representatives to participate in settlement discussions and discussing
court deployment of alternative dispute resolution); Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994) (encouraging the adoption of plans in each district
court to curb delay and expense and including both settlement efforts and alternative dispute
resolution as modes of doing so).
Ill. Resnik, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, supra note 84, at 230
(what, in the 1983 amendments to Rule 16 had been called "extrajudicial procedure~," in the
1993 amendments w(:re termed "special procedures to assist in resolving the dispute" -
thereby completing the location of ADR within the courthouse).
112. See supra note 79 (discussing the retinue of other decision makers within the
federal courts). In 1974, the Second Circuit established the first such program. See Irving R.
Kaufinan, Must Every Appeal Run the Gamut?-The Civil Appeals Management Program, 95
YALE L.J. 755, 758-61 (1986) (the encouragement of settlement is an important aspect of
the program; data indicated that it "reduce[d] by one-sixth the number of cases argued"); see
also Irving R. Kaufinan, Reform for a System in Crisis: Alternative Dispute Resolution in
the Federal Courts, 59 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 11 (1990) (stating that the program "settles
more cases than two judges would normally handle in a year at one-third the cost of two
judicial chambers"). As of 1993, several circuits had such programs; in 1994, FED. R. APP.
P. 33 was amended to permit appellate courts to "direct the attorneys, and in appropriate
cases the parties, to participate in one or more conferences to address any matter that may
aid in the disposition of the proceedings, including . . . the possibility of settlement"). See
Resnik, Whose Judgment?, supra note 3, at 1501-03.
HeinOnline -- 98 W. Va. L. Rev. 203 1995-1996
1995] FEDERAL COURTS 203
In 1982, I offered the term "managerial judges" to capture the
shift in judicial attitude as judges established oversight of the pretrial
process. l13 In 1990, contemporary social scientists Wolf Heydebrand
and Carroll Seron detailed the "quiet revolution taking place in Ameri-
can COurtS,,,114 and provided a rich analysis of why the judiciary had
moved toward what they termed the "technocratic rationalization of
justice.,,115 In 1994, Stephen Yeazell considered seventy-five years of
procedural innovation and concluded that revised rules of procedure
had the effects of reorienting the litigation process to the pretrial
phase, expanding the powers of trial level judges, and contracting
authority of the appellate courts.116 A transformation in the
methodology of courts is well underway.
D. Permeable Boundaries: Judicial Federalism
A fourth aspect of the difficult task of understanding the present
requires a shift in focus, from a discussion exclusively about the
federal system to one that encompasses both federal and state judicia-
ries. As the Long Range Planning Committee discussed, 'judicial
federalism" has emerged as state and federal judges share an
understanding of the relationships between and interdependence of
federal and state court systems. ll7 Hints of a new judicial entity
(neither fish nor fowl, neither state nor federal) are quite recent. 118 In
the 1980s, federal and state judges began to cross jurisdictional lines,
to reach out to each other, to coordinate schedules, and to talk about
shared problems.
113. Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 374 (1982).
114. WOLF HEYDEBRAND & CARROLL SERON, RATIONALIZING JUSTICE 1 (1990).
115. Id. at 13 (the volume itself is devoted to exploring the rise of demand for court
services, the factors pressing toward rationalization including fiscal constraints coupled with
ever-increasing demands, and the theoretical and normative problems created).
116. Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process,
1994 WIS. L. REv. 631 [hereinafter Yeazell, Misunderstood Consequences].
117. 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 21 (chapter entitled "Judicial
Federalism"); 1994 DRAFT PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 19 (similar chap-
ter heading).
118. See J. Clifford Wallace, Before State and Federal Courts Clash, JUDGES' J., Fall
1995, at 36 (calling for coordination).
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One impetus for such joint work was the large-scale aggregated
litigation; while formally based either in state or federal court,
resolution of these cases increasingly depends on "global peace" - a
settlement that includes all litigants. But incentives to coordinate come
from a wide variety of sources,119 ranging from specific topics such
as prisoners' filings, criminal caseloads, and ethical rules to more
general concerns that prompted leaders of both sets of judiciaries to
create institutional arrangements to link them. 120 In 1990, the
Conference of Chief Justices of State Courts and the Judicial
Conference of the United States Courts authorized the creation of a
''National Federal-State Judicial Council"121 to enable consideration of
issues of mutual concern. In 1992, the first national conference of state
and federal judges demonstrated the interest in increased coordina-
tion. 122 In the fall of 1994, the National Center for State Courts
hosted a con£::rence for federal and state judges, lawyers, and
academics specifically to discuss joint work related to mass tortS. 123 A
119. Proceedings of the Western Regional Conference on State-Federal Judicial Rela-
tionships, 155 F.R.D. 233, 273-74 (1993) (then Chief Judge Barbara Rothstein, of the United
States District Court for the Western District of Washington, discussing state-federal coordi-
nation) [hereinafter Western Regional Conference].
120. See, e.g., Vincent L. McKusick, Combining Resources, NAT'L. L.1., Nov. 19, 1990,
at 13 (fonner presidl:nt of the Conference of Chief Justices of the State Courts arguing for
coordination in the context of drug cases).
121. Hany W. Swegle, Washington Perspective, STATE COURT 1., Fall 1990, at 2 ("It
took 200 years to get around to it, but state and federal judges soon will begin talking to
one another at the national level on a fonnally structured and continuing basis.").
122. Malcolm M. Lucas, Keynote Address: National Conference on State-Federal Judi-
cial Relationships, 78 VA. 1. REv. 1663 (1992) (introducing the conference); Edward B.
McConnell, Planning for the State and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L. REv. 1849 (1992) (de-
scribing the mechanisms for coordinated work, the federal judicial committees on which state
judges serve, and the conferences that had occurred); see also Western Regional Conference,
supra note 119, at 237 (Reporter John B. Oakley's preface describes the regional conference
as implementing the "principles" of the 1992 meeting); William K. Slate, Proceedings of the
Middle Atlantic State-Federal Judicial Relationships Conference, 162 F.R.D. 173 (1994)
(describing that gathering, also stemming from the 1992 meeting) [hereinafter Middle Atlantic
Conference]; Victor Eugene Flango & Maria Schmidt, Administrative Cooperation between
State and Federal Courts, JUDGES' J., Spring 1995, at 3 (summarizing survey of judge and
court administrators about their views on areas for cooperation).
123. National Mass Tort Conference Held in Cincinnati, STATE JUSTICE INSTITUTE
NEWS, Winter 1995, at 1, 8 (describing the National Mass Torts Conference, held Nov. lO-
B, 1994, in Cincinnati, Ohio). The papers presented at that conference are published in the
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national newsletter now reports on the increasingly routine interactions
of state and federal court systems.124
.The fruits of coordination are beginning to be visible - in the
press, law reviews, and occasionally in the case law. Despite the for-
mal statements of statutes and doctrine - that federal and state judicial
systems are distinct and there are no mechanisms for inter-jurisdictional
consolidation12S informally, federal and state judges are
increasingly co-venturers, working with each other.126 Federal and
state judges in charge of "All Brooklyn Navy Yard" asbestos cases
literally sat in the same room, jointly convening a "state and federal
court" and ruling together on issues.127 In the Exxon Valdez litiga-
tion, federal and state judges coordinated scheduling both the pretrial
and trial processes.128 The state-created Mass Tort Litigation Commit-
tee ("MTLC"), comprised of a judge from each of several states that
have many mass tort cases, worked with the federal district judge
Symposium, National Mass Tort Conference, 73 TEx. L. REv. 1523 (1995).
124. STAlE-FEDERAL JUDICIAL OBSERVER: NEWS AND COMMENTARY OF INTEREsT TO
TIIE STAlE AND FEDERAL JUDICIARY Goint publication of the Fedeml Judicial Center and the
National Center for State Courts, first issue, Jan. 1993).
125. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1994). This statute was relied on in part to preclude
state-fedeml consolidation in In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982).
126. William W Schwarzer, Nancy E. Weiss & Alan Hirsch, Judicial Federalism in
Action: Coordination of Litigation in State and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L. REv. 1689
(1992); see also John B. Oakley, The Future Relationship of California's State and Federal
Courts: An Essay on Jurisdictional Reform, the Transformation of Property, and the New
Age of Information, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 2233 (1993) (calling in the short term for coordi-
nation and in the longer term for unification).
127. See, for example, the work of Judge Helen E. Freedman of the New York State's
Supreme Court, and Judge Jack B. Weinstein of the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York, in "All Brooklyn Navy Yard" asbestos cases. In re Joint E.
& S. Districts Asbestos Litig., 737 F. Supp. 735 (E. & S.D.N.Y. & Sup. Ct N.Y. 1990);
In re New York City Asbestos Litig., 123 B.R 7 (E. & S.D.N.Y. & Sup. Ct N.Y. 1990);
In re Joint E. & S. Districts Asbestos Litig., 129 F.RD. 434 (E. & S.D.N.Y. & Sup. Ct
N.Y. 1990).
128. See The Hon. H. Russel Holland, The Exxon Valdez: Was There a Second Disas-
ter? 1, 8-12 (presentation at the National Mass Tort Conference, Cinn. Ohio, Nov. 10, 1994)
(on fIle with the author) (detailing the state and fedeml judicial efforts to coordinate
discovery and case prepamtion); see also Notice of Related Case, a recommendation of the
California State-Fedeml Council, in which counsel would be obliged to inform judges of
related cases pending in either state or fedeml courts (Sept, 1994) (on fIle with the author).
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assigned the multi-district breast implant litigation; thereafter that judge
appointed one of the state judges as the head of the claim processing
facility created as a part of a proposed settlement. 129
Further, proposals have been made to change the formal prohibi-
tion on inter-jurisdictional transfers and consolidations. In 1991, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Law approved the
Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act, designed to enable "transfer of
litigation from a court in one judicial system to a court in another
judicial system.'>130 In 1993, the American Law Institute approved a
proposal for complex litigation that included provisions for consolida-
tion of litigation across state and federal lines in either state or federal
court. 131 Moreover, while the focus here is civil jurisdiction, the idea
of sharing resources and crossing boundaries is longstanding on the
criminal side, in which "cross-designation" of federal and state agents
and prosecutors cross the lines between state and federal courts for
crime enforcement purposes. 132
129. Details of a proposed and now defunct settlement can be found in In re Silicone
Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig. (Lindsey v. Dow Coming Corp) (MDL 926), No.
CV94-P-11558-S, 1994 WL 578353 (N.D. Ala. Sept 1, 1994). See supra note 8; see also
Henry Weinstein, $3.7-Bil/ion Implant Settlement Wins Tentative OK, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 5,
1994, at A3 (Federal District Judge Sam Pointer appointed the Hon. Ann T. Cochran, who
subsequently resigned from the Texas state court judicial system, to serve as claims adminis-
trator of the settlement fund). Some of the duties of the administrator are described in In re
Silicone Gel Breast Implant, 1994 WL 578353 at *10, *14, *25. See also Sandra Mazer
Moss, State-Federal and Interstate Cooperation, Case Management Techniques Move Complex
Litigation, Hasten Disposition ofAsbestos, Other Cases, STAlE-FEDERAL JUDICIAL OBSERVER,
Apr. 1993, at 3; Middle Atlantic Conftrence, supra note 122, at 202-11 (detailing coordi-
nation among state and federal judges in that and other mass torts).
130. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STAlE LAWS, UNIFORM
TRANSFER OF LmGA110N ACT (1992) (prefatory note) (approved by the National Conference,
Aug. 1991 and approved by the American Bar Association, Feb. 1992), reprinted in AMERI-
CAN LAW INSTITIJ1E, COMPLEX LmGATlON: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS
WITH REPORlER'S SlUDY at 551 (Appendix C) (1994) [hereinafter ALI, COMPLEX LmGA-
TlON].
131. ALI, COMPLEX LmGATlON, supra note 130, at 165-216.
132. In 1870, Congress gave the Attorney General of the United States the authority to
appoint special attorneys to assist in the "trial of any case." Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150,
16 Stat 162, 164 (now codified, as amended, at 28 U.S.C. § 515(a) and § 518(b) (1994)).
Since then, Congress has provided additional authority for cross-designation under specific
statutes. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 5776a(e) (West 1995) (child abduction cases). Parallel
statutes exist in many states; see, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-20I(I)(c) (West
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The physical boundaries of state and federal courts (even with the
"100 mile bulge"l33) have so often been inscribed that it is hard to.
1995) (authorizing the appointment of special prosecutorial deputies, including United States
attorneys and their assistants); see also J. Clifford Wallace, A New Era of Federal-Tribal
Court Cooperation, 79 JUOICA1URE 150, 153 (1995) (discussing designation by federal
authorities in Arizona and Oregon of tribal prosecutors as special assistant United States
Attorneys). Courts have often affirmed prosecutorial authority to cross-designate, declined to
require specificity in the commissions of such designees, and welcomed the use of such
coordinated activity of both prosecutorial and investigatory officials of state and federal
courts. See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 221-22 (1960) (citing the need to
foster cooperation between state and federal law enforcement as a ground for adopting the
exclusionary rule in federal courts); United States v. Ucciferri, 960 F.2d 953 (11th Cir.
1992) (reinstating a federal indictment based on investigation primarily conducted by state
authorities).
133. FED. R. CN. P. 4(f) (1963 amendments) (providing that those litigants "brought in
as parties pursuant to Rule 13(h) or Rule 14, or as additional parties to a pending action
pursuant to Rule 19, may be served . . . at all places outside the state but within the
United States that are not more than 100 miles from the place in which the action is com-
menced, or to which it is assigned or transferred for trial"). According to Wright and
Miller, the 1963 amendments "recognize[d] the increased incidence of multiparty litigation in
the federal courts and the need to compromise territorial boundaries in order to facilitate the
handling of these cases." 4A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & AR1HUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1127, p.332 (2d ed. 1987).
The import of the 1963 amendment providing the "bulge" has been differently de-
scribed. Benjamin Kaplan, then reporter for the Advisory Committee that drafted the rule,
called the amendment "modest," analogized it to interpleader in that both enable federal
judges to hear "entire controversies," and argued both its constitutionality and propriety;
Kaplan also noted that the rule responded to instances when states could not constitutionally
reach the "entire controversy." Benjamin Kaplan, Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 1961-63 (1), 77 HARv. L. REv. 601, 629-34 (1964). In contrast, Allan Vestal
termed the change "monumental" because it represented a move from the "traditional limited
reach of the federal courts" and represented the "broad historical trend toward the supremacy
of the federal government" Allan D. Vestal, Expanding the Jurisdictional Reach of the
Federal Courts: The 1963 Changes in Federal Rule 4, 38 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1053, 1053, 1077
(1963).
In 1993, the relevant provision was moved to FED. R. CN. P. 4(k)(I)(B) and the
language changed somewhat (providing for service of parties joined under either Rules 14 or
19 and "served at a place within a judicial district of the United States and not more than
100 miles from the place from which the summons issues"). As the 1993 Advisory Note
explained: "In the light of present-day facilities for communication and travel, the territorial
range of the service allowed, analogous to that which applies to the service of a subpoena
under Rule 45(e)(I), can hardly work hardship on the parties summoned" and also noted
that some "metropolitan areas spanO more than one state." The 1993 amendments also pro-
vide for nationwide service of process in federal question cases. See FED. R. CN. P.
4(k)(I)(D).
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see that the lines are blurring. When federal and state judges sit
together, they make permeable the boundaries between the two sets of
courts and deconstruct the reality of discrete and independent court
systems.
E. Gaping Holes
I have just outlined four sets of changes, one related to the
providers of adjudication, a second related to the size or unit of the
matter to be resolved, a third related to the nature of the processing of
civil cases, and a fourth related to the interactions among two theoreti-
cally distinct jurisdictions with separate sets of judges. I do not want
to leave this descriptive enterprise without making plain the many
missing elements and the partial perspective that I am offering.
Some may share my postmodem angst, self-conscious about narra-
tives and appreciative not only of multiple vantage points but also the
contingent nature of even these glimpses. Whether one does or not, I
assume all will appreciate the impoverished empirical position from
which we begin and agree that, to the extent possible, future plans
should be predicated upon detailed information about the current state
of affairs. While many claims are made about litigation in the federal
courts, we actually know far less than we would need to about the
costs, time, processes, and modes of litigation and about the partici-
pants. Data collection on the federal courts is not only a relatively
recent phenomenon at a systematic level,134 it is also a limited one.
FED. R. CN. P. 45, which provides for service of subpoenas, has an analogous pro-
vision, permitting su(:h service "at any place without the district that is within 100 miles of
the place of the deposition, hearing, trial, production, or inspection." That fedeml courts
could reach outside their own territory has been a longstanding proposition of fedeml law;
under a 1793 provision, a fedeml court could subpoena witnesses not within the district but
within "one hundred miles from the place of holding" the hearing. See 1 Stat. 333, 335, ch.
22, § 6 (1793).
134. 28 U.S.C. §§ 601, 604 (1994) (duties of Director of Administrative Office of
United States Courts include examining "the state of the dockets of the courts" and reporting
on "business of the courts"). That office was created in 1939. Act of August 7, 1939, Pub.
L. No. 76-299, 53 Stat 1223 (1939) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 601-620 (1994)). In
1967, Congress also created the Fedeml Judicial Center; its charge includes research on the
fedeml courts. Act of Dec. 20, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-219, 81 Stat. 664 (current version at
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As the long range planners themselves were acutely aware,135 whole
categories of information remain unavailable. While researchers are
calling for development of "legal indicators" (standardized measures to
understand the component elements of litigation, to enable focus on
users of the courts, as well as on providers and institutions, and to
capture something of the interactions among professionals, litigants, and
other participants in the justice system)/36 the current discussion of
federal court jurisdiction goes on without such sign posts.
First, we lack systematic information about the litigants and non-
lawyer participants in the federal courts. Neither I nor anyone else can
answer questions such as: Who uses the federal courts? What
percentage of lawsuits of what kinds are filed by which people from
which areas in the United States? I do not want to overstate. Federal
efforts at collecting data are impressive and constantly under
reconsideration; more information is available about certain pockets of
the docket (such as the characteristics of criminal defendants) than
others. 137 Further, ad hoc, intensive research (some but not all
28 U.S.C. § 620 (1994)). Before the creation in 1939 of the Administrative Office, the
Attorney Geneml of the United States provided reports to Congress. See, e.g., 1935 ANNuAL
REpORT OF TIlE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TIlE UNITED STATES FOR TIlE FISCAL YEAR
(1935); Will Shafroth, Federal Judicial Statistics, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 200, 204-06
(1948).
135. See 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 99-100 (Recommenda-
tion 81(a); calling for the Judicial Conference "to establish a steering group to coordinate
and define the process" of data collection, and that such a group, consisting of outside re-
searchers as well as judiciary members do an "assessmenf' study to help "design the most
appropriate single or coordinated network of data bases"); Action Notice, supra note 26
(Recommendation 81 approved); 1994 DRAFT PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4,
at 83-84 (Recommendation 78) (similar provision).
136. See Deborah R. Hensler, Developing Civil Justice Indicators: A Fmmework for
Discussion, paper prepared for a Workshop on Civil Justice Indicators (Feb. 1993) (referring
to Stanton Wheeler's use of the term in the 1970s in a paper prepared for a conference
convened by the Chief Justice Warren Burger); Marc Galanter, Bryant Garth, Deborah R.
Hensler, & Frances Kahn Zemans, How To Improve Civil Justice Policy, 77 JUDICAWRE
185 (1994).
137. On the civil side, the Administrative Office provides data on the numbers of cases
commenced by "basis of jurisdiction" and "nature of suif' as well as giving information on
the kinds of action taken by courts. See, e.g., 1994 AO REPORT, supra note 13, at tbls. C-
2, C-4. On the criminal side, the categories include the "major offense" and disposition. Id.
at tbls. D-2, D-4. In addition, both the Bureau of Prisons and Sentencing Commission are
data sources. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T JUSTICE, STATE OF TIlE BUREAU 36-37 (1992) (data on
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federally-sponsored) in particular areas is starting to provide partial
pictures about sets of litigants,138 but we remain impoverished by our
own ignorance of the population for whom the federal courts provide
judicial services. 139
Turning to other participants in the litigation system, we have no
nationally published data about the number of women and men of what
ethnicities and races who serve on grand and petit juries, about who
serves repeatedly, who never. 140 We have limited knowledge about
those who serve as experts for the federal courts, 141 those appointed
to positions such as special masters, court-annexed arbitrators, and
fedeml inmates based on gender, mce, ethnicity, age, citizenship); UNITED STATES
SENTENCING COMMISSION, ANNuAL REPORT 41-54 (1992) (detailing mce, ethnicity, gender,
age, citizenship and mode of conviction for defendants sentencing under the guidelines); see
also LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, PRISONS AND PRISONERS IN TIIE UNITED STATES (Bureau of
Justice Statistics, 1992) (surveying both state and fedeml convicted defendants and describing
them by gender, race, ethnicity).
138. See, e.g., Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Con-
sumer Debtors Ten Years Later: A Financial Comparison of Consumer Bankrupts, 1981-91,
68 AM. BANKR. LJ. 121 (1994); TEREsA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABElH WARREN & JAY LAW-
RENCE WESTBROOK, As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT
IN AMERICA 147-65 (1989) [hereinafter BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT]; see also
Karen Gross, Re-vision of the Bankruptcy System: New Images of Individual Debtors, 88
MICH. L. REv. 1506, 1526-28 (1990).
139. The '''customer service'" approach for which the Proposed Long Range Plan calls
cannot easily be implemented without ongoing information about who the customers are. See
1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 101-02 (Recommendation 85); Action
Notice, supra note 26 (Recommendation 85 accepted); 1994 DRAFT PROPOSED LONG RANGE
PLAN, supra note 4, at 86 (Recommendation 82) (similar).
140. From specially-chartered task forces, one gleans a bit of information. For example,
according to the DRAFT FINAL REPORT OF TIIE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON GENDER TO THE
D.C. CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON GENDER, RAcE, AND ETHNIC BIAS at 35-36 (Jan, 1995)
(hereinafter D.C. CIRCUIT GENDER BIAS REPORT], during a six-month period in 1993, about
56 percent of the petit jurors serving in the District were women and 44 percent men.
According to the Ninth Circuit's review of one year, about half of the empaneled grand
jurors within the Circuit were female. THE EFFECTS OF GENDER IN THE FEDERAL COURTS,
THE FINAL REPORT OF TIIE NINTH CIRCUIT GENDER BIAS TASK FORCE, reprinted in 67 S.
CAL. L. REv. 745, 783 (1994) [hereinafter THE EFFECTS OF GENDER].
141. See Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. WiIIging, Court-Appointed Experts, in REFERENCE
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 525 (1994) (relying on mailed survey and telephone
information to obtain data on judicial use of experts appointed pursuant to FED. R. EVID.
706); Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. WiIIging, The Use of Court-Appointed Experts in Federal
Courts, 78 JUDICATURE 41 (1994) (summarizing data from same study).
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those who serve on court committees.142 As of 1992, no national
mechanism routinely collected data about how each district selected
lawyers to represent indigent criminal defendants; what qualifications
were required; how one might be denied appointments because of prior
poor performance; or which individual lawyers received what amounts
of compensation over any period of years. 143 We also do not know
the percentage of lawyers within the federal bar who appear in more
than one circuit yearly and how many routinely go back and forth
among which state and federal courts.
Turning from the litigants to the beginning of the civil litigation
process itself, those lawyers who have filed lawsuits in the federal
courts know that a form called a "civil cover sheet" must be
completed. This form is a primary source of data on what kinds of
cases are filed in the federal courts but has not been revised in major
respects in several years. 144 One weakness is that attorneys are asked
142. When task forces chartered by the federal courts have sought to paint a demo-
graphic picture of the workplace, they have had to poll each district to learn what commit-
tees existed in the courts, how lawyer representatives were selected to attend judicial
conferences, and how each district appointed magistrates. See, e.g., D.C. CIRCUIT GENDER
BIAS REPORT, supra note 140, at 26-31 (court committees, invitees to judicial conference,
panelists, and ADR providers); Lee Seltman, Appointment of Special Masters to the Supreme
Court and the Ninth Circuit (June, 1992) (Working Paper of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias
Task Force, on file with author); Veronica Gentilli, Composition of the Civil Justice Reform
Act Advisory Groups (May, 1992) (Working Paper of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task
Force, on file with author); Susan Factor & Veronica Gentilli, Procedures for the Selection
of Magistrate Judges within the Ninth Circuit (January, 1993) (Working Paper of the Ninth
Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, on file with author). Other researchers have also undertaken
original data collection. See Lauren K. Robel, Grass Roots Procedure: Local Advisory
Groups and the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 879, 893-98 (1993)
(survey of 485 members of Advisory Committees appointed pursuant to the Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1991).
143. Specially-chartered research projects provide information upon occasion. See, e.g.,
REPORT OF TIlE COMMITIEE TO REvIEw TIlE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT (prado Report), re-
printed in 52 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2265 (Mar. 10, 1993); Maria E. Stratton & Sheryl
Gordon McCloud, Composition of the Criminal Justice Act Panels (June, 1992) (Working
Paper of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force, on file with author); see also THE
EFFECTS OF GENDER, supra note 140, at 788 (Table 3.1).
144. Form #JS44 was last updated in July of 1989 (conversation with staff of the Ad-
ministrative Office of the United States Courts, June, 1995). Revisions from a form a few
years earlier appear minor, such as adding a subcategory "drug related seizure of property"
under the section entitled "nature of suit" and the subsection entitled "forfeiture/penalty." In
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to identify a single code for the "kind of action." Since many com-
plaints include multiple causes of actions, this requirement builds in
insufficient descriptions that form the bases for classification of cases
thereafter.
Despite aggregate litigation's now major impact on the federal
courts, relatively little systematic information is currently gathered
about that genre. No centralized agency is currently in charge of sur-
veying and understanding the interrelationships among multi-district
cases, class actions, consolidations, and other forms of aggregation. 145
For example, data about the :MDL statute146 (by which cases are
joined across districts for pretrial processing and often for their dura-
tion) are kept in. part by the Administrative Office of the United States
COurtS147 and in part by the panel on Multi-District Litigation created
by that statute. 148 Moreover, an ongoing Federal Judicial Center spe-
cial study reports problems with national data that underestimate the
number of class actions. 149 Moving from initiation to the pretrial
1978, the fonn was revised to "provide more detailed accounting of Social Security cases, to
clarifY the fonn regarding class action allegations and jury demand." See Memorandum to
Clerks of the United States District Courts from William E. Foley, Director, Administrative
Office of the United States Courts at 1 (Dec. 8, 1978) (on file with author).
145. Published materials do not systematically evaluate the interrelationships among class
actions and MDL cases, including data on who is initiating the request for MDL status, how
often cases are first rejected and later certified under MDL, the frequency with which class
action certification precedes MDL treatment For example, while data are available on
whether class actions were requested in cases in which MDL status is also sought, data are
not readily available on how many of those cases include class action certifications, nor can
one readily learn which judges have been assigned multiple MDL proceedings. For further
discussion of the infonnation now available, see Resnik, Aggregation, supra note 97, at 112-
15.
146. 28 U.S.C. !i 1407 (1994) (discussed supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text).
147. See, e.g., ADMINISlRATIVE OFFICE OF TIlE UNIlED STATES COURTS, UNITED
STATES COURTS: SELEClED REPORTS AI-87 (Table C-5), 55 (Table S-lO) (1993) (of 220,000
pending civil cases in the federal district courts in 1993, 37,000 or almost 17% were sub-
jected to MDL treatment).
148. The Office of the Clerk of the MDL Panel in Washington, D.C., compiles infor-
mation on the types of actions in which MDL status is requested and the action taken. See
Multidistrict Automated Tracking System: Citations Summary and the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation, Statistical Analysis of Multidistrict Litigation: Cumulative From Sep-
tember 1968 Through September 30, 1994.
149. Thomas E. WiIIging, Laurel L. Hooper, & Robert J. Niemic, Preliminary Report
on Time Study Class Actions Cases (Memorandum to the Advisory Committee on Civil
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process (which has come to dominate civil litigationISO), statistical
information has not followed that change. The current data continue
their focus on trials, whether concluded by judge or jury decision. lSI
While settlement is a topic of enormous interest for contemporary
litigation,IS2 we know relatively little about how settlements occur
currently in federal courts, what forms of settlements are desired by
parties, and how much judicial time is taken when consent judgments,
in contrast to dismissals, are sought. Turning to trials themselves, cur-
rent data collection does not distinguish between evidentiary hearings
and motions,ls3 making it difficult to know how many "trials" occur
annually.ls4 Similarly, as the use of various alternative dispute resolu-
tion ("ADR") procedures increases, ISS it is essential to learn what
fraction of cases, of different types, are being disposed of by what
Rules, Feb. 9, 1995) (describing that the statistical infonnation provided by the Administra-
tive Office underreported the numbers of class actions found upon reviewing a random sam-
ple of filings in specific district courts) (on file with author).
150. See Yeazell, Misunderstood Consequences, supra note 116, at 632-39 ("Civil pro-
cess based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has largely replaced trials with
motions.") (footnote omitted).
151. Two law professors from Cornell Law School have provided nationwide access, via
the "world wide web" internet system, to a data base they have created by using Admin-
istrative Office data. As of this writing, data from more than three million civil cases tenni-
nated from 1971-1993 can be accessed; because those data derive from infonnation compiled
by the AO, the limitations outlined above apply to this set of data as well. See Theodore
Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clennont, Judicial Statistical Inquiry Form (created Apr. 20, 1995,
accessed by www.law.comell.edu/focus/statistics.htmlorted@teddy.law.comell.edu) ("For the
time being, to keep computer usage under control, you are limited to cases fully tried").
The computer-based data enables a good deal of research on outcomes of such cases. See
Presentation of Kevin Clennont, Whither Due Process? Here to Stay (presentation at the
American Association of Law Schools, Workshop on Civil Procedure, Washington D.C.,
June, 1995) (discussing the effects of transfers on the rate at which plaintiffs win cases).
152. See supra Section lIC.
153. 1994 AO REPORT, supra note 13, at 14 ("Trials include those proceedings
resulting in a verdict by a jury or final judgment by the court as well as other contested
hearings where evidence is presented.").
154. See Little, supra note 13, at 1048-49 (discussing the Administrative Office's defi-
nition of a "trial" and arguing that pretrial motions in criminal cases likely prompt eviden-
tiary hearings at rates more frequent than in civil trials, and therefore that the AO definition
makes criminal "trials" appear more frequently than they actually .occur); Charles D.
Weisselberg, Evidentiary Hearings in Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REv.
131, 165, n.188 (also describing the AO statistical definition or'trials and its problems).
155. Little, supra note 13, at 1048-49.
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kinds of different procedures and whether those answers change over
time. IS6 For example, while much discussion is had about ADR, the
frequency of its deployment is the subject of controversy.IS7
Let me tum now from questions about litigants and cases to
information about judges. Many aspects of the work of the newest sets
of federal judg<::s - magistrate and bankruptcy judges - are not data-
based. While individual circuits have conducted studies of magistrate
judges,IS8 while the FIe did a report in the mid-1980s on the use of
magistrate judges in nine districts,IS9 and while the Administrative
Office recently analyzed the governing case law,160 national data
bases do not provide ready access to the number and kind of delega-
tions to magistrate judges, the requests for review of magistrates'
156. Again, special research projects, focusing on a particular issue and a particular
time frame, undertaken by either the FJC or the AO illuminate some of these issues,
including implementution of the Civil Justice Reform Act and the use of ADR. See, e.g.,
Donna Steinstra, ADR in the Federal Courts, 7 FJC DIRECTIONS 4 (Dec., 1994). The
Institute for Civil Justice of RAND also has a congressional grant to study the effects of
the CJRA. See Terence Dunworth & James S. Kakalik, Preliminary Observations on Imple-
mentation of the Pilot Program of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REv.
1303 (1994).
157. See, e.g., Kim Dayton, The Myth of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal
Courts, 76 IOWA L. REv. 889, 917-18 (1991) (while several districts have ADR programs,
"many ... have never used any ADR procedure ... [or do so in] only a limited number
of cases"); Steinstra, supra note 156, at 5 ("at least two-thirds of the courts now authorize
one or more forms of ADR"); Dunworth & Kakalik, supra note 156, at 1330-34 (writing a
few years later that Dayton and reporting that virtually all of the "pilot districts" under the
Civil Justice Reform Act had "an ADR program of one kind or another," but also noting
that the volume of uctivity within such programs was not equal across districts).
158. REPORT OF TIlE NIN1H CIRCUIT JUDICIAL COUNCIL'S ADVISORY COMMI1TEE ON
UNI1ED STA1ES MAOISTRA1ES, STUDY OF MAGISTRA1ES WI1HIN TIlE NINrn CIRCUIT COURT
OF APPEALS (April 15, 1990).
159. CARROLL SERON, THE ROLE OF MAGISTRA1ES: NINE CASE STUDIES (Federal Judi-
cial Center 1985).
160. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF MAGISTRAlE JUDGE AurnoRITY, supra note 74.
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decisions,161 the number of reversals and affrrmances,162 or parallel
information about bankruptcy judges' rulings.
Other questions relate to the appellate process. Information is
available on the quantity of appeals, the time of processing, and
whether oral argument is had. General description is also provided
about whether cases are terminated "on the merits" as contrasted with
"procedural terminations," as well as whether decisions are reversed, as
contrasted with dismissed, remanded, affrrmed or enforced, or
something else.163 The bases on which appellate courts reversed trial
judges are not, however, adequately illuminated. For example, while
we know that in 1994, more than 10 percent of cases were reversed on
appeal,164 we do not know much about why cases were reversed (i.e.,
how often do appellate courts fmd errors in factfmding? what kinds of
errors of law are used as the bases for rejection?). Also, while one can
tell the frequency of oral argument, as contrasted with submission on
the papers,165 not reported is the frequency of unpublished decisions
nor which cases are selected for en bane review.
These kinds of materials would inform the current debate about
proposals to abolish appeal as of right, 166 which the Long Range
Planning Committee rejected.167 In light of increased reliance on staff
161. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1994).
162. Other issues relate to magistrate judges themselves, such as their selection, rates of
reappointment (for example to learn whether a system of de facto tenure evolves), and the
number of magistrate judges who subsequently become life tenured Article III judges. See
CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, UNITED STATES MAGIS1RATES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: SUBORDI-
NAlE JUDGES (1990) (history of magistrate judges including information on selection of
judges and their roles).
163. 1994 AO REPORT, supra note 13, at A-I to A-17 (Tables B, B-1, B-4, B-5, B-7).
164. Id at A-9 (Table B-5; U.S. Courts of Appeals Cases Terminated on the Merits
and including categories on nature of suit, such as "criminal," bankruptcy," civil excluding
prisoners, and also delineated by circuits).
165. Id. at A-2, Table B-1 (of 27,219 terminations on the merits, 11,047 occurred after
oral argument, while 16,172 occurred based on submission on the briefs).
166. REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITIEE ON COURT ADMINIS1RATION
AND CASE MANAGEMENT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITIEE ON LONG RANGE
PLANNING 8-9 (1993) (recommending discretionary appeals); see generally Judith Resnik, The
Death of Appeals?, 5 FIF1H CIRCUIT REP. 637 (1988).
167. See 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 41 (Recommendation
17; rejecting "the notion of discretionary appellate review"); Action Notice, supra note 26
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attorneys, unpublished opinions, and less oral argument, it is possible
that discretionary review has already taken hold in practice in certain
categories of cases, making the statutory right of appeal less signifi-
cant. In sum, our ability to understand the effects of proposals is
constrained by the limits of our knowledge of current practices across
the federal docket.
IV. SELECTING MEMORIES
The debate about federal jurisdiction is also constrained by invoca-
tions of the past that are partial and selective. Here again I use as
illustrative the Proposed Long Range Plan of the federal judiciary.
Recall its premises introduced at the outset: that the federal courts have
a special and distinct mission; that given the need to preserve such
distinction, a very few judges should have life tenure, but that this
corps is now facing too many cases. Hence, one of the proposed
responses was to argue that Congress should resist giving the federal
courts new work to do.
The 1995 Proposed Plan offers as its first recommendation the
"overarching principle" that Congress "commit itself to conserving the
federal courts as a distinctive judicial forum of limited jurisdiction . . .
[and assign cases] only to further clearly defined and justified national
interests, leaving to the state courts the responsibility for adjudicating
all other matters."168 To that end, the plan states a series of "pruden-
tial guidelines for limiting federal jurisdiction."169 Where do
(Recommendation 17 deferred). The 1994 draft adopted the same position. 1994 DRAFT PRO-
POSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 35.
168. 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 23 (Recommendation 1); Ac-
tion Notice, supra note 26 (Recommendation 1 deferred). The 1994 dmft did not offer a
pamllel geneml frame but its subsequent recommendations contained the same premise.
169. 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 23; see also id. at 27 (Rec-
ommendation 6; calling for Congress to "exercise restmint in the enactment of new statutes
that assign civil jurisdiction to the fedeml courts and [to do] so only to further clearly de-
fined and justified fedeml interests"); Action Notice, supra note 26 (Recommendation 6
deferred); 1994 DRAFT PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 23 (Recommendation
5; stating that "Congroess should assign civil jurisdiction to the fedeml courts only to further
clearly defined and justified fedeml interests, and it should not create new rights of action
concerning matters tmditionally cognizable by state courts").
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presumptions against federal jurisdiction and such guidelines come
from? While historical use of the federal courts was often invoked by
the planners, its premises come from remembering part, but not all, of
the past.
A. Many Jurisdictional Histories
The implicit baseline of the Long Range Plan is that what has
been within the jurisdictional preserve of the state courts should not,
absent special justification, become a matter for federal court jurisdic-
tion. At points, this approach translates into an assumption that what
has been state jurisdiction is presumptively what should be. 170 Yet the
planners do not take the same approach to federal jurisdictional history;
they also propose de-accessing certain historical categories of federal
jurisdiction. Several problems accompany this selective reliance on
historical categories of jurisdiction.
First, no single history exists. Instead, there are a series of tradi-
tions about the allocation of authority between state and federal courts.
These traditions are multifaceted and rich, permitting a range of nor-
mative claims to be couched in historical practices but varying
On the criminal side, the planners state that in "principle, criminal activity should be
prosecuted in a fedeml court only in those instances in which state court prosecution is not
appropriate or where fedeml interests are paramount" See 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE
PLAN, supra note 4, at 23 (Recommendation 2); Action Notice, supra note 26 (Recommen-
dation 2 deferred); 1994 DRAFT PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 20 (Recom-
mendation 1, similar); see also Weis Statement, supra note 27 ("Planning for the future
must include measures to limit the caseload and the size of the fedeml courts to the extent
that the judiciary can do so"). Judge Weis chaired the Fedeml Courts Study Committee. Id.
170. Justice Scalia has used a related approach to define the content of proceduml due
process. See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (upholding state
court jurisdiction based on the physical presence of a defendant when served; that pmctice
was both "old" and "continuing," and such "continuing tmditions of our legal system . . .
define the due process standard of 'tmditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."');
see also Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 446 (1992) (Kennedy, J. for the Court, also
relying on "historical treatment" as a basis for determining due process rights).
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significantly. 171 Even if the touchstone of what should be is what was
- to what within the 200 years of history should one hark back?
For exampl1e, in an essay a few years ago, Richard Fallon nicely
set forth two competing conceptions of the federal judicial role. He
termed one a "nationalist model" and another a "federalist model," and
then detailed the claims made on behalf of both and the historically
relevant moments to which each turned. 172 For the federalists, the
founding of the nation is key; the states are the backdrop court system,
and the federal courts are part of the extra court system, to be em-
ployed only in the exceptional moment. 173 For the nationalists, the
Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment, the New Deal, and the 1960s
Civil Rights movement revised the story and shifted the focus; the
stress is on federal courts involvement.174 From these differing
171. The recent Supreme Court debate about the reach of Congress's powers illustrates
the degree to which debate about the fundamental contours of fedemlism remain unresolved;
in the two major decisions of the 1995 term, the Court was divided 5-4 in each. See. e.g.,
United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (Congress lacks power to prohibit the sale
of a gun within a 1000 feet of schools because such activity lacks sufficient relationship to
interstate commerce); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995) (states do
not have authority to alter qualifications for national offices).
172. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REv.
1141, 1151-64 (1988) [hereinafter Fallon, Ideologies]. Other scholars have offered different
delineations. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views of Federalism: "Converse-I983" in
Context, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1229, 1231-32 (1994) (discussing "perspectives" on the relation-
ship between state and fedeml courts) [hereinafter Amar, Five Views]; Debomh Jones Merritt,
Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a Formula for the Future, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1563
(1994) (describing "tl:rritorial," "fedeml process," and "autonomy" models). But see Bruce
Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 475, 569
(1995) (arguing that a series of rebellious moments constitutes our "ongoing tradition of
revolutionary reform").
173. Fallon, Ideologies, supra note 172, at 1151-57 (states as equally "competent" and
absent contraIy evidence, fedeml judges should assume state court abilities).
174. Id. at 1158-64 (discussing the "special role" for federal judiciary and ready ac-
cess). See also Amar, Five Views, supra note 172, at 1231-32 (describing the perspective of
the states as "wrongdoers"); Burt Neubome, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105
(1977) (discussing the states as wrongdoers in need of federal oversight); LARRY W.
YACKLE, RECLAIMING TIlE FEDERAL COURTS 34-44 (1994) (arguing that the federal courts
are "far better forums for the vindication of rights than are the state courts"); and Robert
Jerome Glennon, The Jurisdictional Legacy of the Civil Rights Movement, 61 TENN. L. REv.
869 (1994) (providing a historical case study of events in the southern parts of the United
States in the 1950s and 1960s and arguing that jurisdictional rules are deeply embedded in
particular disputes).
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VISIons, one could create two kinds of presumptions, one about pre-
sumptive reliance on state courts and the other about a presumptive
welcome to the federal courts. .
One could use other examples of jurisdictional tradition - not
aspiring to a two-century overview but instead focused on specific
areas of law. As Professor Rory Little has summarized it, by 1790
federal criminal jurisdiction reached bribery, false statements, "murder,
maiming, theft, fraud, and even receiving stolen property.'H7S
Scanning the two centuries, Professor John Jeffries and Judge John
Gleeson concluded that, even before the 1994 crime bill, "federal law
reached virtually all robberies, most schemes to defraud, many firearms
offenses, all loansharking, most illegal gambling operations, most
briberies, and every drug deal, no matter how small ...."176
During this century, calls for increased federal jurisdiction over
crime have become common. As a 1934 commentator put it: "Recent
hysteria brought on by a number of sensational crimes has given rise
to insistent demands for vastly increased federal activity in criminal
law administration."177 One could therefore describe federal criminal
175. Little, supra note 13, at 1063; see also id. at 1034 (arguing that it is mythic to
perceive of the "federalization of crime [as] a new phenomenon."); David P. Currie, The
Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in the First Congress, 1789-1791, 61 U. Cm. L.
REv. 775, 833 (1994) (describing congressional creation of federal crimes beyond the
"explicit constitutional authority" and arguing that the First Congress believed itself
authorized to create federal criminal law "necessary and proper to the exercise of some other
explicit federal power") (footnote omitted). In contrast to Little, Professor Kathleen F.
Brickey argues that the "federalization of American criminal law is a twentieth century
phenomenon." Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief The Federalization of American
Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS LJ. 1135, 1135, 1137-41 (1995).
176. John C. Jeffries Jr. & John Gleeson, The Federalization of Organized Crime: Ad-
vantages of Federal Prosecution, 46 HASTINGS LJ. 1095, 1095-96 (1995). For a snapshot a
half century earlier, see L.B. Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutors' Dis-
cretion, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 64 (1948) (discussing "national criminal jurisdiction,
[ranging from] treason to hunting offenses, occupying approximately one quarter of the fed-
eral judges' time") (footnote omitted).
177. Jerome Hall, Federal Anti-Theft Legislation, 1 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 424, 426-
34 (1934) (describing the enactment of the National Motor Vehicle Act of 1919 and the
enlargement of federal jurisdiction over thefts); see also John Brabner-Smith, Firearm Regu-
lation, 1 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 400, 405 (1934) (discussing the then first federal legis-
lation regulating guns).
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jurisdiction as having an expansive tradition, providing the basis for yet
further congressional enactments. Alternatively, while federal jurisdic-
tion over a variety of crimes has now a long and distinguished tradi-
tion,178 one may well want - given other national priorities - to
abandon some of what has now become familiar if not traditional areas
of federal court jurisdiction.179
That history is messy or multi-faceted does not require rejection of
historical practices but rather self-conscious work at exploring how and
why one selects a particular set of practices as exemplary. But other
difficulties also counsel skepticism about drawing sustaining guidance
from history in this particular context. A good deal of discussion of
the jurisdictional boundaries of the federal courts depends on the invo-
cation of these categories as if they had clear content. As the final
report of the Long Range plan put it, the task is "identifying the
essentials of federal court jurisdiction.,,18o But given the long history
of concurrency of jurisdiction authority, state and federal courts overlap
and resemble each other - in caseload terms - in an array of areas.
If some areas have yet to be fully included in the overlap, should they
now be precluded because they come to the fore during an era in
which barriers to federal jurisdiction are advocated?
Moreover, "state" and "federal" interests are not pre-existing sets
but are interactive and interdependent conceptions that vary over
178. One might delineate two traditions, one that existed during the first century of the
countl)"s life and a second, developed over the past one hundred years. Schwartz argued
that for almost a century, the federal government's criminal machinery was directed toward
prosecuting "acts direc:tly injurious to the central government" Schwartz, supra note 176, at
65. However, after the Civil War, Congress turned to "employing federal sanctions to protect
private individuals from invasion of their rights by other private individuals - a traditional
function of state law." Id. According to Schwartz, the "gradual assumption of the power to
punish for ordinary crimes proceeded concurrently with a great expansion of the role of the
central government in many public-welfare fields." Id at 66.
179. The Long Range Plan followed this route in part; see 1995 PROPOSED LONG
RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 25 (Recommendation 3; "Congress should review existing
federal criminal Statutl~S with the goal of eliminating provisions no longer serving an essen-
tial federal purpose."); Action Notice, supra note 26 (Recommendation 3 deferred); 1994
DRAFT PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 22 (Recommendation 2, similar).
180. 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 23 (emphasis added); 1994
DRAIT PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 20 (same).
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time. 181 This problem surfaces repeatedly in debates among Supreme
Court justices about the meaning and reach of the Tenth Amend-
ment,182 the Eleventh Amendment, and the Commerce Clause. At
issue in Tenth Amendment debates are the kinds of activities so essen-
tial to a state's sovereignty that the United States Supreme Court
should announce that Congress is constitutionally prohibited from legis-
lating. For example, could Congress insist on minimum wages for state
employees or was the decision about payment of employees an "essen-
tial" attribute of sovereignty that was the constitutional preserve of the
states?
Reading these federalism cases, one is reminded that the construc-
tion of roads and the provision of social welfare were once deemed
"private" activities, superintended by neither the state nor federal
governments,183 while educational facilities were often supported by
public and private resources.184 Mark Tushnet makes a further point:
181. For critique of theoretical approaches in other contexts that assume the validity and
utility of conceiving of socially-embedded categories in essential terms, see ELIZABETII
SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988);
Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581
(1990).
182. See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (invalidating
the Fair Labor Standards Act's application to localities); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Tran-
sit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (overruling National League of Cities and upholding congres-
sional authority to regulate wages of transit workers of a locality); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (while Congress can create incentives for states to share in the
problems of nuclear waste disposal, the federal government cannot compel states to accept
nuclear waste). As Professor Erwin Chemerinsky rightly points out, while the Supreme Court
was denying states' claims to exemptions from federal legislation based on federalism, the
Court was also relying on federalism as a justification for denying federal jurisdiction over
an array of cases. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, U. FLA. L. REv. (forth-
coming 1995). More recently, as the Court has relied on federalism to check Congress, a
more symmetrical approach exists. !d. at 25 (manuscript on file with the author).
183. See, e.g., Garcia, 469 U.S. at 539-47 (Justice Blackmun described the difficulty of
distinguishing "governmental" versus "proprietary" functions and rejected the possibility that
a "workable standard for 'traditional governmental functions'" could be developed; also dis-
cussing the limited utility of historical tests). The bases for this decision are illuminated by
Mark Tushnet, Why the Supreme Court Overruled National League of Cities, 47 VAND. L.
REv. 1623, 1626-34 (1994) (explaining that Justice Blackmun had initially voted in
conference in Garcia to overrule Congress but that, upon attempting to draft that opinion for
a then-majority, he became persuaded that he could '''find no principled way'" to do so).
184. See NEWTON EDWARDS & HERMAN G. RICHEY, THE SCHOOL IN TIIE AMERICAN
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that many government functions are not themselves performed by
governments but are contracted out to private entities. 18s Political
scientist Morton Grodzins fights the dichotomization itself and argues
that the role of governance has long been shared by federal, state, and
local authorities, as well as by public and private actors. 186 Hence, a
claim that something is intrinsic to the state's governance becomes
problematic, in part because what provinces are governmental
(belonging either to the states or to the nation or to bothl87) vary
with time and technological changes that alter the relevance of geo-
graphical boundaries,188 and in part because of the overlap in function
among governme:ntal actors.
During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, land
speculation and holding were "national," "federal" issues of great im-
port to the creation of a central government.189 In the late nineteenth
SOCIAL ORDER 211 (1963) (claiming that, at the founding, "no one could have foreseen that
education would come to be regarded as one of the essential functions of government;"
arguing that the rise of interest in public education was linked to concern about the need
for an educated populus to enable republican institutions to function); LLOYD P. JORGENSON,
THE STAlE AND TIIE NON-PUBLIC SCHOOL, 1825-1925 (1987) (arguing that the history of
public and private involvement demonstrates that states could subsidize non-public secular
educational institutions).
185. Tushnet, supra note 183, at 1639.
186. GRODZINS, supra note 2, at 5-24 (including foreign affairs as an example, and also
noting that while the Constitution bars certain federal officials from simultaneously holding
office in other branches of the federal government, no such constitutional bar operates to
preclude dual office holding between state and federal governments).
187. GRODZINS, supra note 2, at 4 (education is misunderstood as a purely "local"
function; both state and federal involvement make this function of government, like most
others, shared).
188. New York v. United States provides a good example; both nuclear waste and its
ready transport, as well as its extraterritorial risks, are artifacts of the twentieth century. For
Justice O'Connor, in the majority, Congress' insistence that states either regulate the disposal
of low level nuclear waste or take title to it impermissibly "commandeer[ed]" the state's
function and relegated them to administrative arms of the federal government 505 U.S. 144,
176 (1992). For the dissenters, the states' participation in the process of generating the legis-
lation sufficed. 505 U.S. at 205-06 (White, J., dissenting). See also Merritt, supra note 172,
at 1564-66 (discussing the limitations of a theory of federalism based on territory).
189. John P. Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW &
CONlEMP. PROBS. 3, at 18-22 (1948) (Twenty-five Supreme Court cases, many brought by
virtue of diversity jurisdiction, about "interests in public lands between 1790 and 1815"; the
"Supreme Court aided virtually every land speculator who came before it from 1790 to
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and early twentieth century, labor-management relations moved into
national focus and onto the federal courts' agenda.190 Kidnapping for
ransom became a national concern in 1932 in the wake of the abduc-
tion of a child of Charles Lindbergh.191 The era of federal prohibition
of alcohol resulted in a federal prison population in the early 1940s in
which about half of the inmates were incarcerated for "liquor law vio-
lations."192 Also during the twentieth century, both the New Deal and
the 1960s Civil Rights movement prompted Congress to defme a
1815") [hereinafter Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System]. On
"congressional instrumentalism" when deciding the boundaries of federal court subject matter
jurisdiction in the early years, see WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN TIlE EARLY
REPUBLIC 51-53 (1995) ("the drafters of the Judiciary Act viewed the federal courts as a
tool to effect specific substantive results").
190. Ray Forrester, The Jurisdiction of Federal Courts in Labor Disputes, 13 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 114 (1948).
191. Horace L. Bomar, Jr., The Lindbergh Law, 1 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 435, 435-
36 (1934) (in 1931, while 279 kidnappings were reported in 501 cities, only 69 convictions
were reported; proposals for federal jurisdiction over inter-state kidnappings had been made
but none were enacted until after that "atrocious deed"). For discussion of both the
federalization of car theft in 1919 and the subsequent "de facto defederalization" by
prosecutorial decisions not to bring such cases, see Little, supra note 13, at 1068-69
(between 1922-33, an average of 1,466 auto theft prosecutions were brought, but by 1991
such filings were less than 205 a year).
In the 1930s, bank robbery also first became a federal crime. See Act of May 18,
1934, ch. 304, 48 Stat 783. According to the Justice Department, impetus for the bill came
from difficulties contending with organized gangsters "sufficiently powerful and well
equipped to defY local police, and to flee beyond the borders of the State before adequate
forces can be organized." See H.R. REP. No. 1461, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., at 2 (1933) (State-
ment of Attorney General); see also A Note on the Racketeering, Bank Robbery, and "Kick-
Back" Laws, 1 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 445, 448 (1934) ("[S]ince only federal forces are
free to conduct their operations without regard for state lines, the federal government is in a
strategic position to combat such activities"). Convictions under bank robbery statutes have
increased from 118 in 1941, to 237 in 1961 and to 1740 in 1994. See 1941 U.S. ANNuAL
REPORTS OF TIlE ATTORNEY GENERAL at 102; 1961 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE REPORT at 280
(Table D4); 1994 AO REPORT, supra note 13, at A-78 (Table D4). See Brickey, supra note
175, at 1144 (by legislation such as this, local problems became national ones).
192. James V. Bennett, Excerpts from Report on Federal YouthfUl Offinders, Table A,
reprinted in REPORT TO TIlE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF TIlE COMMITTEE ON PUNISHMENT
FOR CRIME 41 (Appendix I) (1942). In terms of the focus of federal criminal enforcement
during that era, see Schwartz, supra note 196, at 64 (of the 31,114 criminal cases in 1947,
3,244 or more than 10 percent were filed under the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, the
"Dyer Act"; the two largest categories prosecuted were "fraud and other theft" which repre-
sented 7,082 cases or almost 23 percent, and immigration which represented 7,029 cases,
also about 23 percent); see also Hall, supra note 177, at 424.
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myriad of issues, some relating to economic wherewithal and some to
civil liberties, as "federal."193 In the past few years, a battle has been
fought about whether violence against women is a national issue to
which federal judicial attention ought to be paid,194 and about the
scope of federal court criminal jurisdiction.195
What today appears to be of local concern may tomorrow be on
the national agenda.196 Moreover, as illustrated by the current debate
about welfare and speed limits on highways, some advocate turning
federal programs and rules over to state governance.197 Objecting to
the very effort of identifying "fixed spheres of federal and state
activity," Jamie Gorelick and Harry Litman conclude that "a limiting
principle cannot be squared with the historical development of the
federal courts' jurisdiction."198 In short, the tradition of allocation
193. Fallon, Ideologies, supra note 172, at 1158-64; see also Little, supra note 13, at
1059 (discussing how what might be tenned "ordinmy" street crime is sometimes perceived
to have federal dimensions because of the relationship between those assaults and racial hos-
tility).
194. In 1994, Congress answered in the affinnative, enacting the Violence Against
Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-122, § 40302, 108 Stat 1941 (codified at 42
U.S.C.A. § 13981 (West Supp. 1995)). For the four years during which the proposal was
pending, federal judicial voices and many lawyers voiced opposition. See Naomi R. Cahn,
Family Law, Federalism and the Federal Courts, 79 IOWA L. REv. 1073, 1108-11 nn.l88-
193 and accompanying text (1994) (reviewing exchanges among federal and state judges and
Senator Biden, one of the legislative sponsors). In 1993, the Judicial Conference of the
United States changed its position from one of opposition to the proposed new cause of
action to one of taking no position, and to supporting the provisions for studies of gender
bias, also provided in the legislative history. See Judicial Conference Resolution on Violence
Against Women (Mareh 1993), reprinted in REPORTS OF mE PROCEEDINGS OF 1HE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF 1HE UNI1ED STA1ES 28 (March 16, 1993); see also Chief Justice's 1991
Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, 24 THIRD BRANCH 1, 3 (1992) (discussing Judi-
cial Conference's then opposition that would "involve the federal courts in a whole host of
domestic relations disputes").
195. Little, supra note 13, at 1034-70; United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995)
(dividing 5-4 on whelher the use of a gun "substantially affects interstate commerce").
196. And an international one as well. See Barry Friedman, Federalism's Future in the
Global Village, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1441, 1461-62 (1994) (state authority over alcohol and
taxation may be affected by GATT); see also Cahn, supra note 194, at 1114-15 (family law
increasingly an issue of national import and deserving of federal court attention).
197. See Pub. L. No. 104-59, § 205 (repealing 23 U.S.C. § 154 (1995), the national
maximum speed limit provision).
198. Jamie S. Gorelick & Harry Litman, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Federalization
Debate, 46 HASTINGS LJ. 967 (1995).
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between state and federal government is one constantly being
reworked; 199 periodically, events prompt Congress and the Supreme
Court to revisit the allocation of authority, and the lines move.
Indeed, the very existence of a proposed future plan for the federal
judiciary testifies to the fact that the needs of the country have
changed over the past decades and that more, and perhaps profound,
changes are to be anticipated. Hence, the status quo is insufficient to
the task. Even assuming one could identify common practices in the
past, at the least a question needs to be asked about why federal juris-
dictional rules from either the nineteenth or the twentieth centuries
should form the predicate for the vision of the twenty-first century.
Even if the allocations between governments were stable over the past
two hundred years, those allocations may not inform aspirations for the
federal courts' long range future plan.
B. Guidelines and Missing Categories
The invocation of a claimed history of limited federal court juris-
diction is not the only basis upon which the Long Range Plan hopes to
reign in Congress.200 The Plan also describes six categories in which
199. According to Larry Kramer's thoughtful consideration of how the federal system
has been maintained over the centuries, while the Constitution envisioned some boundaries
- areas outside the reach of federal law, [t]hose boundaries have almost disappeared today."
Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1485, 1496 (1994) [hereinafter
Kramer, Understanding Federalism]. Given the power of Congress to preempt state law on a
myriad of matters, even the 1995 term's reassertion of congressional limits does not con-
stitute, for Kramer, a substantial restriction on the general legislative authority of Congress
and on the arenas in which federal courts may be enlisted. Id. at 1498 n.23 (discussing the
then-pending Lopez case and commenting that "judicial interference [with Congress] will
remain exceptional even when it comes to laws regulating 'states qua states"').
In contrast, William Eskridge and John Ferejohn delineate certain decisions of gover-
nance, relating to public safety and promotion of economic development, and locate them in
the states ("traditional state functions"), as contrasted with issues that they assume have
greater "externalities" affecting nonresidents or are a part of "widely shared constitutional
values" and thereby located as national functions. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn,
The Elastic Commerce Clause: A Political Theory of American Federalism, 47 VAND. L.
REv. 1355, 1360-61, 1371, 1397-1400 (1994). However, the difficulty with such an approach
is not only the one they recognize - the problem of identifYing "what constitutes a widely
shared constitutional value." Id. at 1399. In addition, what is perceived to have
"externalities" changes over time, in part because of technological advances.
200. 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 21 ("Beyond historical
HeinOnline -- 98 W. Va. L. Rev. 226 1995-1996
226 WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:171
it views federal civil jurisdiction as properly conferred,20I specifically
when matters "arise under the United States Constitution;" "deserve
adjudication in a federal judicial forum because the issues presented
cannot be dealt with satisfactorily at the state level and involve either
(1) a strong need for uniformity or (2) paramount federal interests;"
"involve the foreign relations of the United States;" "involve the
federal government, federal officials, or agencies as plaintiffs or defen-
dants;" "involve disputes between or among the states;" or "affect
substantial interstate or international disputes."202
This listing is intriguing in part because it does not reflect a good
deal of federal jurisdictional history. Until 1875, Congress did not pro-
vide the federal! trial courts with general federal question jurisdic-
tion,203 the very kind of jurisdiction that many today assume to be
practice, the allocation of limited jurisdiction to the federal courts is justified by both theo1Y
and practice."). The planners argue that, as a matter of theo1Y, duplication without distinc-
tion has no utility. Compare Amar, Five Views, supra note 172, offering the diffusion of
power and the competition among governments as reasons for federalism and claiming that
such diffusion worked to protect freedom; Richard Briffault, "What About the 'Ism?"
Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1303,
1344 (1994) (arguing that state governments (and implicitly therefore their courts) exist
simply because they do, under the United States Constitution, which protects their fixed
boundaries, territorial integrity, law making powers, and their identity as units of
governance). See discussion infra, Part IV.
201. 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 27-29 (Recommendation
6(a)-(t); Action Notice, supra note 26 (Recommendation 6 deferred); 1994 DRAFT PROPOSED
LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 23-24 (Recommendation 5(a)-t).
202. 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 27-29 (Recommendation 6);
Action Notice, supra note 26 (Recommendation 6 deferred). The wording of the six catego-
ries is the same from draft to final plan with the exception of one catego1Y, which in draft
form was described as involving "a clear need for national uniformity on an issue that, in
light of experience, cannot be dealt with satisfactorily at the state level." 1994 DRAFT PRO-
POSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 24 (Recommendation 5).
203. Act of March 3, 1875, § 1, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470 (establishing federal jurisdiction
over suits arising under the laws of the United States "where the matter in dispute ex-
ceeds ... five hundred dollars"). Cases arising under federal law could, prior to 1875, find
their way into federal trial courts by virtue of a variety of statutes including jurisdictional
grants when the United States was a party and for diversity cases; statutes granting federal
jurisdiction in certain forfeiture actions; and of course in areas of law committed to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. See, e.g., The Judicia1Y Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§
9, 11, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77, 78-79. Also, in 1801, Congress conferred and then withdrew juris-
diction for cases arising under the Constitution. Act of Feb. 13, 1801, 2 Stat. 89, 92; Act
of March 8, 1802, 2 Stat. 132. Further, federal question cases were considered by the
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the quintessential federal moment - decision making in cases "arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.,,204
Moreover, until 1980, Congress required that such jurisdiction be
limited by an amount in controversy.205
Yet even this seemingly obvious category of federal jurisdiction
has spawned extensive debate about what claims or causes of action
arise under federal law, as contrasted with those that refer to or impli-
cate federal law but also involve issues of state law.206 That many
claims might be characterized as state or federal is yet further evidence
of another aspect of ')udicial federalism" - that rights of action fit
neither box (exclusively) and fit both.207
Other historically-based categories of federal jurisdiction are absent
from the categories listed by the Long Range Plan. Diversity jurisdic-
tion is one of the longest standing traditional bases of federal court
jurisdiction.2og According to John Frank, between 1790 and 1815,
diversity cases comprised the largest segment of the docket of the
Supreme COurt.209 In his words, "[t]he whole federal judicial system
[during this era] gave almost its entire attention to the settlement of
United States Supreme Court. See Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, The Eleventh
Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE LJ. 1, 13-29 (1988) (discussing the
relationship between Supreme Court review of federal questions and the reach of federal trial
courts' jurisdiction over states).
204. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994); 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4,
at 27 (Recommendation 6, ca11ing for federal jurisdiction for civil matters that "arise under
the United States Constitution," rather than under federal law in general); Action Notice,
supra note 26 (Recommendation 6 deferred).
205. See Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486,
§ 1, 94 Stat. 2369 (eliminating the amount in controversy requirement then at $10,000).
206. See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986);
American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G. & A.B., 505 U.S. 247 (1992). See generally David
Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543 (1985).
207. See, for example, the debate about whether a cause of action arises under state or
federal law in Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921); American
Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916); Franchise Tax Bd. of Cali-
fornia v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
208. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73. See Larry Kramer, Diversity
Jurisdiction, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REv. 97 [hereinafter Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction].
209. Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, supra note 189, at 16
(Table 1).
HeinOnline -- 98 W. Va. L. Rev. 228 1995-1996
228 WEST VIRGINIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 98:171
the simplest types of commercial and property disputes."210 Yet that
is a piece of history from which many federal judges (and others) are
happy now to depart.211 Given that diversity jurisdiction has an
impeccable historical pedigree212 and is a caseload staple of the
federal COurtS,213 the judicial proposals to eliminate or radically re-
strict federal diversity jurisdiction make plain that selected excerpts are
the guiding premises, and not historical practice alone.
Another example of excerpted history comes from considering
what is missing or obliquely referenced in the Long Range Plan's list
of categories: federal court jurisdiction to enforce individual rights and
liberties as articulated by Congress rather than based in the Constitu-
tion.214 Federal statutory rights enforcement has a long tradition. The
210. Id. at 18.
211. See supra note 39 and accompanying text
212. Here is an example of multiple ways to teU history. Above, I note that diversity
has been a bedrock of fedeml court jurisdiction. In contmst, Professor Kramer argues, that
unlike "other facets of fedeml jurisdiction [that] have steadily expanded over the last centu-
ry, diversity has been consistently restricted." Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction, supra note 208,
at 102 (footnote omitted).
213. For data on quantity of diversity jurisdiction, see Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction,
supra note 208, at 99 (in 1988, diversity cases were almost 29% of the civil trial docket);
David Clark, Acijudication to Administration: A Statistical Analysis of Federal District Courts
in the Twentieth Century, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 65, 127, 134, 146 (1981) (in 1947, about
13% of the terminated civil cases were based on diversity and, excluding cases to which the
United States was a party, diversity cases comprised about 30 percent of the civil docket; in
1954, almost 29% of the terminated civil cases were based on diversity and, excluding
government cases, diversity was 45%; in 1967, roughly 28% of the civil cases were
diversity and again excluding government cases, diversity was 42%; in 1980, almost 22% of
the civil cases were diversity, and, excluding government cases, about 35% of the civil
terminated caseload); Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, supra note 189,
at 16-17 (from 1790 to 1815, of a total of 434 cases in the Supreme Court, 31%, were
diversity and of 647 cases in the circuit courts, almost 57% were based on diversity).
Another analysis of thl~ docket, considering the case10ad by kinds of cases including tort and
contmct cases based on diversity comes from Marc Galanter, The Lift and Times of the Big
Six: Or, The Federal Courts Since the Good Old Days, 1988 WIS. L. REv. 921, 924·28,
936-46 (describing complex pattern of filings, with many causes not readily captured in
much of contempomry discussion) [hereinafter Federal Courts Since the Good Old Days].
214. Arguably SUl:h legislation is comprehended in the reference to fedeml jurisdiction
when the "issues presented cannot be dealt with satisfactorily at the state level and involve
either (1) a strong ne(:d for uniformity or (2) paramount fedeml interests." 1995 PROPOSED
LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 27-28 (Recommendation 6(b)); Action Notice, supra
note 26 (Recommendation 6, deferred).
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post-Civil War civil rights statutes - enacted in 1871 and now codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. sections 1981, 1983, and 1985 - are central illustra-
tions.21S During this century, Congress has provided civil rights
protections for prisoners,z16 the aged,217 victims of gender-based vio-
lence,218 and insisted on rights of access for the disabled,219 as well
as required fair treatment in housing,220 employment,221 and educa-
tion.222 Such legislation might be characterized as deeply etched in
our history and understood as definitional moments for the federal
courts or, alternatively, conceived as occasional measures not central to
the federal court mission.
For example, this aspect of federal jurisdiction could be stressed as
a default position, that federal court engagement comes after state
failures. Congressional creation of one major federal civil rights
215. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988)); Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3) (1988)); see also Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988)). For discussion of this aspect of federal
jurisdiction, see Fraenkel, supra note 81, at 132; see also Neubome, supra note 174, at -
1105; William M. Wiecek, The Reconstruction of Federal Judicial Power, 1863-1875, 13
AM. J. LEGAL RIST. 333 (1969) (discussing the congressional expansion of federal courts'
jurisdictional powers in the 1860s and stressing the import of removal jurisdiction).
216. Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349
(1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1997a (1988)); revised habeas corpus provisions, see Act of
Sept. 19, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-590, 80 Stat. 811 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994));
Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-711, § 2, 80 Stat. 1105 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
2254 (1994)).
217. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. 1. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994)).
218. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. 1. No. 103-122, § 40302, 108 Stat.
1941 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 13981 (West Supp. 1995)).
219. Americans with Disability Act of 1990, Pub. 1. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. IV 1992)); Education of the Handi-
capped Act, Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 175 (1970) (codified as amended at 20 §§ 1400-
1491a (1994)).
220. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. 1. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988)).
221. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. 1. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq.).
222. See Equal Educational Opportunity Act of 1974, Pub. 1. No. 93-380, Title II, 88
Stat. 514 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1701 (1994)); Women's Educational Equity Act of 1978,
Pub. 1. No. 95-561, 92 Stat. 2298 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 3341 (omitted 1994)).
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remedy (today's § 1983) occurred after the Civil War; Congress
viewed state actors as themselves engaged in the violation of federally-
recognized rights.223 Other civil rights statutes, such as those
protecting state prisoners' rights of habeas corpus, expressly require
that litigants go fIrst to the state courts to exhaust remedies prior to
turning to the 1ederal COurtS224 - thereby demonstrating that federal
court action is only called for after state courts have failed in some
respect. Alternatively, one might stress those pieces of federal civil
rights legislation that do not require demonstration of states' failures as
a predicate to federal court activity as evidence of a general federal
interest, or more accurately, of the ability of a particular set of social
forces to obtain sufficient political interest and clout as to create
federal legislation.
Let me pause to summarize. Above, I detailed how jurisdictional
history is itself varied and complex, supporting a range of claims
rather than operating effectively as a constraint. I have now outlined
that, when history is claimed to be a guiding principle, proponents of
particular visions of federal court jurisdiction are selective, disowning
certain traditions and embracing others. Of course, federal judges sit
awkwardly as policy makers when they write about the future of the
federal courts. Invoking history is in part prompted by a desire to fInd
a "neutral" space, to draw principles from practice, to avoid the
appearance of making normative judgments. But there is no escape
from the normative work entailed in selecting among historical
practices.225
223. Readings of this legislative history are presented in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961) and in Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
224. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (1994).
225. That the scope of federal court jurisdiction reflects political judgments is not a
novel insight See, e.g., Fallon, Comparing Federal Court "Paradigms", supra note 53, at 7;
Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power Over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL.
L. REv. 1030, 1031 (1981) (the constitutional compromise was that access to lower federal
courts was an issue not to be "answered as a matter of constitutional principle, but rather,
should be left a matter of political and legislative judgment"). Thus, those advising Congress
on how and when to c~xercise its authority over federal court jurisdiction are offering their
political judgments about when to deploy life tenured judges. A parallel question exists
relating to states' immunity from congressional intervention, and answers (such as requiring
extra justification prior to such congressional action) rely on similar political judgments
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C. When Tradition Does Not Much Serve: The Inventions of the
Twentieth Century
Yet another difficulty with relying on historical jurisdictional prac-
tices is what to do when the context changes. While one of the
premises of the Long Range Plan is that federal courts should be "rea-
sonably accessible" courts of general jurisdiction,226 the Plan also pro-
poses divesting the federal courts of jurisdiction over certain kinds of
disputes and reassigning them to federal agencies. Included are cases
involving federal benefits or regulation, and thus cases in which claims
are made against the federal government.227 Further the planners
recommend that, "where possible," agencies be permitted to "achieve
fmal resolution of disputes within their jurisdiction."228 Aware of the
about the allocation of authority.
A dissenter to the effort to develop nonnative theories of federalism argues that
instead of focusing on the indetenninate utility of federalism, federalism should be respected
because of the fonnal, legal creation of states as lawmaking units. See Briffault, supra note
200, at 1317-44.
226. 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 47 (Recommendation 25);
Action Notice, supra note 26 (Recommendation 25 deferred); 1994 DRAFT PRoPOSED LONG
RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 39 (Recommendation 23).
227. 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 33 (Recommendation 10);
Action Notice, supra note 26 (Recommendation 10, deferred). Also recommended to be di-
vested are cases involving "work-related personal injury actions," federal ERISA benefits
claims, and other workplace injury litigation. 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra
note 4, at 34-35 (Recommendation 12); Action Notice, supra note 26 (Recommendation 12,
deferred). The proposal provides that cases that "involve the federal government, federal
officials, or agencies as plaintiffs or defendants" would be properly within federal civil juris-
diction; 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 28 (Recommendation 6(d));
Action Notice, supra note 26 (Recommendation 6 deferred).
Reading the recommendations together, a subset of the govemment-a-party cases,
including those involving workplace relations, employment-related claims, and federal benefits
are carved out for reassignment to agencies or other Article I courts. 1995 PROPOSED LONG
RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 33 (Recommendation 10); Action Notice, supra note 26
(Recommendation 10 deferred). The 1994 DRAFT PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note
4, at 28-29 (Recommendations 9, 11), made similar proposals. The FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 23, at 55-58, had also recommended increasing non-life
tenured judges' powers in the context of disability claims and elsewhere.
228. 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 32-33 (Recommendation 9b);
Action Notice, supra note 26 (Recommendation 15 deferred); 1994 DRAFT PROPOSED LONG
RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 27 (8b); see also FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE
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acute workload crisis at the agency level, the planners condition imple-
mentation of their recommendation upon the proposing of "adequate
funding" as well as augmenting the ability of agencies to employ
alternative dispute resolution methods.229
Many of these cases involve what are termed "public rights. ''230
This term derives from the premise that, if Congress creates a right,
Congress also has broad authority to shape the mechanisms by which
to redress alleged deprivations of that right, including vesting adjudica-
tory authority in decisionmakers not garbed in the constitutional
protections of Hfe tenured federal judges. Under this approach, the
Supreme Court has upheld the power of the Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission to impose monetary sanctions; the Court
held that alleged violators of such regulations have no right to a jury
REPORT, supra note 23, at 55 (calling for a "new Article I Court of Disability Claims, with
review in the courts of appeal limited to constitutional claims and to pure issues of law").
229. 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 33 (Recommendation 9b, ex-
planatory text); Action Notice, supra note 26 (Recommendation 9 deferred). The parallel
recommendation in the previous draft did not impose this condition. 1994 DRAFT PROPOSED
LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 28.
230. The terminology stems from the nineteenth century and somewhat ironically, from
a case not about rights but about what was then considered (and soon may be again) "privi-
leges." In Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 18 How.
272 (1852), the Solicitor of the Treasury had ordered collection against a customs collector
for the Port of New York, whose accounts were audited. Upon execution and the sale of
the debtor's property, the debtor argued that an Article III judge, rather than an executive
branch official, should have been the decision maker. The Supreme Court concluded that,
since the citizenry had no judicially cognizable right to such a decision, the executive was
free to make its decision in any way it wished. Id. at 284 ("there are matters, involving
public rights, which may be presented in such form that the judicial power is capable of
acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial determination, but which congress may
or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may deem
proper") (emphasis added). The reasoning was that, since it "depends upon the wiII of con-
gress whether a remedy in the courts shall be allowed at all," the Congress was also free to
"prescribe such rules of determination as they may think just and needfuL" Id.
In the 1930s, the Court relied on Murray's Lessee to uphold substantial delegation
by Congress to non-Article III decisionmakers under the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Worker's Compensation Act See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932). While ac-
knowledging in Crowell that the dispute was between an employer and employee, and hence
a "private right, that is, of the liability of one individual to another under the law as de-
fined," the Court cOlll:luded that like Murray's Lessee, Congress could delegate some of the
decisionmaking - in this instance to commissioners - as long as the life tenured judiciary
continued to have the power to determine jurisdictional facts de novo. Id. at 51, 62-63.
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trial because Seventh Amendment protections do not attach to congres-
sional remedial schemes.231 In several other cases contesting the
authority of non-life tenured judges, the Court has relied on the
category "public rights" (variously defmed232) to approve the location
of adjudication outside the Article III judiciary.233
Proposals like those from the Long Range Plan - calling for
"intensive fact-fmding" by agency officials234 - implicitly recognize
the completion of the transformation of agencies into courts. These
proposals also assume the propriety of sending a segment of citizen
litigation, much of it against the government, to judges who are by
definition more dependent on the government than is the Article III
judiciary. While the Long Range Plan calls for increased resources for
agency judges,23s the Plan does not seek a major reformation of the
231. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S.
442, 455 (1977).
232. For statements that the category of public rights is defined as cases to which the
fedeml government is a party, see Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 450 (defining "public rights"
cases as those in which "the Government sues in its sovereign capacity to enforce public
rights created by statutes within the power of Congress to enacf'); Granfinanciera, S.A., v.
Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 70 (1989) (Scalia, J. concurring) ("the public rights doctrine re-
quires, at a minimum, that the United States be a party to the adjUdication"). For statements
describing a broader category of claims, including those involving litigation between private
parties, see Granfinanciera 492 U.S. at (Brennan, J., for the majority) (fedeml government
"need not be a party for a case to revolve around 'public rights"'); Thomas v. Union
Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 585-89 (1985) (O'Connor, 1., for the majority)
(rejecting "formal categories" in which the "identity of the parties alone determined the
requirements of Article III," and citing many instances in which agency adjudication was
upheld in litigation between private parties); id. at 593-94 (Brennan, J. concurring) ("Con-
gress, acting for a valid legislative purpose pursuant to its constitutional powers under
Article I, may create a seemingly 'private' right that is so closely integmted into a public
regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited
involvement by the Article III judiciary").
233. See also Commodity Futures Tmding Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 857 (1986)
(upholding agency jurisdiction over a counterclaim in a broker-customer dispute and rejecting
"bright-line rules" about when Congress can vest powers in non-Article III judges).
234. 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 33 (Recommendation 10);
Action Notice, supra note 26 (Recommendation 10 deferred); see also 1995 PROPOSED LONG
RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 33 (Recommendation 9(b); "The limited resources of the
fedeml courts can be conserved, in part, by reducing court time devoted to fact finding and
review of administmtive determinations that often tum primarily on factual issues."); 1994
DRAFT PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 27 (Recommendation 8(b)) (same).
235. See supra note 38.
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administrative judiciary to alter its current stature as a post occupied
by mid-level civil servants236 and to enhance its prestige to better
approximate that of the life tenured judiciary.237
How do such proposals square with the traditions of independence
that are associated with life tenure? How do those proposals work,
given that the relationship between judge and sovereign is one in
which the judge must stand in judgment of the very power that
licenses that judgment?238 Both the jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court and the ideology of the federal judiciary posit the Article III
judge as specially situated. With constitutional life tenure and salary
protection, Artiele III judges have some insulation from the need to
236. Under the Office of Personnel Management regulations, administrative law judges,
who used to be at grades GS-I5 to GS-I8, are now categorized as "AL-3, AL-2, and AL-
I," depending on their qualifications and length of service. 5 C.F.R. § 930.210 (I 995). Pay
in 1994 for AL-3 employees ranged from $78,018 to $81,620 and for AL-l employees
ranged from $120,027 to $123,000. Locality Rates of Pay for Administrative Law Judges
and Members of Boards of Contract Appeals, 60 Fed. Reg. 7360 (1995). Federal district
judges were paid $133,600 in 1994. 28 U.S.C. § 135 (1994) and Exec. Order No. 12,944,
60 Fed. Reg. 309 (1994). Bankruptcy and magistrate judges are paid 92 percent of what life
tenured district judges are paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 153 (bankruptcy judges); 28 U.S.C. § 634
(magistrate judges) (1994). See also infra note 301 for a comparison of salaries between
federal life tenured judges and state judges.
237. For proposals to enhance such stature, see Richard B. Hoffinan & Frank P.
Chihlar, Judicial Independence: Can It Be Without Article III?, 46 MERCER L. REv. 863,
878-81 (1995) (arguing that administrative judges need to "in fact be free of command
influence," that is be outside the agency from which claims arise, as well as that qualifi-
cation and selection methods need change). My own instinct is that the life tenured judge
has the potential for imposing greater oversight of the government than does a career civil
servant. Resnik, The Mythic Meaning of Article III, supra note 75; see also Reinhardt State-
ment, supra note 27, at 7 (one of the "primary effects of the Committee's recommendations
would be to shift work now performed by Article III judges to non-tenured magistrate
judges, commissioners, or administrative agencies. I strongly urge you to reconsider ....").
Whether any judge is well situated to constrain national decisionmaking is a question
of debate. See, e.g., Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 199, at 1361-68, 1395-1400 (analyzing
the institutional incentives of the United States Supreme Court justices as affecting the likeli-
hood of overturning congressional judgments, and that federal courts do a more "consistent
job" when "policing abuses by subnational units" - such as by states - rather than by the
national government). Perhaps the suggestion by a segment of the life tenured judiciary that
citizens with claims against the federal government have but very limited access to life
tenured judges illustrates their point.
238. Robert M. Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U. L.
REv. 177, 183-97, 202 (1985).
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curry favor,239 including with their employer, the federal govem-
ment.240 The rise of the administrative state and the recognition of
"entitlements" are twentieth century artifacts, as is the creation and
expansion of the administrative judiciary. What should be its purview
as compared or contrasted or related to that of the life tenured
judiciary? As currently framed, many proponents of increased agency
authority argue for administrative judges to control the facts, and life
tenured federal judges to have some review of law. To assess the wis-
dom of this proposed solution, historical practices of the allocation of
authority among state and federal judges offers little illumination. Once
again, we are required to make choices based on normative visions of
desirable allocation of judicial services.
V. A VARIETY OF VERSIONS OF "OUR FEDERALISM"
It is this normative enterprise that is constantly being undertaken,
albeit often times in the guise of historical description. While in 1970,
Justice Black invoked "our federalism" in his decision for the Court in
Younger v. Harris,241 which in turn created a presumption against
federal court intervention in pending state court proceedings,242 the
content of that federalism is constantly under debate.
239. That insulation is not complete. See Laura E. Little, Loyalty, Gratitude, and the
Federal Judiciary, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 699 (1995) (discussing the underpinnings of
reciprocal relationships and their potential effects on judgment).
240. The dominant "repeat player" is the federal government In 1993, about a quarter
of the federal civil docket were cases to which the federal government was a party. See
ADMINISlRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1993 JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS: ANNuAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, L. RALPH MECHAM, at AI-54
(Table C-2) (1994) (of 229,850 civil suits filed in 1993, 20,482 included the U.S. as plain-
tiff, and 31,242 included the U.S. as defendant, representing 23% of the docket). The 1993
data represent a 17% drop from 1992, largely due to decreases in veterans' benefits actions
and student loan default actions. Id. at 7. In 1994, filings of civil cases involving the
United States declined and comprised about a fifth of the docket 1994 AO REPORT, supra
note 13, at A-24 (Table C-2). As explained by the Administrative Office, student loan
filings declined because of legal changes permitting wage garnishment, and veterans benefit
cases declined because of agency efforts to recover overpayments. 1994 AO REPORT, supra
note 13, at 6.
241. 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
242. Owen M. Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE LJ. 1103, 1117-29 (1977).
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One could tell a host of different stories about "our federalism" -
that it is a crea.ture with many and varying appearances, that it is the
subject of invention and radical reformation243 or of evolution and
quiet alteration borne of periodic reassessments, that it reflects a good
deal of consensus,244 or that it has little current substantive content
and is really about managing a large country.245 One might tell a
story that the states have disappeared in the sense that they no longer
exist as vital centers of power and governance, but that we are so
accustomed to assuming their presence that we cannot yet perceive
their demise, or alternatively that states have remarkable vitality and
stamina, given their endurance in the face of determined efforts at
nationalization.246 One might argue for states based on legal claims to
their formal status as political units recognized in the Constitution.247
One might make claims for state governance based on their capacities
as "laboratories" generative of new rights or of educational and
243. Ackerman & Katyal, supra note 172, at 569 (calling for a conception of the
founders as "pioneers of an ongoing tradition of revolutionary reform").
244. Erwin Chemerinsky & Lany Kramer, Defining the Role of the Federal Courts,
1990 RY.U. L. REv. 67, 77 (developing a "minimal model" of federal jurisdiction, based in
part on the "areas of agreement [that] tum out to be surprisingly large").
245. Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neu-
rosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994) (arguing that Supreme Court doctrinal claims for feder-
alism are in fact arguments about decentralization of decisionmaking, that little evidence sup-
ports the claim that federalism diffuses power or that it supports, engenders, or reflects
communities of affinity or value); see also Friedman, supra note 196, at 1472 (predicting
that globalization will further erode state authority); Tushnet, supra note 183, at 1654-55
("fg]lobalization of the economy is surely more important in determining what happens in
the lives of residents of the United States than the intricacies of federalism doctrine.").
246. Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns, supra note 3, at 747-58 (vitality of federal Indian
tribes and of some forms of state governance suggest the possibility of federalism continuing
to enable divergent norm development and authority); see also Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra
note 199, at 1357-61 (disputing the conventional view that centralization is an inexorable
force and calling for mechanism to maintain a "robust federalism," in which state boundaries
have political content); Ann Althouse, Federalism, Untamed, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1207, 1208-
09 (1994) (while the Supreme Court's deference to state interests could be understood as
"little more than a strategy to exploit state courts, conscripting them to a national agenda,"
federalism should be "untamed," so that state courts can have an important "normative
role . . . in the discourse concerning the meaning of rights.").
247. Briffault, supra note 200, at 1344 (also arguing that most of the arguments made
on behalf of federalism's utility are arguments about the advantages of local governance and
that such localism does not depend on the existence of states but could be provided instead
by municipalities).
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participatory opportunities/48 as enablers of affiliations to govern-
ments borne from proximity,249 as useful or limited competitors,250
as autonomous centers of governance that provide at least some choice
of if not a vast diversity of rules,251 or as co-conversationalists in
norm development.252 One might argue instead for duality itself,
based on the view that two governments protect individual liberty more
than does one.253 Alternatively, one might perceive the state courts as
"wrongdoers" often in need of federal superintendence.254
Note that underlying these various approaches are assumptions
about that which needs to be explained - either the state or the
federal system. While in the 1950s, Herbert Wechsler and Henry Hart
posited the states and thus their courts as the central bodies of law
making and both federal law and federal courts as "interstitial,"255
248. Amar, Five Views, supra note 172, at 1233-36, 1240-46 (distinguishing as two
views of fedemlism, one that posits the states as labomtories for experimentation in an em-
pirical sense and for education and citizen participation, and a second - related - claim
that the states serve to safeguard rights and to provide additional protection for citizens. This
second view is tied to both the writings of Herbert Wechsler and to Justice William
Brennan, while Justices Frankfurter and O'Connor are associated with the first; see also
Andrew Rapczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism after
Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REv. 341, 380-88.
249. GRODZINS, supra note 2, at 383-84. Grodzins also distinguishes this claim from
one based on participation in government, in part by noting low voting mtes in local elec-
tions. Id. at 198.
250. Amar, Five Views, supra note 172, at 1236-40 (discussing both horizontal and ver-
tical competition, among states and against the fedeml government); Lucian Ayre Bebchuk,
Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate
Law, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1435, 1437-42 (1992) (arguing for "substantial expansion of the
role of fedeml law" because of failures in state competition in certain areas).
251. Merritt, supra note 172, at 1573-75 (arguing that state autonomy serves as a check
on fedeml government powers, diversifies the participants in government, and offers some
programmatic alternatives).
252. Various formulations on redundancy and duplication as virtues are provided in
Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Alienkoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the
Court, 86 YALE LJ. 1035 (1977); Robert M. Cover, The Uses ofJurisdictional Redundancy:
Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARy L. REv. 630 (1981) [hereinafter Cover,
The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy]; ELAZER, supra note 7, at 30-32.
253. Amar, Five Views, supra note 172, at 1248. But see Briffault, supra note 200, at
1323 (questioning the bases from which to assume that such duality of governance creates
more freedom).
254. YACKLE, supra note 174, at 44.
255. The 1953 edition of the casebook evidences this approach. HART & WECHSLER,
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many of the 1990s legal narratives on federalism take as their burden
to explain the ongoing authority of states.
The issue of federal court jurisdiction is a subset of the general
question of federalism, and whatever overall picture of federalism is
chosen is then reflected in the tasks permitted the federal COurtS.256
The federal judiciary's long range planners remain loyal to the Hart &
Wechsler assumption of state court prominence; state court judicial
authority is the baseline, and the burden of proof is placed on Con-
gress to explain why to give federal courts jurisdiction. The judiciary
also remains loyal to the premise of dichotomous choices, of state or
federal court action rather than forms of collaboration, parallel to those
ascribed by political scientists to other branches of United States
government.257
What are the aspects of the varying narratives that I want to stress
here, in the context of considering the specific problem of federal court
jurisdiction? First, while historical practices suggest that federal court
jurisdiction has always been linlited as compared to that of the states,
history provides little basis for saying much about what areas of litiga-
tion cannot be entrusted by Congress to the federal courts. More than
that: jurisdictional history may well be the basis for an argument that
federal courts are (almost) courts of unlimited jurisdiction. Absent
wholesale revision of both Wickard v. Filburn258 and (the wonderfully
1ST ED., supra note 60. See also Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362
(1953).
256. As noted, one of the major 1995 federalism opinions, United States v. Lopez, is
about just that: the constitutionality of granting federal courts jurisdiction when crimes are
prosecuted involving gun possession near a school. Given the federal judicial distress at the
"federalization of crime," the federal judiciary had particular interest in the outcome of
Lopez, and the Chief Justice's opinion for the Court referred negatively to the specter of
federal regulation of other activities related to economic life with the concomitant commit-
ment of federal judicial resources. 115 S. Ct 1624, 1632 (1995) (arguing that under the
government's reasoning in support of the legislation, "Congress could regulate any activity
that it found was related to the economic productivity of individual citizens: family law
(including marriage, divorce, and child custody), for example"); see also supra note 194 and
accompanying text (detailing federal judicial opposition to the Violence Against Women
Act).
257. See, e.g., GRODZINS, supra note 2, passim. Several case studies of shared work,
defined as sharing decision making, sharing responsibility, or sharing influence. Id. at I I.
258. 317 U.S. Ill, 129 (1942) (upholding agricultural regulations under the interstate
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named) Heart of Atlanta Motel,259 Congress has assumed the authority
to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts over a broad array of issues.
It is possible to read the Supreme Court decision of United States
v. Lopez-60 as just such a revision.261 Certainly some of the justices
seem prepared to limit congressional authority to use Commerce Clause
powers over states.262 The lower court cases now emerging demon-
strate the many federal statutes thrown into question by possible
readings of Lopez. While the first batch of cases suggests that many
federal statutes will survive Lopez,263 one set of derivative lower
court opinions illustrate the problems with essentialist federalism and
the attraction some jurists have for it. At issue is the congressional
authority to confer federal court jurisdiction in the 1992 Child Support
commerce power because even "wheat consumed on the fann where grown," if left
unregulated, could affect trade regulation).
259. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964) (despite the
"local character" of the motel, Congress' interstate commerce authority can reach such busi-
nesses).
260. 115 S. Ct 1625 (1995).
261. But see Charles Fried, Foreword: Revolutions?, 109 HARv. L. REv. 13, 34, 36,
37, 44 (1995) (arguing that Lopez is "a perfect example not of revolution;" that it continues
to "recognize the breadth of the commerce power," that the Court "both adhered to and
refreshed tradition" in its opinion, and that the majority rejected a return to a "governmental
functions" test); Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court's "Unsteady
Path": A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 901 (1995)
(arguing that Lopez should not be read as a "break with prior decisions" but rather as a
"constitutional 'wake up call'" - that Congress must operate within constitutional parame-
ters).
262. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Comment: Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Tenn Limits, Inc.
v. Thornton, 109 HARv. L. REv. 78, 106-07 (1995) (suggesting that Justice Thomas would
do so and noting Justice Kennedy's inclinations toward narrowed federal powers). Other
limitations on federal judicial power also come from the current Court See, e.g., Missouri v.
Jenkins, 115 S. Ct 2038 (1995).
263. See, e.g., Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517 (11th Cir. 1995); American Life League,
Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642 (4th Cir. 1995), and United States v. Lucero, 895 F. Supp. 1421
(D. Kan. 1995) (all upholding the constitutionality of the Freedom of Access to Clinics
Entrances Act, 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994»; United States v. Pelkey, 61 F.3d 914 (9th Cir.
1995) (upholding a fireann statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(l) (1994»; United States v. Green,
62 F.3d 1418 (6th Cir. 1995) (upholding the carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994».
Compare United States v. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. 621 (B.D. Wis. 1995) (dismissing an indict-
ment under the Freedom of Access Act based on view that it exceeded congressional
power), rev'd by U.S. v. Wilson, No. 95-1871, 1995 WL 76540 (7th Cir. 1995).
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Recovery Act/64 making it a federal crime for a parent to fail to pay
child support payments to children residing in states other than that of
the parent. Some judges claim that family law issues belong to states,
not to the federal government.265 Others recall an era when insurance
law was deemed to be "local," and conclude instead that a debt is a
debt, commercial in nature and subject to Commerce Clause control
once it moves interstate.266
The Supreme Court's interest in Lopez in invoking constitutional
limitations on federal jurisdictional power is linked to "devolution," the
"returning" to the states of control over welfare policy and a host of
264. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994).
265. See, e.g., United States v. Parker, _ F. Supp. ---J No. Crim. 95-352, 1995 WL
683215 (B.D. Pa. 1995) (holding the CSRA unconstitutional in part because the debt is
owed to family members, "defined by state law," and not to "arms length commercial ac-
tors," that traditionally family law has been under state control); United States v. Mussari,
894 F. Supp. 1360, 1362-68 (D. Ariz. 1995) (appeal pending) (finding CSRA unconstitu-
tional and relying in part on Lopez to conclude that, although the statue only applied if a
child and parent were living in different states, interstate commerce was not affected by
parents delinquent in child support payments, in part on the view that because most states
had relevant legislation, "[t]o allow Congress to pass a national criminal statute addressing
this issue would usurp the authority of those States" that had not criminalized failures to
pay, and in part on the Tenth Amendment); United States v. Bailey, 902 F. Supp. 727, 729-
30 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (concluding that the CSRA "sounds, walks, and looks like a domestic
relations statute and aims the central government down a slippery slope where it should not
be" and arguing that the federal courts should not become "embroiled in state family law
matters"); United States v. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. 360 (D. Ariz. 1995) (finding that the
CSRA is an unconstitutional infringement on the liberties of people and on states' internal
ordering).
266. United States v. Hopper, 899 F. Supp. 389, 393 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (magistrate judge
decision, objections to the district court filed Dec. 5, 1995) (making the analogy to argu-
ments about whether insurance contracts were "local" obligations and concluding that "collec-
tion of child support orders across state lines does involve a continuous and indivisible
stream of intercourse among the states involving the transmission of large sums of money
and communications by mail, telephone and telegraph;" also relying on the Supreme Court's
decision in Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992), that the domestic relations excep-
tion to diversity jurisdiction was not a constitutionally-based exception to federal jurisdic-
tion); United States v. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. 1326 (D. Kan. 1995) (upholding the CSRA,
also relying on Ankenbrandt to refuse to abstain); United States v. Murphy, 893 F. Supp.
614, 616 (W.D. Va. 1995) (concluding that Lopez "does not prohibit Congress from enacting
laws aimed at regulating the use of interstate travel as a means by which to avoid the legal
obligations arising from family responsibilities"); United States v. Sage, _ F. Supp. ---J
1995 WL 627950 (D. Conn. 1995) (upholding the CSRA as based on activities with a suffi-
cient interstate nexus).
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other issues.267 At the moment, a majority of the justices on the
Supreme Court, like a majority of the 1995 Congress, are committed to
a political vision of the United States with sharply reduced federal
government roles, at least on certain issues.268 Indeed, the Lopez ap-
proach accomplishes by constitutional interpretation what some federal
justices and judges have been unable to do by persuasion: limit federal
court criminal jurisdiction and provide the basis to limit civil jurisdic-
tion over what is styled "family law.,,269
But the categorical line drawing does not work. In terms of family
law, a host of federal laws - tax, immigration, bankruptcy, and
pension, for example - defme and affect the structure of families and
their economic interactions;27o federal tax policy creates incentives for
certain kinds of family arrangements and discourages others,271 and
few would argue that federal courts should jettison jurisdiction over
these statutes. While some federal judges may not want what they term
"domestic relations" to be within their ken, Justice Breyer's dissent in
Lopez has the better of the argument.272 Issues related both to
267. See Vicki C. Jackson, Cautioning Congress to Pull Back, LEGAL TIMES OF
WASHINGTON, July 31, 1995, at S31.
268. Compare efforts to create a national law on products liability. See, e.g., The Com-
mon Sense Legal Standards Reform Act of 1995, H.R. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Version
7, Mar. 16 1995) (proposing liability rules for products, statutes of limitations, and
defenses).
269. See note 194 supra, discussing federal judicial opposition to the Violence Against
Women Act's jurisdictional provisions; see also Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender:
Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1682, 1685-94, 1749-50
(1991) (describing federal judicial reluctance to undertake studies of the effects of gender as
had state court judges, and linking that reluctance to a federal judiciary's self-conception that
it had less involvement with family law issues, which are themselves gender-coded, than did
state court judges) [hereinafter Resnik, Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts].
270. See Resnik, Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts, supra note 269 (federal
court authority over issues relating to family matters is longstanding); Cahn, supra note 194,
at 1075 (arguing that the "domestic relations" exception to diversity jurisdiction is not sup-
ported by "persuasive rationale[s]" and that federal courts should exercise jurisdiction over
these cases to help make plain that "families are a national issue"), at 1102-08 (surveying
family law issues currently falling within federal jurisdiction).
271. Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gen-
der Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REv. 983, 987 (1993) (detailing federal taxation's
affects on "everyday life" and the types of families fostered and discouraged).
272. 115 S. Ct 1624, 1657, 1659-62 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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education and to children have long been a part of national economic
policy, thereby forming the basis for federal jurisdiction - should
Congress so desire. Whatever today's political and legal interpretations
of congressional powers, federal jurisdictional authority is very broad,
edging toward the limitless.
Second, in light of the increasing appreciation for the overlap
between state and federal jurisdiction and the need to act in concert, it
is unwise to link permissible exercises of congressional enlargement of
federal jurisdiction to the concept that certain issues "cannot be dealt
with satisfactorily at the state level."273 As an empirical matter, on
certain issues with political freight (such as abortion, affirmative action,
or fighting particular forms of crime), one would expect variation
among states. In some instances, local enforcement of federal rules
may fail either because of problems of resources or of will, while in
other states, political authorities may embrace protections equal to or
beyond what federal law requires. On other issues, the inability to deal
satisfactorily with such issues might stem from the interjurisdictional
nature or effects of problems, but as I develop below, options exist for
inter-jurisdictional structures other than the federal COurtS.274
As a theoretical matter, commentary about reliance on either state
or federal jurisdiction often assumes an oppositional set of choices
rather than cooperative avenues of shared work. As a political matter,
in the contemporary world of impoverished judicial resources and
increasing appreciation of ')udicial federalism," it is unappealing to
invite negative commentary by Congress about the states as a predicate
to investing the federal judiciary with new authority. Of course, such a
statement would also make some members of Congress uncomfortable;
to the extent they continue to perceive themselves as significantly state-
identified,275 calling for indictments of the states as a predicate to
273. 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 27-28 (Recommendation
6(b)); Action Notice, supra note 26 (Recommendation 6 deferred); see also Little, supra
note 13, at 1077-81 (attempting to craft such a principle without its pejorative implications
and based either on intentional state failures that might be disput?d or lack of resources and
capacities to respond to issues of interstate dimensions).
274. See infra Sl~ction VII A.
275. See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv.
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federal jurisdiction would likely damp down the creation of new
federal causes of action.
A third and related point is that I hope discussants of the federal
courts will move away from explicit and implicit references to the
"essential" meaning of state or federal governments.276 Let me here
offer analogies from other debates within critical race theory and
feminism about the "essential" meaning of race and of gender.
Essentialist assumptions, that race or gender carries particular
characteristics, turn out to be deeply linked to culture, both in the
identification of certain characteristics as tied to race and gender and in
the ability to perceive those characteristics as telling.277 Similarly,
efforts to fix the private/public distinction reflects an array of social
perceptions about arenas of life, rather than one enduring line.278
Placing these parallels in the context of the federal courts, I sug-
gest that our understanding of federal and state jurisdiction should
recognize the necessarily fluid and changing understandings of federal
and state boundaries, that neither federal nor state jurisdiction need be
what it has or has not been before. Note that this is not a blanket
rejection of invocation of historical practices; indeed, I rely on past
choices of enlarging jurisdiction, but do so without claiming that those
or other historical practices have a presumptively special status among
arguments for or against jurisdiction. To be clear on the implications,
543 (1954) (Wechsler made that assumption, which has now been challenged); see also
Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L.
REv. 847, 857-68 (1979) (structural and political changes have made state-elected national
officials more identified with the national government than state-affiliated). But see Kramer,
Understanding Federalism, supra note 199, at 1529-46 (weak national parties and reliance on
local administration support state-based affiliations).
276. Here, Kramer makes a related point, that to the extent federalism is driven by ef-
forts to locate governance about issues in a manner that is most beneficial "for the people"
federalism's answers are deeply embedded in contextual judgments and "[T]he optimal level
at which to do things depends on complicated circumstances that change over time."
Kramer, Understanding Federalism, supra note 199, at 1500.
277. See generally RU1H FRANKENBERG, THE SOCIAL CONSlRUCTION OF WHITENESS
(1993).
278. See Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REv.
1 (1992) (outlining both the challenges to the distinction and criticisms of those approaches);
see also Cahn, supra note 194, at 1101-15.
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my suggested non-essentialist approach provides no safe havens for
particular parts of the federal jurisdictional mandate that one likes, be
they diversity, federal family law, or civil rights jurisdiction. Advocacy
for forms of jurisdiction needs to be predicated on normative claims -
whether about the need for national lawmaking, the desirability of
providing life tenured judges, the importance of continuing particular
aspects of federal or state court jurisdiction, the value of deferring to
state court jurisdiction, the enforcement of federal rights by a
specialized judiciary, the utility of adding resources like the federal
courts, the hostility of other government officials, or the importance of
keeping a preserve of special judges insulated from particular kinds of
problems. Then the focus of disagreement can rest on the adequacy of
these justifications, rather than on a claim that no justification is
needed because one is treading down well-marked paths.
My non-categorical conception carries with it a skepticism I want
to make explicit - about the capacity of scholars to offer singular
justifications or unified theories about the value of either the invocation
or abandonment of federal court jurisdiction. I am enthusiastic about
and have benefitted from those scholars who offer structural approaches
to federalism;279 what I am leery of are efforts to sift the meaning
down to a simple core that endures over time. Abandoning a categori-
cal approach to state and federal judicial capacities entails
acknowledging that sometimes one or the other may be champions of
whatever precept is close to a particular scholar's heart, be it individual
liberty, community authority, or something else. For example, a
commitment to (~xpansion of individual liberties does not inhere in the
designation "state" or "federal" but in the positions that either or both
sets of governments might undertake.28o More-over, under a non-cate-
gorical view, states are also not a singular unit to be compared as a
279. See, e.g., Fallon, Ideologies, supra note 172; Amar, Five Views, supra note 172;
Merritt, supra note 172; Briffault, supra note 200; Kramer, Understanding Federalism, supra
note 199; Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 199; Rubin & Feeley, supra note 245.
280. Compare Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 199, at 1360-68, 1395-99 (effort to
provide a structuml descriptive theory of when fedemily-empowered judges will overrule
Congress or police "subunits," that is the states). See also PELTASON, supra note 107, at 3-
6, 24-28, 65 (arguing for the legitimacy of seeing fedeml judges as self-interested politically-
situated actors).
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whole to the federal government but rather understood as likely to
evidence diverse attitudes.281 Further, the ongoing workings of
federalist arrangements are understood as continually renegotiated.
Fourth, to the extent that state and federal systems have been dis-
crete entities, I hope debates about federal jurisdiction will recognize
the decreasing plausibility of the concept of bounded state and federal
governance. Participants within - judges, lawyers, legislators, and resi-
dents - are actively engaged in eroding such boundaries.282 From
legislative grants of aid (conditioned on particular actions by states) to
state and federal judges convening both sets of courts simultaneously,
the experience of interdependence is enacted and reiterated.283
What is emerging will be very difficult for those trained in law
within contemporary contexts (myself included of course) to
understand. The physical and material boundaries that are explicitly the
281. In this sense, I share some sympathy with Briffault's critique that nonnative
fedemlisms - justifications based on claims of what fedemlism accomplishes - are an
amalgam of historical example, empiricism, intuition and aspimtions and thus unsatisfactory.
Briffault, supra note 200, at 1324-28. Briffault's proposed solution, however, that states and
fedemlism exist based on constitutional stipulation, fails to solve the problem that has
prompted the search for nonnative justification - that having said that states exist as a
legal matter does not answer what degree of national governance is pennissible, even in
constitutional doctrinal tenns, let alone in tenns of contempomry needs. Briffault did not
purport to answer all those questions but argued that, when faced with such questions, courts
should examine "the impact of national action on the capacities of the states to be indepen-
dent lawmakers and alternative power centers within the fedeml framework, mther than by a
more open-ended and value-laden assessment of the conflicting political values said to be
advanced or impaired by state or national action." Id. at 1352. The difficulty is that the
very assessments for which Briffault called are themselves "open-ended and value-laden." Id.
The point is that there is no escape from that activity, which should I believe, be cast in
less pejomtive tenns.
282. Compare Briffault, supra note 200, at 1336-38 ("territorial integrity" of states and
its stability, that is very few boundary changes). That states have fixed boundaries does not
make such boundaries detenninative of how judicial systems should opemte.
283. In a speech, Justice O'Connor used the metaphor of a "marriage" to describe the
state-fedeml relationship, which she chamcterized as a system of "dialogue and dependence."
Sandm Day O'Connor, Keynote Speaker, Middle Atlantic Conference, supra note 122, 162
F.R.D. 180, 182 (1994) ("Each partner must depend on the other to uphold its solemn obli-
gations with respect to fedeml rights; each partner must have appropriate respect and regard
for the other; and each partner must listen to and appreciate the views the other brings to
bear on the issues they must, by the necessity of their marriage, address in common."). That
image does not convey the blurring boundaries I wish to stress here.
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core of a good deal of jurisdictional doctrine - land, in nineteenth
century terms -- are losing their relevance. Let me pause to underscore
the disjunction between the history of jurisdiction and the changing
roles of state and federal governments, occasioned in large measure by
technological developments.
Remember the intellectual breakthrough of the 1940s and
1950s,284 that jurisdiction over the person was a concept distinct from
the ability to serve a person physically within one's borders. Until
about 1950, a literal physical nexus to the person (sometimes in the
fictive form that the person had designated a state official to act as
that person's "agent" to receive process within the boundaries of the
state) was the sine qua non of jurisdictional power. A government
within the Unitl~d States could not, absent consent, invoke its power
over a person without this material, embodied relationship.
Physical authority is not only a relic of old jurisdictional rules;
territoriality remains a vital part of contemporary jurisdictional law. In
1990, the United States Supreme Court concluded that, when a person
is served within the boundaries of a state, jurisdictional authority is
proper, no matter the relationship between that person and the
state.28S Federal admiralty and maritime jurisdiction are similarly
keyed to place.286 Further, on the criminal side, physical presence
remains the touchstone; the absent defendant cannot generally be
tried.287 And the coordinate point is that physical authority can permit
284. See Mullan<: v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306 (1950), and Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
285. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
286. Location is not the exclusive basis but a factor to be considered. See City of
Chicago v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 115 S. Ct 1043, 1048 (1995) (Souter, J. for
the majority) (detennining that admiralty jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(1) involving
tort claims "must satisfy conditions both of location and of connection with maritime
activity"); compare the opinion by Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, arguing that the
jurisdictional inquiry should be limited to the "simple question whether the tort occurred on
a vessel on the navigable waters." Id. at 1056. See also Executive Jet Aviation Inc. v. City
of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972) (litigation about a plane that falls into Lake Erie not
within admiralty jurisdiction because the "wrong" did not "bear a significant relationship to
traditional maritime activity").
287. Linked to the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause and right to defend guaran-
tees as well as to due process concerns, Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
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trial; not only does the ability to compel extradition serve the require-
ment of physical presence but jurisdiction by kidnap is also expressly
permitted under Supreme Court constitutional interpretation.28S
In short, territoriality and physicality - material moments in
water, air, and land - are centerpieces of jurisdictional authority (and
implicitly of theory).289 To this day, active federal judges are
generally required to reside within the circuit or district in which they
sit,290 and federal district lines are drawn in relationship to state
boundaries. The 1995 Long Range Plan reflects this physical orienta-
tion; its aspiration for the federal trial bench is that:
the primary trial forum for disputes committed to federal jurisdiction
should be a generalist district court whose judges are affiliated with, and
required to reside in, the general geographiC region served by the court,
and whose facilities are reasonably accessible to litigants, jurors, witnesses
and other participants in the judicial process.291
requires that a non-corporate felony defendant be present at arraignment and at every stage
of the proceedings, subject to waiver. See Crosby v. United States, 113 S. Ct 748 (1993)
(absconding prior to the beginning of trial precludes trial under the Rule). If a defendant ab-
sconds during trial, it may continue, and if a defendant leaves the country while an appeal
is pending, an appellate court may dismiss that appeal. Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States,
113 S. Ct 1199 (1993).
288. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (abduction of a criminal
defendant, even from countries with which the United States has extradition treaties, does
not prevent that defendant's trial). The court in Alvarez-Machain relied on what has become
termed the "Ker-Frisbie" doctrine. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886) (State of Illinois had
defendant abducted from Peru); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952) (Michigan officials
kidnapping defendant from Chicago).
289. As Lea Brilmayer describes it: "government coercion is mediated by reference to
land." See LEA BRILMAYER, JUSTIFYING INTERNATIONAL Acrs 52-78 (1989) (emphasis in the
original); see also Friedman, supra note 196, at 1442-53 (predicting that globalization will
require reconsidering domestic federalism, including the forms of regulating business and
industry).
290. See 28 U.S.C. § 44(c) (1994) (except for the D.C. Circuit, each circuit judge
"shall be a resident of the circuit for which appointed at the time of his appointment and
thereafter while in active service"); 28 U.S.C. § 134(b) (1994) (except again for the District
of Columbia, each district judge "shall reside in the district . . . for which he is
appointed"). These provisions stem from the First Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 3, 1
Stat 73. Once holding a life tenured judgeship, that individual may be temporarily reas-
signed to sit elsewhere. 28 U.S.C. §§ 291 (circuit judges), 292 (district judges) (1994).
291. 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 47 (Recommendation 25)
(emphasis added); Action Notice, supra note 26 (Recommendation 25 deferred); 1994 DRAFT
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While jurisdictional theory still relies on physical nexus, political
theory about the United States and the relationship between state and
federal governments has turned away from the idea of land and geog-
raphy as central. To describe the relationships among state and federal
governments, contemporary commentators sometimes rely on metaphors
like a "marble cake,,292 or a bowl of "mush."293 We who think
about courts will need to reassess assumptions - both of structure and
of process - heretofore deeply rooted in the physical relationship of
human beings on a specific piece of soil to a particular courthouse.
In practice, technology has and could further disengage courts
from dependence on the physical presence of individuals. Today it is
telephone conferences in lieu of court appearances.294 Tomorrow it
will be video teleconferencing and the internet. Today, claimants and
lawyers from across the country in the Silicone Breast Implant Litiga-
tion can address questions to the claims facility in Texas and receive
information about the litigation via a computer,29S and LEXIS-NEXIS
has developed a "complex litigation automated docket system"
("CLAD") by which documents can be filed electronically and deci-
sions posted.296
Given cyberspace and globalization, the coherence of physicality as
the basis of jurisdiction diminishes, with variation depending on the
context.297 Within the confmes of my topic here, this point translates
LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 15, at 39 (Recommendation 23, similar).
292. GRODZINS, supra note 2, at 8.
293. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 245, at 933.
294. FED. R. CN. P. 16(b) (providing for pretrial conferences in person or "by ...
telephone, mail, or other suitable means").
295. The Plaintiffs' Liaison Counsel created a Breast Implant Bulletin Board System,
enabling access by modem to obtain infonnation, including finding posted notices about the
progress of the litigation and dates of hearings; in addition, the Claims Facility has also es-
tablished a Bulletin Board for claimants. Telephone interview with Richard Rosenthal,
Plaintiffs' Liaison Counsel (July 6, 1995).
296. Telephone interview with Richard Klein of LEXIS-NEXIS (June 14, 1995) (de-
scribing systems used by the Delaware Superior Court for its asbestos litigation and in a
multi-party insurance case; as well as by the Fulton County Court System, Georgia; the
Southern. District of New York's Bankruptcy Court in a bankruptcy proceeding; and in the
Eastern District of Ohio for a product liability action).
297. An area of law much taken with how to assess the effects of technology on legal
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into yet another reason why federal and state judicial boundaries are
and will become increasingly difficult to justify on lines other than
one's normative aspirations for a group of government-empowered
adjudicators.298
VI. DEFINITION BY CONTRAST
Is there anything quintessentially different about the federal courts
as contrasted to other court systems within the United States? Federal
court caseload has long been an eclectic mix, not limited only to dis-
putes readily recognized as "federal" by commentators a generation
earlier or later.299 Much of federal jurisdiction is concurrent with that
of the state courts and has been since the inception of the country.
Federal courts are no longer populated exclusively by life tenured
judges, which might have been a mark of distinction from most other
court systems. The modes of decision making within federal courts are
also not unique. The amalgam of management, settlement, and
doctrine is choice of law; like jurisdiction, reliance on a physical nexus - the place of the
event - solves fewer problems when participants in the event(s) are far flung and injuries
occur across not only physical boundaries but also electronic transmissions.
298. I question not the longevity of state boundaries but their normative implications.
Hence, I part company with Briffault who argues that even "the modern tendency to define
rights nationally, high levels of interstate mobility, the emergence of new-non-state-based
interests" will not undermine the centrality of states. Briffault, supra note 200, at 1346. Note
also the contrast between Briffault and Kramer. Kramer, Understanding Federalism, supra
note 199, at 1522-46 (arguing that key contemporaI)' elements of state power stem from the
role of national media in an era of weak national political parties, the relationships among
national and state-elected officials, and federal laws relying on states for administrative pur-
poses); see also Susan Rose-Ackerman, Environmental Policy and Federal Structure: A Com-
parison of the United States and Germany, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1587, 1591-97 (1994) (dis-
cussing how even "local" problems such as noise and waste disposal can be inefficiently and
inefficaciously decentralized).
299. A related point is nicely made in the exchange between Justice Scalia and Marc
Galanter - that contemporaI)' assumptions about "federal cases" do not reflect the full fed-
eral docket Justice Scalia argued in a speech that, in 1960 when he had gone to law
school, the docket of the federal courts was populated by important cases, with a touch of
the "routine." Galanter reviewed the docket of those "good old days," and demonstrated that
a good many "routine" cases were on the docket then as now, but were not the subject of
law school discussions. Galanter, Federal Courts Since the Good Old Days, supra note 213,
at 921-28. See also Resnik, Housekeeping, supra note 3 (discussing valuation of tasks of
federal trial judges); Little, supra note 13, at 1035-36 (discussing longstanding federal crimi-
nal jurisdiction over crimes that might also be prosecuted in state courts).
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adjudication, of published and unpublished decisions, is shared by state
and federal judiciaries. While federal jurisdictional boundaries have
been and are more limited than that of state courts, limited mandates
themselves do not delineate federal courts from other adjudicatory
institutions; federal agency courts also are courts of limited jurisdiction.
Yet the impulse of federal judges to mark distinction remains strong.
In large measure, the Long Range Plan defmes the federal courts by
striving to maintain the contrast between state courts, federal agency
courts, and the life tenured judiciary.
One distinction that shapes that difference is that the federal courts
today are richer, in material and symbolic terms, than their counter-
parts.300 This relative richness comes in several forms, such as judi-
cial salaries/ol the ratio of judges to cases/02 the quality of
300. See also Little, supra note 13, at 1055-61 (discussing the "dignitary concerns" of
federal judges, and commenting that the 1994 Draft Proposed Long Range Plan included
"unanalyzed excesses" in terms of making claims about the superiority of the federal courts,
and that his discussion may be more "blunt" than others in describing federal judicial criti-
cisms of certain kinds of crime as based on the view that certain crimes are "too trivial and
therefore beneath the federal courts' attention"); YACKLE, supra note 174, at 46-49 (describ-
ing what he terms "snob appeal" and arguing not to "depreciate the coin that is the federal
judicimy," but that "modestly increasing" its ranks would not undermine substantially its
"elite" status); Frank Statement, supra note 35, at 4-5 ("prestige read as rarity may have to
yield to prestige based on accomplishment;" to maintain the very small size of the federal
judicimy is to sustain "a glorification of prestige at the price of sound social policy").
301. Insofar as legal research reveals, no one compendium provides historical review of
the respective salaries of state and federal judges. Both the National Center for State Courts
("NCSC") and federal statutes provide data on salaries. Beginning in 1975, the NCSC has
published surveys of salaries annually. See NCSC, NCSC Completes New Survey of Judicial
Salaries, 1 STAlE COURT REPORT 1 (Issue 2, Winter, 1995) (also discussing plans to pub-
lish data on trends) [hereinafter NCSC 1994 Salary Survey]. Further, a few studies provide
information on salaries at particular moments in time. See, e.g., Judicial Salaries and Retire-
ment Plans in the United States, 54 AM. JUDICATIJRE 184 (1970) (reviewing all the state
salaries, describing pay as generally "inadequate" and comparing salaries of highest court
judges to other state officials); COMMlTIEE ON STAlE JUDICIAL SALARIES, A HANDBOOK ON
STAlE JUDICIAL SALARIES (ABA, Judicial Administration Division, June 1986) (again dis-
cussing "inadequate salaries" and calling for reform, surveying salaries of judges and some
court employees in all the states and providing comparative data).
To trace the salaries of each bench, we are looking at federal statutes and specific
states at specific intervals. However, relevant intervals - i.e., when courts are created and
salaries set - do not match easily across systems; further, our library holdings do not
include all the relevant historical sources. Hence, it is difficult to obtain matched informa-
tion, that is, in soml~ years we have data on one system but not another. Rather than
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reviewing all states, we are looking at Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia (fonner colo-
nies), as well as Michigan, Illinois, and California (major industrial states), and Mississippi,
Arkansas, and Wyoming (less industrial and regionally diverse). Further, because intennediate
appellate courts were added at different times in the various jurisdictions, we are surveying
only data from trial courts of general jurisdiction and from the highest courts in the state or
federal systems.
In tenns of the 18th and 19th century, a preliminary review reveals an uneven
pattern of differences between state and federal salaries. While federal judges were paid
more than Massachusetts judges, at some points California judges were paid more than
federal judges. In 1789, United States Supreme Court associate justices were paid $3,500
(Act of Sept 23, 1789, ch. 18, 1 Stat 72 (1789)), while justices from the highest court of
Massachusetts made $1,500 in 1789 (1789 Mass. Acts ch. 44). Twenty years later, the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts' justices were paid an additional $600 (1809 Mass. Acts ch.
13). Congress raised the associate justices salaries in 1819 to $4,500 (Act of Feb. 20, 1819,
ch. 27, 3 Stat 484), and then in 1867 to $6,000 (Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 166, 14 Stat
455). Massachusetts raised its Supreme Court justices' salaries in 1843 to $2,500 (1843
Mass. Acts ch. 9), in 1856 to $4,000 (1856 Mass. Acts ch. 10), and then in 1866 to $5,000
(1866 Mass. Acts ch. 46). In 1857, Michigan, which became a state in 1837, paid its asso-
ciate justices $2,500 (1857 Mich. Pub. Acts no. 146 § 14), raised in 1887 to $5,000 (1887
Mich. Pub. Acts no. 96). In 1850, California paid their justices $10,000 (1850 Cal. Stat ch.
25), later reduced to $8,000 in 1852 (1852 Cal. Stat ch. 10).
Turning to the twentieth century, Congress raised associate justices salaries to
$14,500 in 1911 (Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat 1152), to $20,000 in 1926 (Act of
Dec. 13, 1926, ch. 6, 44 Stat 919), to $25,000 in 1946 (Act of July 31, 1946, ch. 704, 60
Stat 716), to $39,500 in 1964 (Act of Aug. 14, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-426, § 403(a), 78
Stat 434), to $60,000 in 1969 (Salary recommendations for 1969 increases, 34 Fed. Reg.
2241 (Jan. 15, 1969)), to $63,000 in 1975 (Act of Aug. 9, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-82, §
205(b)(1), 89 Stat 422), to $72,000 in 1977 (Salary Recommendations for 1977 increase, 42
Fed. Reg. 10297 (Jan. 17, 1977)). Between 1978 and 1994, the justices' salaries were
increased many times, to the current level of $164,100 (28 U.S.C. § 5 (1994), Exec. Order
No. 12,944, 60 Fed. Reg. 309 (1994)). Massachusetts' associate justice salaries over the
same period ranged from $10,500 to $95,808 (1911 Mass. Acts ch. 743; NCSC 1994 Salary
Survey at 6). Michigan's associate justices were paid $7,000 in 1913 (1913 Mich. Pub. Acts
no. 103) and in 1994 $111,941 (NCSC 1994 Salary Survey at 6). California's justices had a
base pay in 1911 of $8,000 (1905 Cal. Stat ch. 249, note no pay raise from 1905 until
approximately 1919), and by 1994 of $131,085 (NCSC 1994 Salary Survey at 4).
As of 1994, federal judges in general are paid more than state court judges. The
NCSC survey reports that associate justices of the states' highest courts were paid a low of
$64,452 and a high of $131,085; at the trial level the range was between $61,740 and
$113,000. NCSC 1994 Salary Survey at 1. Thus, one can see that currently, federal life
tenured judges are paid more than their state counterparts (associate justices paid $164,100,
district judges paid $133,600). Congress has also mandated that the District of Columbia's
local court's trial level judges are paid the same - that is $133,600. Id. at 8. Of course,
not all compensation is represented in direct pay; retirement benefits and other kinds of
remuneration may make disparities less or more between the two systems. See Judicial Re-
tirement and Pension Plans (Am. Judicature Soc'y, 1961); 28 U.S.C. § 372 (1994).
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courtroom space and its comfort/03 the public resources spent/04 the
status of the lawyers and litigants who appear in the COurtS,305 the
Further, some states have had to cut back or eliminate budgets for items like judicial
travel and other forms of support. See SAVING OUR SYS1EM, supra note 51, at LXV (1993)
(describing as one of South Carolina's "crisis points" that "[t]unding cuts to the courts have
resulted in the slashing of operating expenses, including judicial travel").
Another measure of wealth are the support staffs available to each judge. See
Neuborne, supra note 174, at 1122-24 (federal district judges have the support of law clerks,
"chosen from among the most promising recent law school graduates" as well as a smaller
docket than do state trial judges, who may either lack technical support or have long term
staff assistance; Neuborne argues that such "technical competence" of federal judges, coupled
with other factors, make the federal courts a venue of preference for civil rights litigators).
302. Caseload volume is an important aspect of the experience of judges. Comparable
data are available for 1993. As of that year, the 789 California trial judges of general juris-
diction had an average of 1,108 filings apiece; the 362 Ohio trial judges had an average of
1,282 filings; the 17 Wyoming judges had an average of 817 filings; and the 372 New
Jersey judges had an average of 2,836 filings. NCSC ANNUAL REPORT, EXAMINING lHE
WORK OF STATE COURTS, 1993: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM 1HE COURT STATISTICS
PROJECT 7-8 (1995) (filings include what are termed "civil, domestic, and criminal"). In
contrast, the national average for the 649 "authorized" federal district judges for 1993 was
426 filings per judge; note further that this average does not include the working contribu-
tions of either the 242 district judges who have senior status or the 369 full-time magistrate
judges. ANNuAL REPORT OF 1HE DIRECTOR, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF lHE UNITED STATES
COURTS 7 (Table 5), I I (Table 8) (1993).
303. Compare Randy Gragg, Monuments to a Crime-Fearing Age, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
May 28, 1995, at 36 (describing the "largest public-building construction campaign since the
New Deal," spending "$10 billion" to build more than 50 new federal court houses and to
alter 60 other buildings, and employing "some of the country's best-known architects") with
William Glaberson, Mini-Courtrooms Aid Crowded Dockets, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1990, at
Bl (describing courtrooms so small judges need not tell lawyers "to approach the bench;"
the smaller courtrooms made to respond to caseload crises; the lack of funds for new court
construction; and the removal of a "marble information booth" in the lobby of one court
house to make room for the "1,500 or so people who often wait outside in the morning to
get in"); Jan Hoffinan, Chaos Presides in New York Housing Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28,
1994, at AI ("one court was so tiny it scarcely accommodated six bodies"). See also
SAVING OUR SYS1EM, supra note 51, at XIII, XLVII, LIII (unsafe and/or inadequate court-
room facilities in specific states).
304. See James S. Kakalik & Abby Eisenstat Robyn, Costs of the Civil Justice System
XV (1982) (providing comparative "government expenditures for tort cases filed" for trial
courts in California, Florida, the State of Washington, and the federal district courts; average
expenditures by the federal system for jury trials and per case were "substantially higher"
than in state courts).
305. Bryant Garth, Privatization and the New Market for Disputes: A Framework for
Analysis and a Preliminary Assessment, 12B STUD. IN LAW, POL'y & SOC'Y 373, 374-75
(1992) (analyzing courts' "competition for desirable business," and that resources of litigants,
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kind of cases on the federal docket/06 and the stature accorded to
those who hold the position of federal judge. Consider the words of
one federal judge, rejecting the accusation that he seeks to maintain
federal court privilege for reasons of prestige. He countered that his
goals for the federal judiciary are founded on the need for
an institution of special distinction - staffed by judges of unifonnly high
quality, functioning in an environment appropriate to the sensitive task of
adjudicating issues of constitutional and federal statutory law.307
To borrow again from feminist theory, standpoint theorist Nancy
Hartsock insists (ll la Marx) that one's "standpoint" is not simply an
artifact of social position or gender but is an achieved stance, created
through self-conscious understanding, self-conception, and identifica-
tion.30B Many federal judges and academics have achieved such a
standpoint, an understanding of Article III judges as a group
constituted with a claim of identity and a need for preservation. For
some, the argument for preservation of such an elite is based on the
scope of case, and financial stakes affect the desirability of cases).
306. Ann Althouse argues that federal court "deference" to state court interests is also
founded in federal judicial self-interest; in "making jurisdictional doctrine, the federal courts
are, after all, designing their own workload." Althouse, supra note 246, at 1207 (arguing
that the basis for declining jurisdiction in "domestic relations" diversity cases is the "sense
that this work is insignificant docket-clutter beneath the dignity of the federal judge. State
judges receive this work not because of respect for integrity of the state's judicial system,
but because federal judges have turned up their noses at it").
307. Newman, 1,000 Judges-The Limit for an Effective Federal Judiciary, supra note
68, at 194 (also appreciating and not wishing to "disparage" the "hard-working, talented"
judges of the state courts, but arguing that federal courts need be "distinctive"). As noted
above, the writers of the Proposed Long Range Plan also argued that federal courts have a
"unique mission [which] requires a commitment to conserving the federal courts as a distinc-
tive judicial forum." 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 6; 1994 DRAFT
PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 4 (same). To keep the numbers of judges
small within the federal courts, Judge Newman has proposed what he terms a system of
"discretionary access," by which federal judges would decide "whether a particular case
within federal jurisdiction ought to be litigated in federal or state court" Jon O. Newman,
Determining the Proper Allocation of Cases Between Federal and State Courts, 79 JUDICA-
TURE 6, 6 (1995); Newman Statement, supra note 27.
308. Hartsock, supra note 59, at 160 (explaining that the "concept of a standpoint de-
pends on the assumption that epistemology grows in a complex and contradictory way from
material life.").
HeinOnline -- 98 W. Va. L. Rev. 254 1995-1996
254 WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:171
view that the federal judiciary's privileged status has served the
country well. Others argue that such distinctions serve only some seg-
ments of the country well.309 The issue is whether an enclave of
privilege has tht: potential to serve a range of interests such that it is
in the interest of all to support some form of unique status for the
federal judiciary.3lO
VII. TIME FOR INVENTION, AGAIN
Once freed from undue reliance on historical claims about the
jurisdiction of the federal courts, and yet appreciative of the historical
stature of federal courts stemming in good measure from its relative
wealth, we can, I hope, move on - toward a new century, and per-
haps new options. I fmd disheartening recommendations for shifting
jurisdiction from one burdened institution to another, and specifically
proposals that move cases from the federal to the state courts and to
federal agencies, institutions more beleaguered and less well-resourced
than are the federal courts.
Rather than engage in or prompt jockeying with other judges about
relative deprivations, federal judges should appreciate that they - like
309. According to John Frank, the constitutional decision to create diversity jurisdiction
was a product of desires "to pennit commercial, manufacturing and speculative interests to
litigate their controversies, and particularity their controversies with other classes, before
judges who would be fmnly tied to their own interests," and "to achieve more efficient
administration of justice for the classes thus benefitted." Frank, Historical Bases for Federal
Judicial System, supra note 189, at 28 (footnote omitted); see also Forrester, supra note
190, at 119 (discussing the search for judges who, in words of Prof. Forrester, had "federal
sympathies"); ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND TIlE JUDICIAL PROCESS
(1975) (discussing federal judicial enforcement in the nineteenth century of fugitive slave
laws, as contrasted with some state judiciaries that found slavery morally abhorrent and
hence unconstitutional); EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN INDusTRIAL AMERICA 1870-1958 at 22-27 (1992) (explaining
how federal diversity jurisdiction worked to the benefit of national corporations).
310. John Frank has tied together the question of a generative federal judiciary with the
composition of its caseload. He asked: "Are the federal courts a desirable institution for a
sound social order if they are restricted to 'society's most contentious and most important
issues' and achieve that restriction by over-loading already over-loaded state courts and
dumping people and commercial business problems out of the system?" Frank Statement,
supra note 35, at 8. Given his reading of current proposals to restrict federal jurisdiction,
his question also requires exploration of which issues become understood as "important."
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other judges in the United States - are specially situated. As the Long
Range Plan itself reflects,311 members of the federal judiciary share
with their sibling judges in federal agencies and in state courts both
the problems of the delivery of justice and a deeper understanding of
the harms done by its failures. Moreover, judges appreciate these prob-
lems more than do most other members of government. Federal and
state judges could thus join together to invent new means of
responding to the citizenry's need for judgment.
A. National Courts for Interstate Cases
Reflecting on the current crop of proposals, the descriptive changes
that have occurred within the federal system, and political scientists'
observations on the many modes of joint and collaborative governance
within the United States has led me to consider alternative visions for
the coming century. Given that technology has radically altered interac-
tive possibilities,312 I here suggest one possible invention to help
move the conversation from its reliance on the current set of options
(either state or federal court, court or agency) to imagine something
else.
The narrative of the federal judicial system I prefer to tell is a
history of invention with a good deal of creativity, some quiet and
some exuberant. Take magistrate judges, who accrued power slowly
311. See 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 22~23 ("it is unfair to
solve the future caseload burdens of the federal courts by foisting them off onto the
states"); id. at 36-37 (Recommendation 14; calling for Congress, when considering shifting
jurisdiction away from the federal courts, to address both the impact on the states and to
provide financial assistance); Action Notice, supra note 26 (Recommendation 14 deferred).
The earlier draft of the Long Range Plan had a recommendation parallel to Recommendation
14, but did not include the discussion of the unfairness of solving federal caseload burdens
by further burdening the states. 1994 DRAFT PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4,
at 31 (Recommendation 13).
312. Technology has also caused many problems for the federal courts. For example,
one way to understand the difficulty that pretrial discovery rights have posed is to recall
that those rules were drafted in the 1930s, before photocopiers became commonplace. What
injuries photocopies have inflicted, computer data-basing and scanning may well resolve.
Current (and future) means of amassing and locating information are critical to the courts of
the twenty-first century, and may well help to solve many of the problems pressing us at
the close of this century.
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over a period of thirty years, not even gaining the title "judge" until
1990.313 The emergence of the fourth tier of federal judges need not
be relegated to an embarrassed footnote but rather seen as an innova-
tive mechanism almost to double the size of the federal trial bench
during decades when a variety of political obstacles made unfeasible
the expansion of the life tenured apparatus. Consider also the growth
of agency adjudication, with its trumpeted beginnings (the New Dealers
praised this cadre of what today we call bureaucrats and hoped that
their regulatory efforts would benefit the country314), its more quiet
expansion during the 1950s and 1960s,315 its siege of criticism
313. See Fedeml Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-650, § 321, 104· Stat 5089, 5II7 (1990), codified at 28 U.S.C. § 631 note (1994)
(change of name of United States magistmte to "United States Magistmte Judge").
314. The aspimtions for regulatory agencies are iIIustmted by the response to the Su-
preme Court decision in Crowell v. Benson, discussed supra note 75. See John Dickinson,
Crowell v. Benson: Judicial Review of Administrative Determinations of Questions of "Con-
stitutional Fact", 80 U. PA. L. REv. 1055, 1082 (1932) (concluding that allowing trial de
novo after administmtive hearings "would make the establishment of an effective system of
administmtive regulation by the Fedeml government well-nigh impossible"); see also Com-
ment, Judicial Review of Administrative Findings-Crowell v. Benson, 41 YALE LJ. 1037,
1047-48, 1053 (1932) ("Crowell v. Benson injects into the administmtion of the ... Act
inconvenience and confusion which will materially obstruct attainment of its ends . . . .
Injured workmen will be subjected to a great deal of litigation . . . . And herein lies the
greatest significance of the case; the harm for which it will be remembered."). For discus-
sion of other animating bases for agency expansion, see SlEPHEN SKOWRONKEN, BUILDING A
NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINIS1RATIVE CAPACITIES 1877-
1920 (1982) (analyzing the relationships among industrialization, nationalization, and adminis-
tmtive institutions).
315. The number of administmtive law judges grew from the 1950s onward. For exam-
ple, the Social Security system developed slowly from its inception in 1935 to 1950. In
1950, only 16 percent of those people over age 65 received social security benefits. Robert
M. Ball, The Original Understanding on Social Security: Implications for Later Develop-
ments, in SOCIAL SECURI1Y: BEYOND THE RHETORIC OF CRISIS 17, 27 (Theodore R.
Marmor & Jerry L. Mashaw eds., 1988). The hearings and appeals system for the progmms
in existence until the mid-1950s (old-age and survivors insumnce) "protected well-defined
rights and protect[ed] against administmtive error" on issues such as eligibility based on age,
retirement, or marital status. Edward D. Berkowitz, Disability Insurance and the Social Secu-
rity Tradition, in SOCIAL SECURI1Y: THE FiRsT HALF-CENTURY, 292-93 (Gemld D. Nash,
Noel H. Pugach & Richard F. Thommasson eds., 1988).
The number of administmtive law judges grew from the 1950s onward, from 30 in
1956 to 110 in 1960 to more than 800 in 1988. Id By 1975, disability appeals before ad-
ministmtive law judges numbered some 150,000 per year. By 1983, the number of such
appeals was 364,000. Jerry L. Mashaw, Disability Insurance in an Age of Retrenchment: The
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resulting in the "due process revolution,"316 during which procedural
obligations were imposed on agency adjudication and by which agen-
cies came all the more to resemble courts.
The more recent developments, of judicial federalism, large-scale
litigation, and fluid borders, could in turn prompt yet another round of
innovations - aspiring to create more judicial services with stature and
wealth rather than to shift crumbling pieces of pie about. One such
proposal is to call for a set of what I term "national courts," either
created by the states317 or by Congress pursuant to its interstate com-
merce powers, and staffed primarily by state, not federal, judges.
Why another set of courts? Why national courts? Because of the
many instances in which contemporary litigation involves disputes that
cut across several states. Prime examples include the aggregated cases
described above, such as air crashes and asbestos injuries, in which the
underlying rules of tort law are currently made by the states, and typi-
cally filed both in state and/or federal courts.
Federal courts have become a place for aggregation because many
of these litigations transcend the boundaries of individual states/IS
Politics of Implementing Rights, in BEYOND THE RHETORIC OF CRISIS 166. As of 1991,
requests for a hearing before an administrative law judge numbered 327,000. Robert S.
Haberman & David G. Hatfield, The Role of the Appeals Council in the Administrative
Adjudicative Process: Unveiling the Mystery, 39 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 444, 447 (1992). For
more history of the Social Security system, see JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE:
MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS (1983).
316. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (requiring a hearing prior to the termina-
tion of welfare benefits).
317. If done by interstate compacts, this constitutional route sometimes requires the
consent of Congress. United States Steel Corp. v. MuItistate Tax. Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452,
459-60, 471 (1978) (rejecting literal reading of the Clause and applying functional test under
which agreements that do not "encroach" on federal power do not require congressional
consent while "most multilateral compacts have been submitted for congressional
approval, . . . [that] historical practice" was not a requirement that all be). See U.S.
CONST., Article I, § 10 ("the Compact Clause"), discussed in Felix Frankfurter & James M.
Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE
LJ. 685, 691-708 (1925) (detailing compacts related to land and boundaries, navigation,
crime, uniform legislation, natural resources, utilities, and taxation) [hereinafter Frankfurter &
Landis, The Compact Clause]. A narrower view of the reach of the Compact Clause is
provided in Abraham C. Weinfeld, What Did the Framers of the Federal Constitution Mean
by "Agreements or Compacts"?, 3 U. CHI. L. REv. 453 (1935-36).
318. Contempofal)' rules about the territorial limits of state court jurisdiction make
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have no particular connection with any given state, and involve liti-
gants from many parts of the country. Federal courts are also a venue
for decision making because, as detailed above, they have more re-
sources with which to respond than do many of the state courts. But
these cases are burdensome and time consuming. Moreover, the source
of their claim to federal court time is generally that actors from
different states are litigants and not (absent the current proposed enact-
ment of national products liability legislation) that federal law should
govern the dispute. Given the bases in state law, contemporary
proposals for consolidation also include recognition of the important
role state judges play in large-scale litigation.319
Today, such cases are neither state nor federal.no In 1996, the
debates about the meaning and values of federalism are too narrowly
cast as discussions about governance by either individual states or the
national government. Over the course of the century, institutions have
developed across the country that recognize the need to cross state
lines without becoming instruments of the United States
litigation of all issues within the confines of a single state difficult and have prompted a
variety of suggestions, including alterations of federal jurisdiction to relax diversity require-
ments to enable centralization in the federal courts. See, e.g., the Multiparty Multiforum
Jurisdiction Act of 1993, H.R. 1100, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); see also 1995 PROPOSED
LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 29-32 (Recommendation 7; "Diversity jurisdiction
should . . . be retained for some consolidated 'mass tort' litigation, which will require a
relaxation of the traditional 'complete diversity' requirement, in order to promote effective
consolidation of related cases"); Action Notice, supra note 26 (Recommendation 7 deferred);
1994 DRAFT PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 25-26 (Recommendation 6
similar); see generally Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Kenneth D. Sibley, Beyond Diversity:
Federal Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 7 (1986).
319. See ALI, COMPLEX LmGATION, supra note 130, at 165·216 (Chapter 4; interstate
and interfederal consolidation); NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STAlE LAWS, UNIFORM TRANSFER OF LmGATION ACT, supra note 130 (inter-state transfers).
The differences are analyzed in Edward H. Cooper, Interstate Consolidation: A Comparison
of the ALI Project with the Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act, 54 LA. L. REv. 897 (1994).
320. In many respects, the suggestion of an interstate court reflects calIs from earlier
eras on the need for interstate regulatory coordination. See, e.g., Frankfurter & Landis, The
Compact Clause, supra note 317, at 717 (explained state compacts relating to natural re-
sources: "The regional character of electric power, as a social and engineering fact, must
find a counterpart in the effort of law to deal with it No single State in isolation can
wholly deal with the problems. . . . Co-ordinated regulation among groups of States, in
harmony with the Federal administration, . . . must be the objective").
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government,321 For example, for more than a century, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has worked in
response to the felt need for uniformity across states.322 Other state-
based national organizations include the National Conference of State
Legislators, the National Association of Attorneys General, the National
League of Cities, the National Governors' Association, and the United
States Conference of Mayors,323 all of which play important roles in
shaping national policy.324 Some have used the phrase "picket fence
federalism" to capture existing national connections across states and
through tiers of government;325 others have used the terms "marble
cakes»326 and "matrixes.»327
321. Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause, supra note 317, at 688-90 (including
a list of such associations as of that writing).
322. Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause, supra note 317, at 688 (detailing this
effort, beginning in 1890).
323. The National Conference of State Legislatures, founded in 1975, describes its aim
as "improving the qualit)' and effectiveness of state legislatures," as well as "to ensure states
a strong, cohesive voice in the federal decision-making process" and "to foster interstate
communication and cooperation." The National Governors' Association, founded in 1908,
describes itself as a "vehicle through which governors influence the development and imple-
mentation of national policy." The National Association of Attorneys General, founded in
1907, sponsors national legal education seminars, including on United States Supreme Court
practice. The National League of Cities, founded in 1924, is a federation that pursued a
"national municipal policy" and "represents municipalities before Congress and federal agen-
cies." The United States Conference of Mayors, founded in 1932, is constituted of mayors
of cities with populations of more than 30,000, to promote "cooperation between cities and
the federal government" 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS, pt 1, at 672-73, 693-94
(1995).
324. Kramer, Understanding Federalism, supra note 199, at 1552-53. Political scientists
describe the "Big Seven," constituted by the National Governors Conference, the Council of
State Governments, the National Legislative Conference, National Association of County
Officials, National League of Cities, U.S. Conference of Mayors, and the International Cit)'
Management Association. See Wright, Revenue Sharing, supra note 6, at 111; see also
GRODZINS, supra note 2 (discussing the cross currents in influence that run national, state,
and local).
325. Wright, Revenue Sharing, supra note 6, at 109-10 (relying on former North Caro-
lina Governor Terry Sanford's metaphor and elaborating on the competition by professionals
for funds, jurisdiction, and political support, and analyzing the discrete interests and points
of view based on those actors' positions).
326. GRODZINS, supra note 2.
327. ELAZER, supra note 7, at 37, 200.
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While political scientists have appreciated the webs of social struc-
turing that cut across state and federal lines, the legal tradition (in part
because of a focus on state and federal jurisdiction) has tended to see
but the two alternatives and/or their concurrency.328 I think that mem-
bers of both state and federal judiciaries could be teaching us all what
they in fact know from fIrst hand experience: that an interstate prob-
lem is not nec(~ssarily a problem for the federal courts to consider
alone nor one to be remitted to a single state's judiciary. Instead of the
ad hoc, erratic integration exemplifIed by some of the asbestos cases,
the breast implant litigation, and Exxon Valdez, federal and state
judges could jointly request either that the states launch a compact
effort or that Congress create a new set of national COurtS,329 to have
jurisdiction over those cases involving litigants from several states and
arising under state law, and over ordinary diversity cases as well.330
This new set of courts could relieve burdens on the federal
courts,331 enabling those courts to maintain a focus on federal
328. Responding to the "shibboleths 'State-Rights' and 'National Supremacy,'" in 1925,
Frankfurter and Landis advocated recognition of regional needs: "Our regions are realities.
Political thinking must respond to these realities." Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact
Clause, supra note 317, at 729.
329. Precedent for such requests can be found in the federal judiciaty's proposal for
congressional assistanl:e to deal with what used to be termed "protracted" litigation out of
which grew the Multidistrict Litigation statute. See Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation."
supra note 3, at 29-35.
330. To the extent that abolition of federal diversity litigation is opposed because of the
view that state courts will either be biased or are overwhelmed, the provision of national
courts would respond to those complaints. To the extent diversity jurisdiction is opposed
because of the view that federal judges learn from and should engage in common law con-
tract and tort cases and that the state and federal courts are both well served by a criss-
crossing of information, then the removal of "ordinaty" diversity cases would be a loss. See
Frank, For Maintaining Diversity Jurisdiction, supra note 39, at 11 (discussing "the educa-
tional value of having two systems in interaction"); Frank, The Case for Diversity Jurisdic-
tion, supra note 39, at 409 (similar discussion).
331. The potential for also using national courts to respond to the so-called "federaliza-
tion of crime" is not my focus here but if such courts were established, they could become
a possible venue for criminal as well as civil cases in which interstate transactions and the
need for national coordinated responses dominate. See Beale, supra note 13, at 1004-18
(proposing "disaggregation of federal criminal jurisdiction" so that federal crimes may be
prosecuted in state court but noting that certain federal crimes may continue to require a
specifically federal judicial response); Little, supra note 13, at 1085 (concluding that federal
courts should continue to exercise federal authority "when states are demonstrably unable or
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statutory and constitutional adjudication332 and could, if supported by
congressional funding, relieve burdens on state courts, enabling the
individual state systems to concentrate resources on problems perceived
to be particular to each state.333 These national courts could be
established in several regions across the country.334 Technology (such
as "filing by fax" and computer-based data accessing) can ease the
difficulties of distance. State judges (assisted by congressional fmancial
support for these new, national courts) could rotate in and out of these
courts. Of course there are a host of substantive and procedural details
to formulate, from the reach and meaning of the law of such courts
and their modes of proceedings335 to the relationship between national
courts and the existing COurtS,336 and particularly federal bankruptcy
unwilling to address criminal behavior that has reached some significant proportions.").
332. What my suggestion would not do, as contrasted with some proposals to reshape
federal jurisdiction, is to deprive life tenured judges of all cases involving small amounts of
money; federal jurisdiction over federal statutory claims would remain, thereby ensuring that
federal judges work not only on large-scale or constitutional issues but that their judgments
in array of cases are informed by knowledge gained from a general caseload.
333. The creation of such a national court would respond to the concerns of some
federal judges, whose workload would be reduced and the mix changed; as long as Congress
funds additional judges for states, state court burdens would also not increase and would
likely decrease. The current Congress, unfortunately, has not been attentive to the needs to
support the state judiciaries; it plans to phase out the State Justice Institute, which has pro-
vided grants for coordination among state, tribal, and federal judiciaries, funds experimental
programs, convenes conferences, and serves as a clearinghouse for information. See Malcolm
M. Lucas, Don't Pull the Rug Out from under the State Justice Institute, LEGAL TIMEs OF
WASH., Sept 25, 1995 at 21 (arguing that to "dismantle the only federally funded organiza-
tion dedicated to helping the state courts manage the overwhelming torrent of criminal
cases" is terrible).
334. See also Rose-Ackerman, supra note 298, at 1622 (discussing the failures of envi-
ronmental policies that operate too much at either the national or local level and the need
for "recognizing the complex regional and interjurisdictional character of air and water pollu-
tion").
335. If these courts are analogized to state compact law, then they might be understood
as generating a "third and distinct species" of law (David E. Engdahl, Construction of Inter-
state Compacts: A Questionable Federal Question, 51 VA. L. REv. 987, 1039 (1965)) -
rather than being forced into the "mold" of being characterized as either state or federal.
See L. Mark Eichorn, Cuyler v. Adams and the Characterization of Compact Law, 77 VA.
L. REv. 1387, 1411 (1991).
336. When appropriate, Indian tribal courts should also be consulted and mechanisms
for cooperation and coordination among the three court systems developed. See NCCJ Adopts
Two Strong Resolutions on Federalism, 7 STAlE-FEDERAL JUDICIAL OBSERVER 1 (Oct 1994)
(National Conference of Chief Justices adopt resolution supporting cooperation and
HeinOnline -- 98 W. Va. L. Rev. 262 1995-1996
262 WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:171
courts that cUITiently function as a fulcrum between state and federal
systems.337
National courts would also be responsive to the objections made to
taking diversity jurisdiction out of the federal courts - that (in the
words of one lawyer who testified before the Long Range Planning
Committee) "the problem of local prejudice, particularly in states with
electoral judgeship systems, is far more serious than" is currently
recognized.338 National courts need not be populated by local judges
but could be staffed by state judges assigned on rotating bases, and
perhaps by fe:deral judges. Further, instead of rejecting the
"nationalizing role of diversity jurisdiction,"339 such courts could ex-
pand that trend, which stems from the interstate nature of the disputes
and is an unsurprising artifact of ready interchange among people in
distant locales.34o Moreover, if national courts had many high
coordination among slate, federal and Tribal courts); TRIBAL COURTS-STAlE COURT FORUMS:
A How TO Do IT GUIDE TO PREVENT AND REsOLVE JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES BETWEEN
TRIBAL AND STAlE COURTS (NCSC 1993).
337. Depending on how the courts were created and constructed, one would anticipate
legal challenges. For example, if such courts were congressionally created and staffed by
state judges, would such a mandate constitute "commandeering" state powers? See Evan H.
Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinancy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to
Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1001 (1995). Would such congressional action
be an example of "protective jurisdiction" and the creation of causes of action without
vesting jurisdiction? See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 460, 469-84
(1957) (Frankfurter, 1., dissenting) (assuming that federal common law cannot govern and
addressing the issue of whether Congress can confer jurisdiction while not creating the sub-
stantive law); Carole E. Goldberg-Ambrose, The Protective Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts, 30 UCLA L. REv. 542 (1983); Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1991) (the Adop-
tion Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, requiring federal reimbursement to states for
certain services, does not create an implied cause of action); Thompson v. Thompson, 484
U.S. 174 (1988) (the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act does not create an implied cause
of action).
338. Ayer Statement, supra note 48, at 4; Comments of the Bar Association of the
District of Columbia Litigation Committee before the Long Range Planning Committee at 2-
4 (diversity jurisdiction limits the incentives of special interest groups to attempt to influence
state judicial elections) (on file with the author); see also Frank, For Maintaining Diversity
Jurisdiction, supra notl~ 39, at 12.
339. This is Judgc~ Sloviter's phrase. Sloviter, Diversity Jurisdiction Through the Lens of
Federalism, supra note 39, at 99.
340. Judges could go to Congress with a variety of proposals, many less ambitious than
that detailed above, to enhance judicial federalism. For example, judges could request
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visibility cases, which while burdensome are also interesting, such a
bench could achieve prestige and stature, thus enlarging the country's
occasions upon which to provide elite judiciaries.341
B. Dialectical or Dissolving Federalism: On the Gains and Losses
Let me turn from an illustrative specific proposal to a more
general point about federalism. Edward Rubin and Malcolm Feeley
have recently argued that the country has evolved from a federation of
semi-sovereigns into a national government that relies on the states as
centers of de-centralization; in their view, federalism per se has little to
commend it.342 In contrast, Larry Kramer believes that the states are
alive and well) with laws affecting the lives of most citizens more than
does federal law.343 Two decades ago, Robert Cover and Alexander
Alienkoff spoke of the values of a dialectical federalism) of the dia-
logue between state and federal systems) of normative utility of main-
taining distinctive systems.344
amendment of the Anti-Injunction Act to codify changing understandings of judicial
federalism or the enactment of a separate statute to authorize joint federal-state judicial ac-
tivities. See. e.g., Diane P. Wood, Fine-Tuning Judicial Federalism: A Proposal for Reform
of the Anti-Injunction Act, 1990 RY.U. L. REv. 289. Further, judges need not await con-
gressional action to make plain the changing needs of the judiciary and to craft a future
plan to encompass greater cooperation and coordination between state and federal systems.
341. To the extent that state-based agreements evidence significant power, they may
bump into Compact Clause doctrine which is leery of state "encroachments" on federal
power and into federal judges who are protective of their own jurisdiction over "complex"
and desirable cases. See United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452,
472-79 (1978); Garth, supra note 305.
342. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 245, at 908-09.
343. Kramer, Understanding Federalism, supra note 199, at 1504 ("by comparison with
other developed nations, it's striking how much authority in this country is still exercised by
state law"). Kramer also believed that the principle mechanisms by which state governance
flourishes is the structure of political parties in the United States and the federal reliance on
decentralized administration, rather than on judicially-enforced state/federal distinctions. Id. at
1543-46 ("interdependence of legislation and administration" and critical dependence of
federal law on state administration); see also Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 199, at 1358-
59 (arguing that federalism has a problem "of credibility" if it does not seek to maintain a
"robust" role for state governance) (emphasis in original).
344. Cover & Alienkoff, supra note 252, at 1045-52; 1064-68 (overlapping jurisdiction
also useful to enact the tensions in governance and ambivalence about norms); see also
Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy, supra note 252. Compare Professor Meador's
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My hope is to move toward a position that embraces something
from each of these divergent sources, at times focused on the immense
power of the national project, and other times sharing an appreciation
for the vitality and durability of forms of governance that, without
guns or great resources, continue to have social and political force.345
Collaborative federalism is the story that some not schooled in law
stress, and that approach captures some of the emerging methods of
legal practice that cut across state and federal jurisdiction.
My suggestion of yet another set of courts, representing the
collectivity of the states, is prompted by interest in exploring opportu-
nities for multiple voices, exchange, and coordination, and by unease
with the centralization that accrues so much work and power to a
single locale.346 Deliberate "noncentralization"347 offers one response.
While we have a judicial system that I have described above as a
sprawling house, with courts, agencies, and private providers, we have
not supported these activities in as generative fashion as might be pos-
sible. Currently, agency courts lack a strong written tradition/48 and
private providers are desired in large measure because of their silent,
closed processes. The other court systems, state and federal, each feel
themselves so engulfed that they are at risk of losing their capacity for
deliberate speech. Would another court - charged with articulation -
reinvigorate a conversation about norms and constitute a force that
counters the power of the federal government and captures the power
of states? Just as states exist in part because of the habit of invoking
suggestion of a unifil:d court system, in Daniel J. Meador, Transformation of the American
Judiciary, 46 ALA. 1.. REv. 763, 776-82 (1995) (considering the advantages of a unified
state and federal court system and the trends that underlie movement in that direction).
345. Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns, supra note 3, at 747-58; Resnik, Rereading "The
Federal Courts", supra note 3, at 1049-51; see also AVIAM SOIFER, LAW AND TIlE
COMPANY WE KEEP (1995).
346. The specific example here in the context of mass torts is the resolution of hun-
dreds of thousands or millions of claims by a single judge working with a small set of
attorneys and appointed experts. See SCHUCK, supra note 100 (Agent Orange); SOBOL, supra
note 89 (Dalkon Shield).
347. A term borrowed from BLAZER, supra note 7, at 171.
348. See also POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 23, at 162 (noting the ab-
sence of opinion writing by the appellate structure within the Social Security Administration
and urging Congress to create a "specialized appellate review" court within the agency).
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them as relevant sources of governance,349 so might we build on
practices of co-venturing across states to enable additional effective
means of providing adjudicatory resources. Is it worth trying to shape
another national institution, one charged with providing adjudicatory
services? Here are the imponderables of prediction, coupled with aspi-
rations for more justice, not less.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The life tenured federal judiciary currently occupies a relatively
luxurious space. These judges have both resources and a culture of
excellence that they understandably seek to preserve. I write in the
hopes that those who consider the shape of "the federal courts" will
think not only of its own preservation but of the preservation of judi-
cial resources - by necessary expansion. The conversation about ex-
pansion needs, I think, to move beyond the question of what size the
life tenured judiciary should be (whatever the size, it will remain
minute in a country of more than 250 million people), to consider how
judges who lack life tenure can partake of and generate a comparable
culture of excellence, a bravado that enables them to sit in judgment of
those who empower them, and energy and resources sufficient for the
careful consideration of an unending line of complaints.35o
Judicial interdependence exists between Article III and non-Article
III judge, as it does between state and federal judge. All of these
judges are under siege; all live precariously in a world impatient with
individualized judgment and eager for a sense of enhanced security.
The shared project is to increase social appreciation and support for the
enterprise of judging, and to help all who hold the power to judge to
349. Briffault, supra note 200, at 1346-47 (discussing how a "complex of values ...
gives the states a certain importance in the popular consciousness that reinforce their politi-
cal position").
350. As Ellen Peters, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Connecticut explained:
"Unless courts themselves self-consciously take on the role of principal players in the
nation's management of its adjudicatory resources, others will take over the planning for us.
That is a default position that neither the courts of this country, nor the people whom we
serve, can afford." Ellen A. Peters, State-Federal Judicial Relationships: A Report from the
Trenches, 78 VA. L. REv. 1887, 1893 (1992).
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exercise it thoughtfully and wisely. The true nightmare "scenarios"35I
are when litigants in search of justice find insufficient numbers of any
judges able to respond and when we live in a society indifferent to
hearing either litigants or judges.
351. 1995 PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 4, at 18-19.
